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ABSTRACT 
Effective corporate governance of boards can become a sustainable competitive 
advantage for organisations.  In the extant literature a number of reasons are cited for 
dysfunctional boards.  Some of the reasons attributed to board failure relate to poor 
corporate governance, practice and oversight.  Some of the reasons for board failure 
pertain to micromanaging of the organisation, an ineffective nominating committee, size 
of the board, non-functioning committee structure, absence of strategic plan, no 
orientation\induction plan and no rotational plan. 
 
Poor governance practises across all sectors has negatively tainted economic 
investment in South Africa consequentially affecting economic growth.  Below South 
Africa’s competitive rating slipped from (52nd) in 2012-2013 to 53rd in 2013-2014 rating 
is given to show that marked improvement is needed in corporate governance.  South 
Africa’s rating in the Corruption Perceptions Index for 2012 was 43 and slipped to 
position 69 amongst 176 countries for the Corruption Perception Index, 2013.   The 
trend analysis report of the Public Service Commission  reported that In 2006/7, there 
were 1 042 cases of corruption, amounting to R130.6-million; in 2007/8, there were 868 
cases, amounting to R21.7-million; in 2008/9, there were 1 204 cases, amounting to 
R100.1-million; in 2009/10, there were 1 135 cases, amounting to R346.5-million; in 
2010/11, there were 1 035 cases, amounting to R932.3-million; in 2011/12, there were 
1 243 cases, amounting to R229.9-million. 
 
Good governance frameworks, policies, procedures, processes and practices attract 
foreign direct investments.  Better governance practices are critical for improved 
economic growth and development that will result in an improvement in the South 
Africa’s competitiveness and corruption perception index ratings.  South Africa’s 
continued economic growth and development is dependent on attracting foreign direct 
investment.  From 1994 corporate governance regimes were promulgated.  Although 
there are a collection of corporate governance codes and guidelines that have been 
published, few specifically cover governance practices in public entities.  Moreover, with 
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better governance practices state-owned enterprises can significantly contribute to the 
economic transformation and development in South Africa. 
 
The purpose of the study is to establish that improved governance is a function of board 
structure and board process variables.  With the presence of structural and process 
variables board activism will improve resulting in board decision quality.  Independent 
directors without no conflict of interest, the requisite industry expertise and intelligence 
(functional area knowledge), the information to make decisions are adequate, accurate 
and timely (information quality), directors exert the needed effort (effort norms), 
directors robustly explore all dimensions and options (cognitive conflict) and the board 
functions optimally (cohesiveness) influence board decision quality.  Boards which are 
configured optimally are able to execute their fiduciary responsibility optimally. 
 
In 2012 a budget of R845.5 billion was provisioned for infrastructural development to 
boost economic development.  This budget allocation must be prudently and frugally 
managed in accordance with good governance practises to achieve economic 
development.  In particular South Africa has to improve its competitiveness rating and 
corruption perception index to attract investments and continual growth. 
 
In terms of the research design, to address the research questions, a mixed research 
approach was selected for the study. The phenomenological (qualitative) and positivist 
(quantitative) philosophical paradigms were adopted with the purpose to obtain a 
greater understanding of board decision quality in the Public Entities in South Africa.  
The data collection instruments used in the study was in-depth interviews, focus group 
interviews and administration of a survey.  The population for the qualitative research 
was 19 in-depth interviews and two focus group interviews.  For the quantitative study a 
population of 215 public entity board members were selected for the study.   A total of 
104 board members of Public Entities completed the survey for the study.  In relation to 
data analysis for the qualitative study Tesch’s coding, thematic analysis was used to 
analyse the in-depth and focus group interviews.  For the quantitative study, SPSS was 
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used to analyse responses from the surveys. The hypothesis was tested using 
inferential statistics, namely, factor analysis and multiple regression was used..    
 
The findings generated from the first phase, the qualitative study that provided support 
for the positive relationship between board structure, board process variables and board 
decision quality.   
 
The following five variables are incorporated in a model that seeks to identify the 
strongest predictor of board decision quality: (1) board independence, (2) effort norms, 
(3) functional area knowledge and skill, (4) cognitive conflict and (5) information quality. 
The findings show that information quality is the strongest predictor of board decision 
quality followed by expert knowledge and skill. As expected, expert knowledge does not 
only increase the cognitive capacity of the board, but it also positively affects company 
competitiveness. The findings also show that cognitive conflict has a negative 
association with decision quality. The study argues that political influence exerted by 
board political appointees may explain the negative relationship between cognitive 
conflict and board decision quality. The major contribution of this study is that it provides 
a 28-item instrument that can be used practically by public entity boards in the reflective 
process to improve board decision quality. The study concludes by offering avenues for 
further research. 
 
The model suggests that board decision quality is a product of board structure (board 
independence), board process (functional area knowledge, information quality, and 
cognitive conflict and effort norms).   
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With the introduction of King III the boardroom, once an inner sanctum for secret ritual of top-level policymaking, is slowly opening its doors 
and letting in a bit of sunshine. As the shareholders or investors begin to peek into the corporate “kiva,” (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2011) 
 
"Good corporate governance, it's about being proper and prosper.”  
― Toba Beta, Master of Stupidity 
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 
1. OVERVIEW AND RATIONALE  
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will describe the context in which public entities operate and outline the 
need for the study.  The chapter will also explain the relationship between the research 
problem, objectives and scope of the study.  
 
Board decision quality is a topic within the broader field of corporate governance 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999). As a field of study corporate governance has evolved from 
a preventative focus, monitoring mechanism, to the study of board process variables as 
a means to improve the performance of organisations (Scarborough, Haynie and 
Shook, 2010).  Corporate governance thinking was dominated by agency theory 
thinking for decades and this is highlighted by the work of Berle and Means (1932), 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Shleifer and Vishney (1997), Fama and Jensen (1983), 
Perry and Shivdasani (2005), Shleifer and Vishny (2003), and Finegold, Benson and 
Hecht (2007).  Agency theory propagated the thinking of improving governance through 
separating ownership and control, a structural perspective.  Agency theory thinking was 
further refined through studies on board independence, in monitoring of the CEO, the 
number of independent directors, board size and CEO duality.  Despite the extant of 
empirical investigations none of these studies yielded strong research results that 
impact the performance of the organisation or rigorously improved corporate 
governance practices.    
 
As indicated above the main thrust of agency theory was to improve separation and 
control to make agents more accountable and align behaviour with company objectives.    
Agency theory thinking was further developed by Gill, Vijay and Jha (2009) and Shleifer 
and Vishney (1997) as a means of introducing internal or external corporate governance 
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mechanism to reduce managerial opportunism.  The internal mechanisms developed to 
improve governance were the board of directors, ownership structure (managerial 
ownership), ownership concentration and disclosure.   
 
Similarly Perry and Shivdasani (2005) advocated that the board of directors is one of 
the primary mechanisms for monitoring management in pursuit of attaining 
organisational objectives.  Several studies were dedicated to assess the degree to 
which the varying characteristics of board structure could control management and 
therefore enhance the performance of the firm. However, there was no consistent 
evidence regarding these relationships. Some studies found a positive relationship 
between board characteristics and firm performance, some report no relationship while, 
some other studies reported a negative relationship between the board characteristics 
and firm performance. Likewise, the research by Finegold, Benson and Hecht (2007) 
highlighted the inconclusiveness of the relationship in their review on corporate boards 
and company performance. 
 
Other governance theories emerged that demonstrated that monitoring is not the only 
role that boards play. Boards can also enhance company performance by providing 
strategic advice, securing external resources, developing managerial capabilities, and 
helping to manage the firm during a crisis (Johnson, Daily, and Ellstrand, 1996; Daily, 
Dalton, and Cannella, 2003).   
 
Still other functions of the board debated in the extant literature.  Boards can create 
access to valuable resources, act as a strategic advisor and navigate the organisation 
through recessionary climates.  Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) Hillman, Canella, and 
Paetzold (2000) and Erakovic and Goel (2008) highlighted that having critical resources 
needed by the firm can reduce uncertainty and transaction costs.  Consequentially 
privileged information and access to scarce and critical resource, can give an 
organization a cost advantage over its rivals. 
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In addition, apart from the critical resources mentioned above, the board members can 
provide other resources like important information or knowledge and legitimacy to the 
organization (Pfeffer, 1972; Boeker and Goodstein 1991; Judge and Zeithmal, 1992; 
Huse, 2005; Erakovtic and Goel, 2008). 
 
Still other governance theory focused on the effective board-management relationship.  
Resource-based view (RBV), a governance theory that emphasise that effective board-
management relationship can be a rare and valuable resource that can create a 
sustainable competitive advantage (Erakovik and Goel, 2008).  A number of scholars 
(Barney, 1991; Carney: 2005; Castanias and Helfat: 2001 and Gadhoum, 1998) argued 
that a resource that provides a sustainable competitive advantage satisfies certain 
measures.  Some of the criteria alluded to by Barney (1991) is the capability to provide 
expert advice on strategic issues, director’s valuable links with the external environment 
and the reputation of directors.   The board-management relationship that develops and 
is sustained can be a source of competitive advantage for an organisation.  
 
Antagonists like Donaldson (1990a & 1990b) and Barney (1990) proposed an 
alternative to agency theory, stewardship theory.  This theory proposed that the CEO 
must be given complete power and authority in executing responsibilities and will 
consequentially result in good performance. This theory recommended that the CEO 
exercises complete authority over the corporation and that their role is unambiguous 
and unchallenged.  Stewardship theory proposed that the executive manager 
essentially aims to do a good job and that there are no inherent general problem of 
executive motivation.  The above scholars argued that the overarching philosophy is 
that good performance is attained readily where the CEO is also the chair of the board.  
 
Unlike previous governance theories that focused on the board and its structure and 
resources, stakeholder theory has a socialist focus.  Stakeholder theory caused 
increased pressure on board of directors to consider shareholders and the interest of 
stakeholders (Esser and Dekker, 2008).  Board of directors are required to consider the 
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interest of employees, creditors, consumers, suppliers, the community and the 
environment when making strategic decisions.  
 
Some empirical studies began to focus on board process variables and its relationship 
to increased board and company performance.  Later research focused on process 
variables and its relationship to increased board and company performance. Studies 
looked at the impact that process variables had on performance of organisations.  Some 
scholars (Korac-Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Kouzmin, 2001; Zahra and Pearce, 1989) 
agreed that board process refers to decision-making activities, styles of board, the 
frequency and the length of board proceedings and board culture.  Studies on process 
variables explained how boards could perform even better and positively impact the 
performance of the organisation.  The study of process variables had received little 
research attention as an alternative paradigm of thinking to agency theory.  Several 
studies had begun to look at process variables and the improvement of organisational 
performance (Daily et al, Scarborough, Haynie and Shook, 2010; Zona and Zattoni, 
2007; Wan and Ong, 2005; and others).   
 
This study investigates board process variables and its relationship to board decision 
quality in Schedule 1, 2 and 3 Public Entities in South Africa.  The study critically 
reviews board process variables including board independence, functional area 
knowledge, information quality, cognitive conflict, effort norms, and its relationship to 
board decision quality.  Empirical studies have shown an inconclusive and conflicting 
relationship between these variables (Scarborough, Haynie and Shook, 2010).  This 
study, proposes that board process is the gap in knowledge in the relationship between 
board structure, board activism, with the outcome being board decision quality and 
board performance. 
1.2 Background to the study (problem in context)  
In several Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, 
including South Africa, Public Entities particularly (State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) still 
represent a substantial part of (gross domestic product (GDP), employment and market 
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capitalisation (OECD, 2010). Moreover, Public Entities are often prevalent in utilities and 
infrastructure industries, such as energy, transport and telecommunication, whose 
performance is of great importance to broad segments of the population and to other 
parts of the business sector (OECD, 2010). Consequentially, the governance of Public 
Entities is critical in ensuring their positive contribution to a country’s overall economic 
efficiency and competitiveness.   
 
From the above analysis it can be seen that the Public Sector contributes significantly to 
economic growth and development. Gordhan (2012) reflected on the weaknesses in the 
state’s infrastructure capacity. In the past, spending had lagged behind plans. The 
spending according to budget for 2010/11 was R178 billion from the R260 billion 
budget, a 68% under-spending rate.  
 
In accordance with the Gordhan (2012) the total spending by Public Entities reached 
R1.1 trillion by 2013, representing some 32 per cent of GDP. Fuzile (2012) in the 
Budget Review Report listed 43 major infrastructure projects, adding up to R3.2 trillion 
in expenditure. Over the MTEF period ahead, approved and budgeted infrastructure 
plans amount to R845 billion, of which just under R300 billion was in the energy sector 
and R262 billion was allocated to transport and logistics projects.  Improved governance 
is required to ensure that there is quality of planning, costing and project management, 
so that infrastructure is delivered on time, and on budget. 
 
The magnitude of poor governance cuts across all sectors and had also been prevalent 
in the Private Sector.  Literature has shown that the biggest challenge that South 
African boards are facing is poor decision making (Motala, 2011). The repercussions of 
poor decision making are evident in both private and public entities and had 
catastrophic implications in some instances. For example, in the private sector, 
examples of poor governance practices are Pamodzi Mines, Wendy Machanik 
Properties and Fidentia.  These companies had to liquidate as a result of poor decision 
making.  For Pamdozi, the Joint provisional liquidator claimed R690-million from Aurora 
Empowerment Systems.   Pamdozi Gold Orkney was found to be indebted to trade 
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creditors for R110 million. The secured creditor, Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC’s) indebtedness was R200m plus interest.  The outstanding salaries and wages at 
the date of liquidation was R5m and R8m was owed for leave pay and other benefits. 
The total indebtedness in Pamdozi Gold Orkney as at date of provisional liquidation was 
R350m with interest (Motala, 2011).   Besides the poor governance practises the board 
committed a further transgression was perpetrated by destroying company records and 
removing company assets.  Despite being under curatorship and warned about further 
transgressions Pamodzi Mines removed assets to the value of R690 million from both 
Mines.  Further Pamodzi’s management was accused of damages to the Grootveli and 
Orkney Mines of R1.7 billion (Summers and Comrie, 2012)    
 
A more recent example of poor corporate governance practice was the poor decision 
making and lack of financial oversight of Wendy Mechanik Properties.   A successful 
court application was granted by the Estate Agency Affairs Board to place Wendy 
Mechanik Properties trust accounts under curatorship.  This was as a result of financial 
irregularities in the management of the accounts involving at least R27 million.  A 
forensic investigation revealed that the owner, Wendy Mechnaik channelled funds from 
a trust account to her company account to keep the business, a close corporation, 
afloat.  According to Mabuza (2012) Wendy Mechanik, CEO pleaded guilty to 90 counts 
of theft totaling R27m, and two for failing to keep accounting records of her trust 
account.   
 
Similarly, there are practices of poor governance in the Public Sector.  It has been 
widely reported that the majority of South Africa’s Public Entities, particularly, State-
owned enterprises are loss making, have extremely weak balance sheet, low credit 
rating, inadequate capacity, weak corporate governance notwithstanding the regulatory 
framework of the Public Finance and Management Act 1 of 1999, the New Companies 
Act of 2008 and King 111 of 2010 (Tolsi, 2012 and Vecchiatto, 2014).   
 
A number of governance transgressions in Public Entities were reported between 2009 
and 2012.  For example, the investigation by KPMG on South African Airways (SAA) 
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found that Mr Khaya Ngqula, former CEO of SAA, had exceeded his authority in several 
matters.  Poor governance practices relating to paying retention bonuses and sports 
sponsorships without authorisation of the board.  Under Khaya Ngqula SAA paid out 
bonuses of R60,7-million yet only approved R33,3-million was approved.   In addition 
SAA resources were used by the CEO to take friends to three sporting events and hired 
suites at stadiums for social activities. Ngqula spent R141-million on sports 
sponsorships when only R3-million was budgeted for. These included a R120-million 
sponsorship of the Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) and a R21-million 
sponsorship with Argentinian golfer Angel Cabrera.  Ngqula was also accused of 
spending R3, 3-million without authorisation on leasing hospitality suites in four different 
sport stadiums in the country. Another allegation involved spending R500 000 on 
junkets for friends to international sporting events such as the 2006 Soccer World Cup 
in Germany, the 2007 Rugby World Cup in France and a 2008 ATP tennis tournament 
in Monte Carlo.  The forensic investigation has raised questions about a jet fuel tender 
that was awarded to a company in which Ngqula allegedly has an indirect interest. 
Further tenders issued for call centres were not compliant with good supply chain 
management principles.  Mr Khaya was held liable for repaying at least R30.8 million 
(Basson and Gedye, 2010).   
 
More recently (Politicsweb, 2012) eight members of the SAA Board (including the 
chairperson) resigned followed by the resignation of the CEO.  This was followed by yet 
another bailout of SAA.  In November 2012 another incident of poor corporate 
governance arose at South African Airways.  Litigation was brought against the Sizakele 
Mzimela for misspending.  At the time of writing this dissertation the case was not 
finalised and hence the nature and amounts of the misspending was not determined 
(Department of Public Enterprises, 2013).  The R5-billion bailout provided a guarantee 
for a period of two years starting from September, 1 2012. The guarantee would enable 
SAA to borrow from the financial markets, thus ensuring that the airline continued to 
operate as a going concern (Mail and Guardian, 2012). 
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Another example, of poor governance practice was Eskom.  Eskom was put under 
scrutiny by National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) to establish if the tariff 
increase of 16% over the next five years was justified and whether the power utility was 
operating prudently (Pressly, 2013).  In interviews with an investigative TV 
documentary, Carte Blanche, several unidentified employees of Eskom shared 
examples of wasteful expenditure.  The examples quoted critical spares for repairs 
taking up to nine months to get delivered on site. Another example is that the 
development of the Kusile and Medupi projects was behind schedule resulting in 
penalties paid to the contractors.  Furthermore the acquisition price of the power station 
increased between 3 to 5 times more than the original price as a result of scope 
changes. Another example of poor governance was that an entire project fee was used 
up in penalties before the project even started.  Costs also spiralled beyond budget as a 
result of procuring stock in parts\pieces accruing costs in excess of 50% or more on 
tariffs instead of as a whole with a reduced amount of tariffs.  The above poor practices 
of governance of Eskom in part contributed to South Africa’s poor competitiveness 
rating of 53rd out of 148 countries  (Schwab, 2014) in the Global Competitiveness 
Report, (2013 – 2014).  South Africa’s rating and economic and growth was adversely 
affected by rolling black outs.  With hiking electricity rates South Africa’s power supply 
rates is most expensive in the BRIC countries (De Wet, 2012).  The high cost of 
electricity negatively affects economic growth and development.  
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Public entities, and in particular, State-owned enterprises in South Africa are generally 
well positioned to contribute to transformation and economic development.  This 
contribution by public entities is contingent on good governance policies, procedures, 
processes and practices to attract foreign direct investment.  Besides being preoccupied 
with aligning governance to best practice, Public Entities have an added challenge of 
managing many complex relationships.  Khosa and Adams (2005) contended that the 
governance challenge confronting state-owned enterprises had to do with creating a 
balance between government’s inclination to control public enterprises and the business 
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imperative to achieve excellent performance.  Government’s focus on control rather 
than performance often reinforced these weaknesses in state-owned enterprises.  They 
further argue that the success of state-owned enterprises depends on striking the 
appropriate balance between control and accountability on the one hand, and 
performance and entrepreneurship on the other.   
 
Securing sustained growth of the international investor base required improvement in 
governance standards.   To attract foreign direct investment required the improvement 
of South Africa’s Corruption Perception Index rating.  South Africa’s board effectiveness 
and performance directly impact economic growth and development.  Poor governance 
practices in South Africa have affected the competitiveness rating and the corruption 
perception index.  In the Global Competitiveness Report (Schwab, 2013) reported that 
South Africa rated 52nd overall out of a number of 144 economies.  The global 
competitiveness ranking is unpacked to determine the weaknesses that have 
contributed to this rating.   In order to further improve its competitiveness, the country 
will need to address some weaknesses. A number of areas are cited for improvement, 
in particular, labour related issues (148), primary education (135), unemployment levels, 
infrastructure (66), crime prevention, labour market efficiency (116), corruption and 
health.  The table below depicts the ratings in the Global Competitiveness Report (WEF, 
2013-2014).   
 
Table 1.1:  Key indicators (WEF, Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 
 
MEASURE  RATING  
Basic requirements (40.0%) 95 
Institutions 41 
Infrastructure 66 
Macroeconomic environment 95 
Health and primary education 135 
Efficiency enhancers (50.0%) 34 
Higher education and training 89 
Goods market efficiency 28 
Labor market efficiency 116 
Financial market development 3 
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Technological readiness 62 
Market size  25 
Innovation and sophistication factors (10.0%) 37 
Business sophistication 35 
Innovation 39 
 
Problematic factors that affects doing business in South Africa 
Inadequately educated workforce 19.7 
Restrictive labour regulations 19.4 
Inefficient government bureaucracy 19.3 
Corruption 9.7 
Poor work ethic in national labour force 7.7 
Inadequate supply of infrastructure 7.0 
Crime and theft 6.7 
Policy instability 5.7 
Access to financing 1.4 
Insufficient capacity to innovate 1.4 
Foreign currency regulations 0.6 
Tax rates 0.4 
Tax regulations 0.4 
Poor public health 0.3 
Government instability/coups 0.1 
Inflation 0.1 
Table1.1:  Source: Global Competitiveness Rating (World Economic Forum, 2013-2014) 
 
Examples of poor governance in Public Entities above and in chapter 3 show the 
magnitude of the problem of poor governance in Public Entities.   Poor governance 
impacts performance of institutions causing low economic growth and development 
(Carte Blanche, 2012).  As stated above continued economic development of South 
Africa hinges on the improvement of the corruption perception index and competitive 
rating.  Economic infrastructure development worth billions has to be flawlessly 
managed in Public Entities to stimulate and instigate economic growth and 
development.  Over the next three years, 2013-2015 infrastructural development has to 
be managed using good governance practices.  
 
The State of South Africa’s Economic Infrastructure: opportunities and challenges 
(2012) report acknowledged the need to manage the medium-term expenditure 
framework (MTEF) for the period 2012/13—2014/15, seventeen (17) strategic 
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integrated projects (SIP) with a total budget of R845 billion. This covered economic 
infrastructure of rail, ports, roads, electricity, water and telecommunications. In 2011 a 
Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Commission (PICC) was formed to make 
decisions and coordinate the implementation of these projects.  Two committees were 
already formed, namely, The Presidential Review Committee (PRC) on SOEs that 
aimed to align SOEs with the government’s development agenda, including that of 
infrastructure development.  In addition, the Presidential Infrastructure Coordination 
Commission headed by the President, sought to coordinate and oversee the 
implementation of strategic infrastructure projects that stimulated social and economic 
growth.  If these infrastructural projects are managed in accordance with good 
standards of governance then economic growth and development would be instigated.  
 
According to the Auditor General Report (2013) of the 536 entities audited for the 
financial year 2011-2012, only 22%, or 117, received clean audit opinions.  Another 
pattern highlighted in the report was the stagnation and regression in audit opinions and 
a lack of leadership to improve governance.  Further the report claimed that public 
entities are still plagued by continuing problems in supply-chain management, human 
resources, information technology systems and accuracy of reporting.  Poor governance 
practices were identified in which contracts worth R438m at 47 entities were awarded to 
suppliers in which employees of the entity had an interest.  Also contracts worth 
R141million at 42 entities were awarded to suppliers in which close family members had 
an interest, up from R136 million in 2011-12. 
 
Continual improvement of corporate governance in Public Entities, particularly Stat-
owned enterprises was and will be an increased focus for South Africa.  The Public 
Finance Management Act 1 (1999), King III (2010), the New Companies Act and OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) are the regulatory frameworks that are used 
to improve corporate governance in SOEs.   
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The obsession with improving governance required that a determination of the best 
governance approaches be adopted to effectively manage governance and improve 
performance.  A discussion below reviewed the evolution of governance practice and 
theory, covering the strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches to 
governance.  The approaches of governance span a continuum with agency theory on 
the one side and board process variables on the other side.  
 
Traditionally, board research focussed on the link between board structure and 
performance.  Empirical studies by (Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Wan and Ong, 2005; Daily, 
Dalton and Cannella, 2003; Bhagat and Black, 1999; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; 
Vance, 1995; Cochran, Wood and Jones, 1985; Zahra and Pearce, 1989) had shown 
that the relationship between board structure and board performance was equivocal.  
An evaluation of the work of previous scholars on board structure and board 
performance was briefly discussed.  Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) and Zahra and 
Pearce (1989) argued that there was no agreement as to which structure led to what 
level of performance.  Furthermore, these scholars contended that the relationship 
between board structure and company performance was best described as vexed, 
abstruse, contradictory, mixed and inconsistent.  Further Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand 
(1996) also claimed that the link between board structure and financial performance 
might not exist at all notwithstanding a number of variables like the type of performance 
measures, size of firm or the nature of board composition.   Or alternatively they 
scholars argued that if there was a relationship, the degree may not be of practical 
significance. Likewise, Kesner and Johnson (1990) claimed that boards do not directly 
affect firm performance because they do not participate in the daily decision making. 
As noted above there had been various models that was used to improve corporate 
governance with mixed and varied results.  The performance of companies had been 
judged and monitored from the perspective of a number of variables – separating the 
principal and agent roles (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983).  A few 
studies identified a positive relationship between the percentage of outside directors 
and firm performance (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Daily and Dalton, 1993; Ameer, Ramli 
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and Zakaria, 2010), while other studies found no significant relationship between board 
composition and company performance (Daily and Johnson, 1997; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991); the size of the board and the demographics of the board, (Dey and 
Chauhan:  2009) board structure (Finegold, Benson and Hecht:  2007) and CEO duality 
(Rhoades, Rechner, and Sundaramurthy:  2000).  A review of previous studies by Ong 
(2001) showed an inconclusive correlation between inside-outside directors and 
company performance.  In two separate studies (Vance, 1995; Cochran, Wood and 
Jones, 1985) found that inside representation in manufacturing and industrial firms was 
positively associated with financial performance.  Conversely, Schmidt (1975) and 
Kesner (1987) found no relationship between inside-duality and firm performance.  In a 
review of the proportion of outside directors, (Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma, 1985; 
Zahra and Stanton, 1988) found no relationship to the financial performance of the 
organisation.  On the contrary, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) found a negative 
relationship between the number of outside directors and financial performance.  
 
Similarly, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) conclusively argued that board composition 
and structural elements improbably had a significant effect on firm performance.  
Finkelstein et al (1996) advanced the argument firm performance was influenced by too 
many intervening processes to expect a strong direct association between board 
structure and firm performance.  Consequentially, the impact of board structure on firm 
performance may be multifaceted.   Heracleous (1999, 2001) in assessment of the 
extant literature found that the diverse outcomes are in part attributed to methodological 
and theoretical issues.    In particular there was a lack of focus on group subtleties, the 
recognition that complexities of board are mediated by the size of the board, board 
characteristics are varied and its relationship to firm performance.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
This gap in knowledge suggested further consideration of the mediating\intervening 
process variables that affected board performance levels.   (Scarborough, Haynie and 
Shook, 2010; Wan and Ong, 2005; Ong and Wan, 2001; Sonnenfeld, 2002; Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999) that board structure and the intervening variables (board process) are 
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considered as an integrative conceptual model that resulted in board performance.  This 
study proposed an investigation of board process variables as moderating variables that 
impact board outcomes and lead to better board decision quality and the consequence 
will be improved board performance.   
 
In recognition of the intervening variable, board process, scholars Phan (1998) and 
Buchanan and Huczynski (1997) argued that board performance will emerge as a result 
of the recognition and tailoring of processes that is sustenance for the structure.  
Buchanan et al. (1997) based on the understanding of teams noted that the 
performance of a team\group was a consequence of structure and process.  For optimal 
performance, board process dimensions, like status, power, role status, communication 
structures and decision-making must be analysed.  Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003), 
and Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson (1998) too agreed that there was a substantial 
body of empirical studies on the relationship of board composition and performance 
however, less consideration and empirical investigation attributed to the study of 
process variables. In earlier research Daily et al. (2003) advocated for complementary 
research efforts utilising process variables.   
 
In the extant literature the study of board process variables had evolved from being 
fragmented to the development of board process models (Scarborough, Haynie and 
Shook, 2010; Maharaj, 2009; Zona ad Zattoni, 207; Wan and Ong, 2005; Ong and Wan, 
2001).  In addition, the above studies covered varied variables of board process, 
namely, effort norms, functional skills and knowledge, cognitive conflict, information 
quality, board activism and board decision quality.   
  
Previous studies on board process variables was analysed to assess the relevance for 
the inclusion in the study of board decision quality.  A study by Scarborough, Haynie 
and Shook (2010) found that board activism and effort norms improved decision making 
hence resulting in good performance of the organisation. Board activism is a measure of 
the range of a board’s duties and the degree to which a board actively participates in 
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the matters of the organisation.  These activities relate to attending board meetings, 
performance evaluation of the CEO; reviewing board reports, participating in the 
development and monitoring strategic direction, directing audit activities, ensuring 
compliance to legal and governance regimes, an assessment of financial and 
operational performance, approval of budgets that relate to capital and operating 
expenditure and approving organisational strategies like downsizing and mergers and 
acquisitions (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Salmon, 1993; Zahra and Pearce, 1987; 
Copeland and Towl, 1947; Conger, Finegold and Lawler, 1998; Blair, 1950; Baker, 
1945).  Furthermore, in the extant literature, effort norms had a positive relationship to 
organisation performance.  Effort norms as defined by (Wageman, 1995; Kanfer, 1992) 
referred to the intensity of individuals' task-performance behaviour.  The antecedents 
discussed in the extant literature of effort norms was to carefully scrutinise board packs 
and related information, doing research and investigate issues significant to the 
company, take records of issues at meetings and actively participate in board meetings 
(Wageman, 1995).   Another definition of effort norms provided by Kanfer (1992) was 
the shared beliefs of a group of the performance of a task; amount of time; vigour of 
individual behaviour or total cognitive behaviour towards the target task. Norms referred 
to a set of expected behaviours by the group (Goodman, 1986); sufficient time for duties 
and the research of relevant information in preparation for board meetings to increase 
performance (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989).   
 
The board process variable, functional knowledge\skills positively impact organisation 
performance.  Previous studies were analysed in this regard.  Research done by 
(Scarborough et al., 2010 and Zona and Zatonni, 2007) found empirical support for the 
affirmative link between functional area knowledge and board activism which was 
consistent with the findings of previous research.  The study of Scarborough et al. 
(2010) highlighted the importance of quality decision making and its effect on board 
activism. The study however did not look into dimensions or factors that affect board 
decision quality. This gap in knowledge was pointed out by Scarborough et al. (2010). 
The authors even went as far as suggesting an investigation into the antecedents of 
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board decision quality, as an avenue for further research.  This study was guided by two 
research questions: (1) What processes do SOE boards follow in making good quality 
decisions? How are board processes linked to board decision quality? 
The analysis above of governance models based on structure to the studies that focus 
on board process magnifies the research gap, the antecedents of board decision 
quality.  Hence the study will explore the process variables that influence board decision 
quality.   
1.4 Research objectives  
1.4.1 To explore from the perspective of board members the variables that influence 
quality board decisions. 
1.4.2 To explain the strength and direction of the relationship between board process 
variables and board decision quality.   
1.4.3 To determine if director independence mediate the relationship board process 
variables and board decision quality  
1.4.4 To develop a model that explains the effect of board process variables on board 
decision quality  
 
1.5 Research Questions 
How and why should Public Entities achieve board decision quality to optimise 
performance and become sustainable? 
Sub-questions  
1.5.1 What are the factors that affect board decision quality? 
1.5.2 What is the strength and direction of the relationship between board process 
variables and board decision quality? 
1.5.3 Do board process variables mediate the relationship between director 
independence and board decision quality? 
1.5.4 What effect does the three variables have an effect on board decision quality? 
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1.6 The Hypothesis 
Table 1.2 provides a summary of the study hypotheses on board decision quality  
 Hypotheses 
H1 
 
There is a positive relationship between director independence and 
level of effort norms displayed by public entity boards. 
H2 There is a positive relationship between director independence and 
level of cognitive conflict displayed by public entity boards. 
H3 There is a positive relationship between director independence and 
usage of knowledge and skills by public entity boards. 
H4 There is a positive relationship between director independence and 
the level of information quality used to make board decisions. 
H5 There is a positive relationship between director independence and 
board quality decision 
H6 There is a relationship between board process variables and board 
quality decision 
Table 1.2:  Hypothesis of board decision quality  
1.7 Empirical investigation  
This study will investigate board process variables with a specific emphasis on board 
decision quality by reviewing the constructs, board independence, functional area 
knowledge, information quality, effort norms and cognitive conflict and its relationship to 
board decision quality.  
 
This study followed the sub sector approach, which means that only enterprises in one 
sector (public sector) will be selected and analysed. This approach prevents the 
methodological challenge of distinguishing between enterprise and sectoral issues. 
 
To respond to the research questions, a combined or mixed research approach was 
selected for the study. A phenomenological (qualitative) and positivist (quantitative) 
research approach was used to obtain a greater understanding of the research 
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questions.  This perspective and research approach was adopted because the literature 
on board process, board activism and board decision quality was not well developed in 
the extant literature. 
Below the empirical investigation was discussed per objective with reference to 
research methodology, research respondents, the measuring instruments, the 
procedures for collecting the data and the data analysis.  
For objective 1, to determine the factors of board decision quality, directors of boards 
were interviewed and focus group interviews were conducted.  The study had two 
phases, namely, the first phase was to explore the factors that contribute to board 
decision quality through a qualitative methodology in the use of focus group interviews 
and individual interviews.   The first phase of the research used an exploratory 
approach to unravel and deepen the understanding of the phenomenon board decision 
quality.  To gain a deeper understanding of the phenomena, board decision quality 
literature was reviewed, experts were interviewed and the administration of focus group 
interviews was conducted.  The study was reinforced through interviews with board 
members of state-owned enterprises and corporate governance experts that support 
public enterprises to add a meaningful, abundant layer to the understanding of the 
dimensions of board decision quality.    The measuring instrument was a structured 
interview which focussed on the processes, procedures and systems to measure board 
decision quality.  For the purpose of data analysis thematic analysis (content analysis) 
was done to determine the themes related to board decision quality.  Ethical 
procedures, protocols and standards were adhered to in conducting the research.  
Informed consent was obtained from research participants, anonymity and 
confidentiality was maintained.   
 
For objective 2 and 3 a positivist approach was used to develop the epistemological 
framework for conceptualising this study and the procedures carried out to build the 
board decision quality model.  For the quantitative approach a survey method was used 
to collect data in an attempt to precisely measure board decision quality and to 
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determine the relationship between board process variables and board decision quality. 
To guide and focus the study the positivist research design was used, research 
questions were identified, hypothesis, identification of sampling strategies, research 
strategies and methods of analysis were formulated.  Thus the linkage between theory 
and investigation was inductive in the case of qualitative research and deductive in the 
case of quantitative research.  
 
1.8 The importance and contribution of the study  
This study makes several contributions to research on corporate governance in general 
and board decision quality. First, it improved the understanding of board process and 
board decision quality.  Scarborough, Haynie and Shook’s (2010) research explored the 
effects of board structure and board process variables on board decision quality.  The 
variables examined by Scarborough et al. (2010) were functional area knowledge, 
independence, cognitive conflict, information quality, and effort norms. 
 
Secondly, the contribution of the study is the development of a measure for board 
decision quality.   
 
Thirdly, the outcome of this research can be used by the corporate governance 
practising community to improve governance practises in terms of decision quality 
process of boards. Furthermore, the guidelines and model adds to the body of 
knowledge of governance in State-owned Enterprises.  
 
Finally, another contribution  to assess, through research, the measures of board 
decision quality and propose strategies to develop board quality decision.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
1.9 Structure of the dissertation  
 
Chapter 1 covers the background to the research problem, significance of the study, 
aims of the study, objectives of the study, research questions, problem statement, 
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synopsis of the methodology, significance of the study, limitations of the study and the 
format of the rest of the study. 
 
Chapter 2, the theoretical foundation covers the theories that underpin board process 
variables, governance models, decision models and board decision quality.  As such, 
the chapter provides the first anchors on which to build a foundation for this work.  
 
Chapter 3, the literature review covers an unyielding base from which relevant theories, 
models and concepts are used in governance.  International and South African 
governance convention, policies, procedures and practises are analysed.   From an 
evolutionary perspective a number of theories are discussed.   
                    
The literature review was structured in accordance with an eight process.  The steps 
taken in the literature review were as follows: The steps taken in the literature review 
were as follows:  (1) The concept of governance was defined from several perspectives.  
The objective of this section was to illuminate a thorough understanding of what is 
meant by the word governance and to describe how it will be used in this research.  
This relates to conceptual validity of the proposed measure; (2) The literature provided 
a description of how the concept relates to others variables (like board process 
variables – effort norms, cognitive conflict, functional area knowledge, information 
quality).  In this part, the theories and models of governance regarding the concept are 
presented. This information was used as a basis for making comments regarding the 
concurrent, discriminate and possible predictive validity of the proposed measure; (3) 
further refinements in Step 3, a process to compile several lists of the elements, if any, 
of which the concept comprises.  Here, the objective was to identify the building block of 
the concept. The goal was to find the elements that needed to be included in the 
measure. This relates to the construct validity of the measure;   (4) Notes were recorded 
of the validity and reliability of a measure and the characteristics of a good measure and 
its items; (5) A list of board process measures used in other studies was collated to 
describe the measures of board process variables.  The idea in this section was to find 
37 | P a g e  
 
a measure that could possibly be used to measure board decision quality in the local 
context, or model items to be included in a new measure.  (6) The process is refined to 
in Step 6, by describing how the measures relate to the elements of the concept, board 
process variables.  In step 6, the measures found were evaluated to determine 
construct validity by revisiting step 3.  (7) A description was generated on how the 
measured concept relates to other variables.  With step 7, a search for information 
regarding the criterion-related validity of the existing measures is made. Here, the 
intention was to find journal articles that indicate the theoretical explanations that are 
supported by empirical findings.  (8) A measure or pool of items is suggested as a 
measure of the concept. 
 
Step 1: The concept from several perspectives. 
 
Chapter 4 covers the research design for the study.  This study seeks to address two 
research questions: (1) What processes do public entity boards follow in making good 
quality decisions? How are board processes linked to board activism? To address the 
research questions, a mixed research approach was selected for the study. The 
phenomenological (qualitative) and positivist (quantitative) philosophical paradigms 
were adopted with the purpose of obtaining a greater understanding of board quality 
decisions in the SOEs.  The chapter is divided into seven parts. The first part looks into 
the design of the study. The second part provides the epistemological perspective of the 
study. The section also links the research questions to the study approach, thereby 
giving rationale for the study approach adopted. This is followed by a discussion on 
sampling issues (part three). In the fourth part of the chapter the qualitative and 
quantitative data collection instruments are presented. This section also includes a 
discussion on how issues of bias were dealt with. The fifth part of the chapter presents 
the analytical tools used to analyse both the qualitative and quantitative data. Validity 
and reliability issues are then discussed (part six) followed by the final part of the 
chapter that looks into how ethical issues were handled. 
 
38 | P a g e  
 
Chapter 5 covers the findings of the qualitative and quantitative research, analysis and 
interpretation of all the collected data.  Theory on board process is used as a base to 
interpret and critique the findings.  This analysis is done within the ambit of the research 
question 
 
Chapter 6 covers the researcher’s contributions and recommendations in the form of a 
model through which the research question can be answered.  Through a discussion of 
the limitations of the study, future areas of research are identified by the researcher.   
 
1.10 Conclusion  
This chapter has established the state of governance theories and their relationship to 
board activism, board decision quality and board performance.  Board process was less 
researched whereas board structure was exhaustively researched to improve board 
performance.  Arguments were advanced for the improvement of governance to 
positively impact board performance.  This research sought to analyse and draw 
insights about the governance practices in Public Entities.  A deeper understanding was 
cultivated that board performance was attained through board decision quality which 
was influence by board process variables.  This chapter highlights the importance of the 
growth to a national economy and why it was a worthwhile endeavour to analyse the 
dynamics of board functioning and process.  It then presents the structure of the whole 
research and the definition of the key terms and concepts. This chapter therefore sets 
the ground for the remaining chapters.  Chapter one provides a guide on what literature 
to review and the selection of a research methodology and design for the study.    
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CHAPTER 2:  THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The background (Chapter 1) reflectively opened up a number of emerging themes or 
constructs and thus initiated an unravelling of the underlying research issues.  Further 
the chapter attempted to unravel the underlying research complexities through the 
review of board research, models and theories.   Poor corporate governance practices 
in South African Public Entities affected the competitiveness rating of the country, and 
literature too cited poor decision making processes as a substantial contributor to poor 
corporate governance (Singh and Msweli, 2012). 
 
Making high-quality decisions are important for an organisation’s board of directors to 
ensure growth and sustainability. In accordance with Andringa (2004) board members 
have extensive commitments and restricted time to devote to the strategic orientation 
and hence, the need to review the productive use of time to make quality decisions 
become important. Inevitably, to achieve this, boards must pay attention to board 
activism and board process to attain high-quality board decisions. The current literature 
neglected the relationship between board process (effort norms, cognitive conflict, and 
information quality and board activism), and board decision quality for organisations 
(Scarborough, Haynie and Shook, 2010).  
 
The board was directly responsible for making high level decisions that affect the future 
direction and sustainability of the organisation.   Indeed, there was increasing pressures 
on boards to determine the future direction of the organisation through involvement in 
strategy formulation, advice, counsel and to monitor the implementation of strategy 
(Payne, Benson and Finegold, 2008; Roy, 2008; Useem, 2003; Felton and Watson, 
2002; Stiles, 2001; Golden and Zajac, 2001; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; and 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996).  
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The research done by Scarborough, Haynie and Shook’s (2010) concentrated both on 
structural and process variables.  The structural aspects of the study focussed on 
duality and independence whilst the process variable, effort norms, in relation to board 
activism. A considerable body of research highlighted the ambiguous relationship 
between board structure and performance (e.g., Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003; 
Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998). However, in the extant literature less 
consideration was attributed to the effects of board process variables on firm 
performance. Daily et al. (2003) highlighted the need for further research on board 
process variables.  The significant shift in the extant literature paved the way to fully 
explore the antecedents of board decision quality. 
 
Research done by Zahra and Pearce (1989) confirmed that boards do not adequately 
fulfil their legally mandated responsibilities.  The study revealed that executives do not 
ask discerning questions about company performance and goals, fail to review 
managerial decisions and evaluate the consequences of merger and acquisition 
decisions.  Zahra and Pearce (1989) also believed that managerial domination of 
boards is seen as having resulted in inadequate attention to board processes.  Equally 
Wan and Ong (2005) argued empirical research demonstrated that the relationship 
between board structure and firm performance is equivocal.  Ong and Wan (2001) 
introduced the notion that board performance was multifaceted and was not only 
dependent on the board structure.  From the multi-dimensional perspective Ong et al. 
(2001) argued that an integrative conceptual model bests captured all the variables that 
influence firm performance, a consideration of both structural and process elements.  
Although the literature on board process was scant, studies emerged by Zona and 
Zattoni (2007) that the involvement and influence of boards within the host firm will be 
mediated not only by external conditions and the structural features of boards, but also 
by board processes, motivation and skill.  An instrumental study done by Scarborough, 
Haynie and Shook (2010) on board process variables found empirical support for the 
affirmative relationship between the board process variable, functional area knowledge 
and board activism and a strong association between effort norms and board activism. 
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For this study and depicted in figure 2.1 below five process variables were identified, 
largely based on existing research by Scarborough, Haynie and Shook, 2010; Spetzler, 
Arnold and Lang, 2005; Wageman, 1995; Kanfer, 1992; Forbes and Milliken, 1999 and 
Zahra and Pearce, 1989. The proposed study seeks to investigate the relationship 
between the board process variables, effort norms, conflict, independence, 
knowledge/skills, information quality and cohesiveness and board decision quality.  The 
diagram below depicts the variables that influence board decision quality.  It is 
hypothesised that board independence (structure) and board process variables (efforts 
norms, knowledge\skills, cognitive conflict and information quality) positively influences 
board decision quality. 
 
Figure 2.1:  A model for board decision quality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1:  Proposed model for board decision quality 
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Below literature that cover board process variables were reviewed to identify the 
research gap. 
2.2. Decision process 
Decision process had been studied from different perspectives.  Herein, below a group 
decision process theory, garbage can theory was discussed. Garbage can theory 
covered the full ambit of information interpretation and the management and distribution 
of information (Daft and Wick, 1984).  This theory further unravelled how decisions are 
made, and how group members interact.  Huse (2007) encouraged adherence to 
decision making procedures that culminated in successful decision-making.  Garbage 
can theory was instigated by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) in that board dynamics or 
chaos is ingredients of the process.  Problems, issues and feelings are dumped by 
participants into a garbage can as ideas are generated.  Daft and Wick (1984) proposed 
that this theory was well suited for decision making in that it was non-linear, more adhoc 
and improvisational.   
 
Research by Wooldridge and Floyd’s (1989) found that consensus emerged from 
accepting of a strategic decision and pledge to it, which increased its probability for 
implementation because consensus and decision quality are treated as dependent 
variables.  Parayitam and Dooley (2007) proposed that further research was needed to 
determine harvests such understanding, and in turn, produced decision consensus and 
quality. 
 
Similarly, Huse (2007) agreed that information gathering and decision-making was 
reliant on decision-making structures, procedures and rules.  Aligned to behavioural 
theory Huse (2007) proposed the development of a decision making procedure which 
entailed three components.   The decision making procedure variables are decision 
criteria (identification of issues are worthy of attention); decision processes (the routines 
and consideration in the group); group dynamics (managing conflict and promoting 
understanding) and decision outcomes (factors that result in high board decision 
quality). 
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2.2.1 Decision criteria  
Building on the framework proposed by Huse (2007) on decision criteria (Engel, 2011) 
suggested that boards focus on strategic issues of high magnitude, high uncertainty or 
with high political ramifications.  Likewise Coleman (2007) identified criteria for cognitive 
aspects of decision-making, namely, decision magnitude, uncertainty surrounding the 
decision, threat or catastrophe associated with the timeliness of the decision and how 
the decision developed. Taylor (1996) agreed that Board members should focus on 
advancing their organisation’s mission and long-term welfare. To develop their 
effectiveness, boards should focus on vision and mission of the organisation and the 
consequences thereof (Mintzberg et al., 1976).   
 
2.3 Board Process Studies 
The literature covered below by a number of scholars on decision process focused on 
decision routines, group dynamics, decision steps, dialectical inquiry, devil’s advocacy, 
consensus seeking and procedural justice (Engle, 2011; Coleman, 2007; DeSanctis and 
Gallupe,1999; Judge and Zeithami,1992; Hosking,1991; Schweiger, Sandberg and 
Ragan, 1986; Nutt, 1984; Schwenk, 1982b, 1984; Cosier, 1978, 1980; Cosier and Aplin, 
1980; Schwenk and Cosier, 1980; Cosier, Ruble, and Aplin, 1978; Mitroff, Barabba, and  
Kilmann, 1977; Mintzberg, 1976; Lourenco and Glidewell, 1974). 
 
Amongst the literature on decision process, Mintzberg (1976) is an authority on decision 
routines.   Figure 1 depicts the 25 decision processes that emerged from the research 
of Mintzberg (1976) and refined by Coleman (2007), DeSanctis and Gallupe (1999) and 
Nutt (1984). Further refinement of the decision steps by Mintzberg (1976), Hosking 
(1991), Judge and Zeithaml (1992) too illustrated decision-making processes in three 
phases, namely, issue identification and framing, development and selection, and 
implementation.  
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2.3.1 Decision Steps Model 
 
Figure 2.2: Decision Steps Model 
 
Figure 2.2:  Source:  Judge and Zeithaml (1992), Decision Steps Model  
 
Engle (2008) postulated that although Judge and Zeithaml (1992) portrayed the 
decision step model as a linear model in which the board navigated the decision 
process, alternatively board deliberation of consequential issues navigate in a recursive 
pattern.  Engle (2011) extended this analysis beyond the realm of decision process to 
board member’s commitment to the decision and the quality of the decision.  Further, 
both the board member’s commitment and the quality of the decision benefit from 
decision routines that enrich board decision quality.  Other thinking on decision process 
covered consensus seeking, dialectical inquiry and devil’s advocate.  Janis (1972) and 
Brodwin and Bourgeois (1984) agreed that consensus-seeking groups frequently avoid 
uncertainty and are prone to prematurely smooth over conflict and prefer harmony in the 
group than critical evaluation.  Bourgeois (1985) examined the effects of consensus on 
company objectives in top management teams and found a negative relationship 
between this consensus and company financial performance.  Dean and Sharfman 
45 | P a g e  
 
(1996) asserted that the decision process entails a collection and analysis of information 
relevant to the decision to make a choice and reach consensus.  Similarly, Choo (1996) 
agreed that complexity and uncertainty is eminent in adhering to routines and decision 
procedures.   
 
Scholars contributed to the debates for improving decision quality through other models 
like devil advocacy and dialectical inquiry.  These approaches are discussed below.    
2.3.2 Devil Advocacy Approach 
In the devil’s advocacy approach, a person within a decision-making group is appointed 
to critique a preferred plan or strategy.  This person attempts to point out weaknesses in 
the assumptions underlying the plan, its internal inconsistencies, and problems that may 
lead to its failure. In such circumstances, the devil's advocate acts, in effect, as a good 
trial lawyer, presenting his or her arguments against the majority position as 
convincingly as possible.    
 
2.3.3 Dialectical Inquiry 
A derivative of devil's advocacy, called dialectical inquiry, in which, members with 
similar views are divided into sub-groups but different problem solving capabilities to 
generate a wide variety of solutions.  The subgroups proceeded to develop alternatives 
to the recommended strategy, largely by identifying and criticizing the assumptions on 
which it was based.  The most critical part of dialectical inquiry was the identification of 
the pivotal assumptions on which a recommended strategy was based. 
 
The research done by (Mason and Mitroff, 1981) found that constructive conflict is used 
in group decision-making in both dialectical inquiry and devil's advocacy.  Mason and 
Mitroff (1981) argued that through the process of formalised argumentation and debate 
among top manager’s assumptions and recommendations are systematically evaluated 
and the strengths and weaknesses of each are made explicit.  Qanis (1972) cautioned 
that although conflict deepens the dialogue results in quality recommendations and 
decisions. Conversely, that in structured conflict the inherent argumentation and debate 
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can lead to damaged feelings.  Further Qanis (1972) claimed that feelings of rejection, 
depression, and anger might be evoked and can have a corrosive effect on morale and 
working relations within the group.   
2.3.4 Procedural Justice  
Another dimension of board process was procedural justice, the fair treatment of all 
participants to produce positive decision outcomes and the fairness of the decision 
making process in the application of decision routines (Tyler and Blader, 2000).  
Consistent adherence to procedural justice principles ensured that individuals can 
identify with an outcome with which they disagreed if they assess the decision-making 
procedures to be just (Tyler and Balder, 2003). Tyler and Balder (2000; 2003) 
acknowledged that there was an array of behavioural characteristics that emerge in a 
group setting, on a continuum from politeness, rudeness, respectfulness or with 
hostility, and so on. Through the research of Tyler and Balder (2000; 2003) there was 
recognition that procedural justice and decision routines influence the decision 
outcomes.   
2.3.5 Group Think 
Groupthink created in-group pressure to conform and a deterioration of conceptual 
efficiency, reality testing, and ethical judgement (Janis, 1983).  Other definitions argued 
by Maharaj (2007), when receiving information, persuasion and pressure by board 
members may yield thinking patterns and opinions of conformity.  Similarly, groupthink 
occurs when a person’s thought process and decision-making capabilities become 
heavily influenced by peer pressure (Maharaj, 2007). 
 
Janis’s (1972) contribution to the concept group think was that problems in decision 
making processes was caused by excessive consensus and similarity of views in 
groups. In boards of directors, the biases, assumptions and limitations of the 
chairperson or CEO may not be checked or challenged as a result of groupthink 
behaviour.  According to Mills (1985), such boards may consider too few alternatives to 
those recommended by the CEO. They also tended to make less effective use of 
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experts, paying more attention to information that supported the CEO's thinking and 
position.  
 
Janis (1972) and Mills (1985) proposed that group think manifested and was identified 
through six symptoms.  These symptoms included: (1) the illusion of invulnerability, 
which may cause the board to underestimate the risks of a particular course of action; 
(2) collective rationalisation, which may lead the board to misinterpret signals that a 
change was needed; (3) a belief in the inherent morality of the group lead the board 
members to ignore ethical, legal, and commercial consequences of a strategy; (4) a 
stereotyped view of rivals or out-groups that may limit the accuracy of the board's 
perception of competitors or of company critics; (5) pressure on any group member who 
dissents; (6) self-censorship of doubts and minority opinions, which helped the 
individual to relieve his or her doubts and removes the discomfort of doubting. 
 
Schwenk (1989) proposed three approaches to challenge group think, namely, 
controversy, basic devil’s advocate and multiple advocacy.  Tjosvold (1985) defined 
controversy as a kind of conflict that occurs in decision making when one person's 
ideas, opinions, conclusions, theories, and information are incompatible with that of 
another.  Schwenk (1989) recommended some principles to improve board decision 
making:  (1) Firstly, the chairperson to actively encourage dissent. Directors should be 
urged to express their own views, especially if they differ from those of the chairperson. 
The chair may even decide to adopt the role of custodian of unpopular views as it is 
used in multiple advocacies.  (2) Secondly, the chairperson may wish to assign one or 
more directors to play the role of devil's advocate for important decisions in which there 
is apparent unanimity among the board. Both Schwenk (1989) and Tjosvold (1985) 
provide some decision routines to observe in the decision making process.  Those who 
play the role of devil's advocate should observe decision routines: namely, (1) to identify 
the critical assumptions underlying the proposed course of action, to carefully evaluate 
each of these, and to focus the critique on those that are least defensible; (2) play the 
role of a process consultant interested only in improving the decision by identifying 
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questionable assumptions (3) seek information from outside experts who are not 
members of the board; (4) board members who might have different opinions than the 
chairperson should be sought out and perhaps asked to help prepare the critique; (5) 
when disagreement already exists on a proposed course of action, the chairperson 
should use the principles of dialectal inquiry to ensure that this disagreement is 
productive; (6) the role of devil's advocate should rotate among board members and (7) 
devil’s advocacy must be used for complex decisions and not for all decisions routinely.   
 
Later Maharaj (2007) provided a comprehensive analysis of the impact and 
consequences of group think.  In accordance with a qualitative study, Maharaj (2007) on 
board process variables provided an analysis and consequence of group think 
behaviour.    In the analysis of group think behaviour board members are so absorbed 
on their own discourse (groupthink) that a holistic synopsis is not considered of all the 
facts and figures.   The narrow focus may prevent a full analysis of information from the 
external environment to make better informed decisions.  Maharaj (2007) further argued 
that may cause the group to overestimate their power and morality, causing behaviour 
that disregards the ethical or moral consequences of decisions. This behaviour can 
create a delusion of immunity, excessive optimism, and may encourage risk taking 
behaviour.  Consequentially, this isolated and concealed behaviour may prevent the 
group members from appraising options using due diligence and fully considering 
warnings or other information as a result of pressure to conform.  In accordance with 
Maharaj (2007) the implication is the emergence of a bullying culture disguised as 
cohesiveness.  Another ripple effect was that this intense pressure may cause the group 
members to supress their opinions and criticisms for fear of being different, 
marginalised and victimised from the group.  The silence or non-responsiveness 
behaviour of board members may be considered as consent among the group 
members.  A statistical analysis of the relationship between values, groupthink, 
knowledge and decision- making showed that values and groupthink have a dominating 
effect on knowledge in predicting decision-making (Maharaj, 2007). Variation in decision 
making was caused by differing values and groupthink. 
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Another contribution by Maharaj (2007) in her analysis of board process variables 
distinguished between board members as consensus-builders or conformist. 
Consensus-builders are directors who use their superior conflict resolution skills to 
ensure that there is sharing of information; board members as a team need to be 
motivated to serve as members, in the best interest of the shareholders.  Conformists 
are board members that are cooperative, supportive, maintain the status quo directors 
and retain their position due to past successes or relationships. 
 
The Devil’s advocacy, dialectical inquiry and procedural justice approaches are similar 
to the board process variable, cognitive conflict.  The principles that underpin these 
approaches could be applied to board decision quality.  
 
Similarly, groupthink behaviour will significantly impact the quality of the decisions taken 
by the board.  Groupthink is the inverse of the of the board process variable, cognitive 
conflict.  Some of the recommended strategies to counter group think behaviour can be 
applied in the study to encourage cognitive conflict behaviour.  
 
2.4 Board Context 
Various researchers conducted board process research for more than two decades 
(Mangham and Pye, 1991; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Pettigrew, 1992; Pettigrew 
and McNulty, 1995; Pye, 1995, 2002b).  The research by these scholars focussed on 
variations in context to expose differences in the dynamic interplay of practices, 
processes and performance over time amongst board members.  Some authors had 
drawn attention to context in terms of board process, performance and board 
effectiveness (Hercleous, 2001; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995 and Pye and Camm, 
2003b).   
 
Research done by Bonn and Pettigrew in (1987) distinguished between inner and outer 
context:  where inner context refers to factors from within the organisation, namely, 
structure, culture, power and political characteristics; and outer, to factors external to 
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the organisation such as industry sector, economic, political and social context.  
Important aspects of the outer context included namely (1) the extent of regulation in the 
industry in which an organisation is located; (2) the ownership structure and investor 
relationships with the board; (3) the presence of other influential stakeholders, e.g. 
lobby groups outside the organisation; and (4) the potential for mergers and acquisitions 
activity.  The research identified important elements that affect the inner context, 
namely, (1) commercial requirement of the organisation to develop new core 
competencies or strategic direction; (2) level of perceived trust in the board, as viewed 
by insiders and outsiders; (3) life cycle of the company and of the board and its 
culture\stage of board development.  
 
The research done by Pye and Pettigrew (2005) focused on the effectiveness of boards 
by concentrating on context, process and time, which are crucial to understanding board 
dynamics.  The paper concluded that there are still much more to be researched in this 
area and encouraged work that explored variation in board process and director 
effectiveness in different organisational contexts, as well as seeking to go beyond the 
board to address their impact and effectiveness in the broader organisational and 
external context. 
 
Pye and Pettigrew (2005), in the critique and review of the research done by Robert, 
McNulty and Stiles (2005) identified context, process and time as variables that affect 
board performance.  Pye and Pettigrew (2005) illustrated the significance of considering 
that boards operate in a unique environment comprising different pressures, in which 
decisions and actions are taken at a particular time, against a particular historical legacy 
and set of future strategic ambitions with different performance indicators given priority, 
hence different drivers and constraints on action and evaluations of board performance. 
2.5 Individual and collective inputs, outputs and outcomes  
A second area that was identified for further examination was the ambiguity between 
individual and collective characteristics, conduct, behaviour and effectiveness.  It was 
difficult to disentangle individual and collective inputs, outputs and outcomes.  Many 
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authors noted (e.g. Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Katzenbach, 1998; Mangham and Pye, 
1991; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Sonnenfeld, 2002) boards outputs are often less 
than the sum of the parts.  In the extant literature effective boards was best defined as 
more than a summing of individual contributions.  The dynamic of different people 
working together in a board-level way adds value to the organisation.  This element of 
board performance is still largely under-researched, and remains poorly theorised.  
  
2.6 Group Dynamics 
Another construct, group dynamics, identified by Engel (2008) included managing 
conflict and promoting understanding.  Engel (2008) conceded that conflict is linked with 
decision quality.  Further he made a distinction that conflict and decision making in the 
corporate arena is a more linear and hierarchical process.  Despite the criticism levied 
against the consensus approach in decision making; it is highly valued in the non-profit 
community (Engle, 2008; (Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret, 1976).  
 
An earlier research study by Torrance (1957) found that diverse thinking and 
disagreement of individual board members improved decision accuracy by generating a 
range of judgments to be considered.  Similarly Schweiger and colleagues (1989) 
reported that consensual decision making generated a less antagonistic and belligerent 
environment.  Dooley and Fryxell (1999) explained that an effective approach would be 
to sequentially stage dissent and support to reconcile the contradiction that dissent 
presents.  Dooley et al. (1999) argued that dissent should precede an actual decision 
and consensus building should ensue after the decision is made. Instead Dooley and 
Fryxell (1999) advocated the position, that strategic decision-making teams should 
synthesise the contradictory forces of dissent and consensus during the strategic 
decision-making process. 
 
The antecedents of group dynamics in the form of conflict and the promotion of 
understanding are related to the process variables of cohesiveness and cognitive 
conflict.  
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2.7 Decision Outcomes 
Several studies on decision quality and decision consensus were undertaken within the 
commercial environments (Amason, 1996; Dooley and Fryxell, 1999; Parayitam and 
Dooley, 2007).  Research was also conducted by Wooldridge and Floyd (1989) on 
decision outcomes, with a focus on two variables, namely, decision quality and decision 
commitment.  These scholars asserted that consensus reflected a members’ 
understanding of a strategic decision while commitment increased the chances of 
implementation.  The literature by Amason (1996) and Wooldridge and Floyd (1989) 
used these concepts of decision commitment and consensus interchangeably.    
Amason (1996) contended that to reach consensus a number of prerequisites are 
required, namely, active cooperation of a team and a shared understanding of ends and 
means.  Wooldridge and Floyd (1989) added to this analysis and claimed that it can be 
the decision process or the decision outcome.  Priem (1990) proposed that the 
attainment of consensus is dependent on diverse thinking and ideas of participants 
during group decision making. Mintzberg et al. (1976) reasoned that the attainment of 
consensus is an important precursor to ensure that decisions are implemented. As 
indicated by the studies of various scholars that the attainment of consensus in the 
process and outcome of a decision result in high-quality consequential decisions.  
Another important insight made by Eisenhardt (1992) was that groups, rather than 
individuals, generated better ideas and assumptions and attained better 
recommendations in decision making.  Although superior ideas are generated through 
group process the disadvantage is that both satisfaction and overall decision 
acceptance is compromised.  Amason (1996) supported this analysis too and reported 
that the achievement of high-quality decisions is dependent on critical and investigative 
interactive processes in which team members generate ideas, identify, extract, and 
synthesise their perspectives to produce a decision.   From a strategic decision 
effectiveness perspective Dean and Sharfman (1996) stated that the decision outcomes 
must be aligned to achievement of the firm’s strategic objectives.   
 
Interestingly, Carver and Carver (1997) maintained that corporate governance failures 
are interconnected to flawed processes and not a problem of people. By implication 
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management should be reviewing and refining the decision-making process.  Further 
this demonstrates just how crucial the decision-making process is for producing quality 
decisions timeously.  Hence, Carver et al. (1997) argued that more evaluative research 
on how understanding decision processes and conflict affect decision outcomes.   
 
Several studies on decision quality was done within the context of the general 
management level but the proposed study reviewed board decision at board level 
emerging from configuring board process variables. 
 
2.8 Board decision quality (BDQ) 
Literature on board decision quality mainly proposes that BDQ was attained through 
policy and process.  A study by Spetzler, Arnold and Lang (2005) proposed six basic 
requirements to attain decision quality, namely, meaningful, reliable, clear values and 
trade-offs, logical correct reasoning, commitment to action, appropriate frame, and 
creative, doable alternatives.  Further they proposed the BDQ Approach, a collaborative 
process with four elements that generate quality decisions, namely: (1) the directors and 
line management share an understanding of the requirements of decision quality, (2) 
the board and the CEO agree on the strategic agenda for the coming year, (3) the CEO 
and the board clearly and jointly designate the BDQ items, and (4) for the BDQ items 
the board engages in a structured dialogue with management about the decisions.  
 
Whereas, McDonnell and Moynihan (2011) argued the same that the Board is 
empowered to make high-quality decisions, time should be invested in the design of 
decision-making policies and processes. They proposed that to facilitate the decision-
making process, the Board should have at its disposal high-quality information, access 
to expert opinions (where required), and sufficient time to debate and challenge the 
issue at hand.  Further McDonnell and Moynihan (2011) argued that boards should be 
aware of factors that limit effective board decision quality, such as limited information, 
dominant personalities or agenda restrictions.  They also proposed that factors which 
may distort judgement in the decision-making process such as conflicts of interest, 
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emotional reliance and inappropriate reliance on previous experience.  McDonnell et al 
(2011) further recommended a number of safeguards for situations where judgement 
may be distorted, or appear to be distorted, including obtaining expert advice, 
introducing a devil's advocate or establishing a sub-committee for the area under 
review.  Another useful tool to safeguard against poor judgement and decision-making 
is to have separate discussions on the concept of the proposal, proposal for discussion 
and proposal for decision, so as to avoid the Board being used as a simple 'sign-off' 
mechanism. 
 
For this study five process variables, effort norms, functional knowledge, cognitive 
conflict, independence and information quality were identified, based largely on existing 
research by Scarborough, Haynie and Shook, 2010; Spetzler, Arnold and Lang, 2005; 
Wageman, 1995; Kanfer, 1992; Forbes and Milliken, 1999 and Zahra and Pearce, 1989.  
 
In accordance with the integrative model, Zahra and Pearce (1989) proposed specific 
links among four board attributes (composition, characteristics, structure and process) 
and three critical board roles (service, strategy and control). Finally, board process 
variables refer to the decision-making related activities and styles of boards.   
 
2.9 Process Variables   
Maharaj (2007) defined board process as the ways in which the board members 
engage, lead, develop norms and make decisions.  Both Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) 
and Johnson (1996) agreed that in the recruitment and induction of board members 
board process is not considered or marginalised. 
 
A selection of definitions was provided by different scholars covering different 
perspectives of board process and board decision quality.  Board process variables 
explained how boards could perform better and positively impact the performance of the 
organisation (Daily et al., 2007; Scarborough, Haynie and Shook, 2010; Zona and 
Zattoni, 2007; Ong and Wan, 2001; and others).  Korac-Kakabadse, Kakabadse, and 
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Kouzmin (2001) stated that board process refers to decision-making activities, styles of 
board, the frequency and the length of board proceedings and board culture on 
evaluation of director’s performance. In earlier studies, Anderson and Anthony (1988) 
proposed that board process pertains to generation of healthy, rigorous and robust 
dialogue on corporate issues and problems so that decisions can be reached and 
supported. Dulewicz, MacMillan and Herbert (1995) defined board process as the 
organising and running of board in attainment of board objectives.  
 
The study by Forbes and Milliken (1999) assessed three process variables: (1) 
functional area knowledge, (2) effort norms and (3) cognitive conflict.  A study done by 
Scarborough, Haynie and Shook (2010) proposed that there is a link between the 
functional area knowledge, board composition as well as effort norms with organisation 
performance. Scarborough, Haynie and Shook’s (2010) study posits that board activism 
and effort norms improve decision making. The authors made a link between quality 
decision making and company performance.   
 
Pye and Pettigrew (2005) claimed that it is difficult and challenging to query\probe 
agency theory but this can be done in identifying an integrative basis from which to do 
this.  Most of the work was clustered under board process but this does not guarantee 
any consistency of language or conceptualisation.  Pye and Pettigrew (2005) further 
argued that the banner of “board process” should provide a sound buttress to agency 
theory.  Further they argued that board process described a distinctly different approach 
to research, founded on a different set of assumptions and which make a different 
contribution to theorizing and theory, reflecting its origin in group process studies, 
describing how it is that groups of people interact.  The structure and criteria of what 
comprises a process-oriented approach or analysis must be determined.   
 
Pettigrew (1997) stated that process research in organisational settings is to catch 
reality in flight, to explore the dynamic qualities of human conduct and organisational life 
and to embed such dynamics over time in the various layers of context in which streams 
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of activity occur.  Methodologies must then allow data to be gathered as close to action 
and context as possible and to be conducted over time, with a clear appreciation of 
concepts with which to make sense of what is being studied.  Pettigrew further 
explained the importance of time and of context to understanding ‘not only processes 
and outcomes but also of why and how outcomes are differentially shaped by 
processes.  According to Pettigrew (1997) for work to fall within the board process label 
the work must share guiding assumptions, namely: 
 Embeddedness, studying processes across a number of levels of analysis;  
 Temporal interconnectedness, studying processes in past, present and future 
time; 
 A role in explanation for context and action; 
 A search for holistic rather than linear explanations of processes; and  
 A need to link process analysis to the location and explanation of outcomes 
 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) first introduced research on board process and the impact 
on board performance.  Effort norms are directors’ shared beliefs about the level of 
effort directors should expend on board work (Forbes and Milliken, 1999 and 
Scarborough, Haynie and Shook, 2010).  Similarly (Wageman, 1995; Kanfer, 1992 and 
Forbes and Milliken, 1999) defined efforts norms as a group-level construct that refers 
to the group's shared beliefs regarding the level of effort each individual is expected to 
put toward a task. Conversely Kanfer (1992) contended that as an individual-level 
construct, effort norms being a product of motivation and refers to the intensity of 
individuals' task-performance behaviour.  Although directors may be well motivated they 
have limited time and have to carefully apportion and provision time amongst an array 
of important tasks (Lorsch, 1989; Mace, 1986). Considering the time constraints 
directors dedicate differential effort is applied to board tasks across boards.  The 
differential effort by directors represents the degree to which directors are able to 
achieve shareholder interest and the strategic objectives of the organisation.  Despite 
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the constraint of time Mace (1996) argued that the potential contribution of boards is 
limited by the failure to do research in fully understanding company problems.    
2.10 Board activism 
Board activism was defined by Scarborough, Haynie and Shook (2010), as the extent of 
the scope and depth of board’s activities and the degree to which a board is involved in 
the matters of the organisation.  The board activities as expounded by Scarborough, et 
al.  (2010) to include inter alia: (1)attending board meetings; (2) performance evaluation 
of the CEO; (3) reviewing board reports, (4) participating in the development and 
monitoring strategic direction; (5) directing audit activities; (6) ensuring compliance to 
legal and governance regimes; (7) an assessment of the financial and operating 
performance; (8) approving capital and operating budgets; and (9) approving 
organisational strategies like downsizing and mergers and acquisitions (Lorsch and 
MacIver, 1989; Salmon, 1993; Zahra and Pearce, 1987; Copeland and Towl, 1947; 
Conger, Finegold, Lawler III, 1998; Blair, 1950 and Baker, 1945).  The degree of Board 
involvement is ignited by acquired knowledge.  Scarborough et al (2010), found 
empirical support for an affirmative relationship between functional area knowledge and 
board activism. 
 
Zahra and Pearce (1987) too agreed with the definition of board activism proposed by 
Scarborough, Haynie and Shook (2010).  A number of research studies by (Shultz, 
2001; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Salmon, 1993; Copeland and Towl, 1947; Conger, 
Finegold, Lawler III, 1998; Blair, 1950;  Baker, 1945) referred to the activities as 
attending board meetings, performance evaluation of the CEO; reviewing board reports, 
participating in the development and monitoring strategic direction, directing audit 
activities, ensuring compliance to legal and governance regimes, assessment of 
performance in respect of the financial and operations aspects, approval of budgets  
and the approval of organisational strategies like downsizing and mergers and 
acquisitions.  
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2.11 Board Independence  
Board independence will be reviewed from the perspective of structural dimensions 
(number of insider-outsider board members), the relationship between insider-outsider 
and board performance, the relationship to board activism, resource dependency theory 
and group think.  
 
Atkinson and Atkinson (2010) argued that fraud and alleged frauds such as Enron, 
WorldCom, Global Crossing, Livent, Hollinger International, Adelphia Communications, 
and Parmalat have attracted immense attention and a more plausible explanation for 
these failures are executive greed, lack of board independence and board 
inattentiveness.   Atkinson et al. (2010) proposed that regulators improve independence 
of the boards to improve board decision process.  A noteworthy contribution by Atkinson 
et al. (2010) was that prescriptions that focus on inputs to, rather than outputs from, the 
governance process are demonstrably ineffective because they fundamentally ignore 
that governance is conducted as a social process of group interchange and influence. 
 
Ong and Wan (2001), Atkinson and Atkinson (2010) and Maharaj (2007) agreed that 
most responses to governance failures have concentrated on specifying better 
structural inputs such as the composition and structural characteristics of boards of 
directors (the number, type, skills, number of meetings, and director independence).  
Maharaj (2007) argued that the extant literature on corporate governance focus on the 
implementation of rules to regulate behaviour.  In addition, they have promoted 
increased attention to systems of internal control in general and financial reporting in 
particular.  Both scholars agreed that consideration was given to the structure and 
nature of board processes.  In particular board process variables to address 
independence are behavioural dynamics, techniques and approaches to encourage 
more effective involvement and evaluating either the process or results of Board 
activities. 
 
From a behavioural perspective Atkinson and Atkinson (2010) provided an analysis of 
different types of behaviours of boards below, namely social loafing, herding and 
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sheeple.   Definitions of these concepts by Atkinson and Atkinson (2010) are delineated 
below.  Social pressure is created by repeating the norms of the board so that is forces 
a particular set of behaviours.  Studies of groups have observed that members undergo 
a process of socialisation by which they learn group norms and expected behaviours 
communicated by board chairs.  When social loafing is left unchecked and becomes 
standard operational procedure in a board culture, it may lead to a social psychological 
condition called herding. Herding involves the coalescing of group ideologies and 
practices around those of one central figure or small cluster of charismatic figures.  
Social groups beset with herding include members best described as sheeple; those 
who accept dominant lines of thinking without criticism or reflection, and view more 
utility in maintaining the status quo than upsetting the proverbial apple cart.  The 
sheeple phenomenon may be one characteristic of boards that observers characterize 
as inattentive or failing to challenge important management strategies or decisions. 
 
Board vigilance within the context of external and internal environments is necessary to 
improve governance and decision making. Roy (2008) and Fama and Jensen (1983) 
recommended that independent directors have greater detachment and objectivity and 
more likely to question management decisions and are skilled monitors of performance.  
Despite these expectations of the positive impact of board independence on board 
performance and consequentially corporate performance, the research findings have 
been mixed; little or no correlation has been found, raising questions about the merits of 
board independence and about the true drivers of board performance (Bhagat and 
Black, 2002; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998 and Deutsch, 2005). 
 
Recurring studies focussed on the dimension of board structure mainly the outside-
inside directors. In accordance with many corporate governance codes, like King III 
(2009) outside directors are seen to be more objective, impartial and can consider 
diverse groups in the decision making process (Ammer, Ramli and Zakaria, 2010; 
Lorsch, 1995; Jones and Goldberg, 1982; Spencer, 1983). From an agency perspective, 
independence means members are free from conflicts of interests, autonomous and 
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unbiased with reference to management (Lorsch, 1995). In addition, a dependency of 
effective decision control is whether directors are autonomous of executive 
management (Fama, 1980; Young, Stedham and Beekun, 2000). Consequently, having 
a proportion of outside members promotes objectivity and independence and to create a 
culture free of conflicts of interests.  The board’s independence allows it to fully explore 
all dimensions of an issue and challenge the status quo, thus promoting board activism.  
Outside directors brings diverse thinking and access to critical resources.  Resource 
dependence theorists view boards of directors as means to gain some level of control 
over critical resources in their external environment (Scarborough, Haynie and Shook, 
2010; Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Boeker and Goodstein, 1991; Pfeffer, 1972).  
Additionally, from resource dependence perspective scholars indicated the importance 
of board independence in activism. 
 
In contrast other theorists maintained that outside directors do not have the necessary 
time and expertise to do their job well. Another perspective advanced by some scholars 
is that director independence and objectivity is impaired because the CEO recruits, 
selects and retains directors (Ong, 2001; Geneen, 1984; Vance, 1983).  Further 
impairment is eminent because the CEO is directly responsible for dispersing 
information to the board.   
 
Ammer, Ramli and Zakaria (2010) claimed that outside directors are believed to be 
more effective monitors of management performance. Ammer et al’s (2010) contention 
has been supported by other researchers (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Daily and Johnson, 1997; Dalton and Rechner, 1989; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1988; Dahya, McConnell and Travlos, 2002).  Although there are claims and 
counter claims the above mentioned studies suggested that the work and functioning of 
boards are empirically variable.  
 
Board activism is more likely and promoted by having an independent board with no 
conflict of interest (Scarborough, Haynie and Shook, 2010).  Further Scarborough et al. 
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(2010) argued that outside directors are independent and more likely to act in the 
interest of shareholders and will positively influence the decisions taken by the board. . 
In addition, other benefits of an independent board are that organisations can leverage 
greater access to information and other critical resources, which promote the activism of 
the board.  Stated differently, board activism increased as the proportion of outside 
board members increases, which is the premise behind board independence.  
 
In addition, according to Scarborough et al (ibid), the independence of the board would 
allow organisations greater access to information and other critical resources, which 
promote the activism of the board.   
 
Below a list of key studies that reviewed the relationship between outside-insider 
directors to company performance is shown in Table 2.1 Again, the conclusions are 
equivocal. 
Table 2.1 Relationship between Inside-Outside Directors and Company Performances 
Study (Year) Dimension 
Performance 
Indicators 
Sample Major Findings 
1. Vance (1995) 
Insiders vs 
Outsiders 
Net income  
Sales  
Owners' equity 
200 major 
manufacturing firms 
(1925-1950) 
Insiders' representation 
was positively associated 
with financial performance 
2. Vance (1995) 
Insiders vs 
duality 
Net income  
Sales  
Owners' equity 
103 major industrial 
firms (1925-1963) 
Insiders were conducive to 
effective financial 
performance 
3. Schmidt 
(1975) 
Insiders vs 
duality 
Long-term debt  
Dividends  
Current ratio 
80 chemical 
companies (1962-
1963) 
No relationship with 
financial performance 
4. Cochran et al. 
(1985) 
Insiders' 
representation 
Operating 
income  
Sales  
ROE  
ROA  
Excess value 
ratio 
406 Fortune 500 in 
1982 
Insiders' ratio was 
positively associated with 
financial performance 
5. Baysinger and 
Butler (1985) 
Outsiders ROE 
266 major 
corporations in 1970 
and 1980 
Companies achieved 
higher performance did so 
without having a majority of 
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outsiders 
6. Caganti et al. 
(1985) 
Outsiders 
Firm 
bankruptcy 
21 pairs 
(successful/failing) of 
retail firms 
No relationship with 
financial performance 
7. Kesner (1987) 
Proportion of 
insiders on 
board 
Profit margin  
ROE  
ROA  
EPS  
Stock price 
250 of 1983 Fortune 
500 companies in 27 
industries 
No relationship with 
financial performance 
8. Zahra and 
Stanton (1988) 
Outsiders' ratio 
ROE  
Profit margin on 
sales  
EPS  
DPS 
100 Fortune 500 
1980-1983 
Outsiders' ratio was not 
associated with financial 
performance 
9. Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) 
Outsiders 
Performance 
index 
400 large Forbes 
800, 1987 
Negative relationship 
between number of outside 
directors and financial 
performance 
10. Scarborough, 
Haynie and 
Shook (2010) 
Outsiders  SEC guidelines 
135 company 
secretaries  
Directors’ independence 
was not found to have a 
link with board activism 
Table 2.1 Relationship between Inside-Outside Directors and Company Performances 
 
As depicted in the table above, the majority of empirical studies proposed that 
independence is measured by the proportion of outside directors on a board and linked 
it to performance. However, despite the number of empirical studies in this regard this 
conceptualisation received diversified results. For instance, there have been studies 
where a higher proportion of inside directors had a positive effect on performance (e.g., 
Cochran, Wood and Jones, 1985).  Conversely, others have found that a higher 
proportion of outside directors had a positive effect on performance (e.g., Rechner and 
Dalton, 1991). Some studies have even found no significance for the relationship of 
independence to performance (e.g., Kesner, 1987; Zahra and Stanton, 1988). Still, 
Pfeffer (1972) found the extent to which a board achieves an ideal ratio of outsiders to 
insiders had a positive effect on performance. 
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2.12 Effort norms  
Effort norms as defined by (Wageman, 1995; Pound, 1995; Kanfer, 1992) as the 
intensity of individuals' task-performance behaviour, the shared belief of groups for the 
performance of a task and an outcome of motivation.  Other dimensions of effort norms 
are the devotion of time, resources and effort that is devoted to the activities 
(Wageman, 1995; Pound, 1995; Kanfer, 1992).  Some of the antecedents of effort 
norms according to Wageman (1995) related to carefully scrutinising the board packs 
and agenda prior to meetings; excavating information of relevance to the company, 
taking notes during meetings or actively participating during meetings.  Goodman 
(1986) linked effort norms with a set of expected behaviour that is accepted and can be 
used to enforce the performance of the expected behaviour.   Further, Lorsch and 
MacIver (1989) claimed that directors that dedicated sufficient time for board duties and 
conducted additional research performed better.  Effort norms are also seen as a 
culture and a shared belief in which directors are motivated to become active board 
members. The culture of involvement and participation by board and the establishment 
of norms impact on group behaviour (Feldman, 1984; Steiner, 1972; Weldon and 
Gargano, 1985).  Strong effort norms provide a framework that determines what is 
expected from directors in terms of the level and intensity of participation and the scope 
of and depth of their board duties.    
 
However, other researchers argued that time were not the only ingredient of effort 
(Jensen, 1993; Herman, 1981 and Mace, 1986). Jensen (1993) argued that time as a 
measure of effort is flawed as CEOs set the agendas of meetings.  In contrast, Herman 
(1981) and Mace (1986) also cited empirical evidence that compliance is measured 
through the attendance at meetings and the registration of votes without consideration 
for and proper engagement with the issues facing the board.  Likewise Vafeas (1999) 
found an inverse relationship between the annual number of board meetings and firm 
value. 
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Similarly, Lorsch (1989) further argued the provision of time to do research and the 
dedication of time to board activities enables directors to make better decisions, prevent 
and manage crises and to govern effectively.  Moreover, despite adhering to similar 
amounts of time on board activities boards exhibit different levels of effort. Past 
qualitative studies revealed other derivatives of effort besides time.  Other antecedents 
are that the board execute board activities with varying degrees of attentiveness, 
analysis, and participation.  Drawing on Wageman's (1995) research on effort norms the 
antecedents of effort norms are the rigorous assessment and review of information prior 
to meetings; conducting research on pertinent issues affecting the company; taking 
notes during meetings and active participation during meetings. 
 
Effort norms is the most studied dimension of board process or decision process.  The 
extant literature that was reviewed showed that the variables or constructs of effort 
norms is extensively defined; some studies covering the relationship between effort 
norms, board performance and organisation performance; and very few studies on the 
relationship between effort norms and board activism.   
 
Research has found a positive relationship between effort norms and board 
performance (Wan and Ong, 2005; Zona and Zattoni, 2007). The studies by Wan and 
Ong (2005) and Zona and Zattoni (2007) were implemented using Singapore and Italian 
firms respectively as their samples.  
 
From the perspective of the relationship between effort norms and board effectiveness 
studies done by Pearce and Zahra (1991) and Valeas (1999) found a significantly 
positive relationship between the two variables.  Similarly, Forbes and Milliken (1999) 
postulated that increased effort in the configuration of time spent on board activities can 
significantly determine the degree to which shareholders’ interests are successfully 
achieved.  In contrast, Payne, Benson and Finegold (2008) found that time was not a 
significant indicant of effort to affect firm performance.  This may suggest that time 
spent on board activities does not transform to board effectiveness and board decision 
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quality.  Payne et al. (2008) suggested that future research could extend the body of 
knowledge doing research on the amount of time spent on duties, but with a focus on 
how that time was spent. For example, a study could scrutinise the amount of time a 
board spent on monitoring team behaviours relative to other board activities.   
 
Extending the analysis of the theme of time, Pound (1995) argued that to create an 
effective board is dependent on director’s apportionment of a substantial chunk of 
professional time to the corporation.  Copeland and Towl (1947) contended that 
directors must be able and willing to devote the necessary effort towards the fulfilment 
of responsibilities to stockholders, creditors, employees, and other stakeholders. 
Pound’s (1995) study quantified the time and provision of a guideline to boards to 
commit to a minimum of 25 days in order to fulfil these responsibilities. Additionally, 
strong effort norms (collective effort) enhance the effort each director exerts as a 
member (Feldman, 1984; Steiner, 1972; Wageman, 1995). Conclusively, the investment 
of personal resources to board activities, the ability to access information needed for the 
application of their functional area knowledge in pursuit of effective board performance 
(Lorsch and MacIver, 1989).  
 
Scarborough, Haynie and Shook (2010) findings indicated a strong link between effort 
norms and board activism. This finding reinforced Sonnenfeld’s (2002) argument that 
active and effective boards are a function of treating boards as social system, instead of 
structural elements. Effective boards of directors do not follow all structural protocols 
whereas Huse (2007) proposed adherence to decision procedures.  Sonnenfeld (2002) 
thinking on decision process argued that truly high-performing boards of directors are 
robust, effective social systems with a shared understanding of the level of effort that 
directors should exert in the execution of their duties.   The shared culture of 
collaboration ignited director’s motivation to become active board members.   
 
The measurement tools for effort norms developed by Wageman (1995) and Forbes 
and Milliken (1999) consider the ratings of board member’s support for particular 
behaviours.  The survey consisted of questions on board’s member’s perception of 
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expectations and support on a 7- item measure on a likert scale ranging from 1, a low 
rating, to 5, a high rating.  Some of the indicants of effort norms are, namely, thorough 
consideration of information, doing research on company issues, full participation during 
meetings, query issues and decisions are reached through thorough discussion and 
debate at board level.  Below Boatright (2012) provides a framework for explaining the 
level of effort by board members on a continuum from least involved to most involved.  
Boatright’s framework (2010) closely relates to the variables of effort norms and board 
activism.  
 
The Role of the Board of Directors 
 
Figure 2.3 below highlights the continuum of involvement by the board members 
(Boatright, 2012). 
 
LEAST INVOLVED - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - MOST INVOLVED 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Source:  Boatright (2012).  Ethics and the Conduct of Business. 7th Edition, 
New Jersey: Pearson. 
 
 
The passive board is also called a “rubber stamp” board because they will approve 
whatever is presented to them. On a “rubber stamp” board, the approvals come so 
quickly it is like having the board stamping each proposal with their approval and the 
stamp “bouncing up in the air” and quickly stamping the next proposal like a rubber 
stamp. This type of board involvement was very common in the past since there was a 
lack of transparency of the actions of the board and the stockholders and stakeholders 
did not demand accountability of the board. 
 
The certifying board is a step forward pertaining to being involved in the strategic 
decisions of the organisation. The role of the certifying board is similar to the mandate 
Passive 
 
Certifying Engaged Intervening Operating 
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of an enforcement officer. The certifying board verifies the legality of the actions of the 
board but does not move beyond this responsibility. As a result, employees of the 
organisations would still be allowed to make unethical decisions as long as they were 
legal. 
 
The engaged board moves one step closer to becoming a fully involved board. An 
engaged board is proactive and is not just responding to ideas proposed by 
management but offers their own ideas of the future course of the organisation. An 
engaged board becomes actively involved with the CEO in the formulation of strategic 
ideas which also ensured that ethical issues are incorporated in the decision making 
process. 
 
An intervening board considers themselves to be of equal stature as it pertains to the 
decision making process within the organisation. An intervening board becomes actively 
involved in all major decisions pertaining to the organisation. 
 
An operating board is the highest level of involvement by the board of directors. The key 
distinction between the operating board and the intervening board is the operating 
board controls the decision making process. As a result, the CEO only has one vote 
when decisions are made. Therefore, the CEO’s decision may not always be 
implemented by the firm if the majority of the board does not agree with the decision. 
 
2.13 Use of knowledge/skills 
The extant literature makes a distinction between knowledge/skills, management 
cognition, expertise, functional area knowledge and firm specific knowledge.  The 
knowledge/skills construct, was first identified by Hackman and Morris (1975) and 
(Hackman, 1987: 327) and related to the optimisation of process losses, occurrence of 
cross-training  and collective learning among members.  Cohen and Bailey (1997) 
extended the body of knowledge in recognising that behavioural dimensions of social 
integration which refers to a group's ability to cooperate. Further these scholars made a 
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distinction between the use of knowledge and skills and cognitive conflict.   Knowledge 
and skills refers to the process and coordination of members' contributions, whereas 
cognitive conflict is defined as the content of members' contributions.  The successful 
execution of the control function is dependent on the integration of their knowledge of 
the firm’s internal affairs with their expertise of law and strategy.  In addition, boards 
execute their service task effectively through combining their knowledge of various 
functional areas and applying that knowledge properly to firm-specific issues. Another 
dependency of board effectiveness is board process issues.  This relates to the ability of 
board members to elicit and respect each others' expertise, build and combine their 
contributions in a creative and synergistic ways.   
 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) made a distinction between two dimensions of knowledge, 
namely: (1) functional area knowledge and skills and (2) firm-specific knowledge and 
skills. Functional area knowledge and skills comprise the traditional domains of 
business, including accounting, finance, and marketing, as well as the firm's relationship 
with its environment, such as law. This definition of knowledge is consistent with the 
managerial cognitions literature that defines knowledge domains as categories of 
functional area expertise (Stubbart, 1989).  Rindova (1999) recognised that directors’ 
expertise is a more dominant issue than corporate governance research had previously 
acknowledged. Furthermore director expertise has a significant effect on board activism, 
a finding that focuses greater attention on director cognitions (Scarborough, Haynie and 
Shook, 2010). This finding also suggested boards of directors should be viewed as 
intellectual assets of a corporation.  Forbes and Milliken (1999) agreed that for board 
effectiveness in the execution of their duties a high degree of specialised knowledge 
and skill is required.   
 
Another stream of thinking propagates that expertise includes knowledge about a 
certain domain, awareness of its main problems, and general approaches to solving the 
problems (Sullivan, 1990).  Stubbart’s (1989) conceptualisation of expertise is that each 
area has its own sets of computational rules and operating mechanisms for encoding, 
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locating, using, and changing mental representations determining what individuals 
deem to be important.   
 
The definition of firm-specific knowledge and skills relates to nuanced information about 
the firm and an intimate understanding of its operations and internal management 
issues. Nonaka (1994) argued that to achieve effectiveness and competitive advantage 
Boards often require this kind of "tacit" knowledge. For example, to make informed 
decisions about diversification or acquisition opportunities, the board may need to have 
a detailed understanding of how new and existing businesses would complement one 
another (Farjoun, 1994; Sirower, 1997).   
 
Ancona and Caldwell (1988) argued that to enrich the decision making processes 
directors functional knowledge and skills with external networks for information 
gathering and problem solving is necessary. Nonaka (1994) added that to make good 
informed decisions it is necessary for directors to have firm-specific knowledge and 
skills.  Boards as an elite, strategic-issue-processing group must have members who 
possess knowledge and skills in these areas or have access to external networks that 
can aid in information gathering and problem solving (Ancona and Caldwell, 1988).   
 
The extant literature found that the diversity of the Directors’ functional area knowledge 
increased the overall cognitive capacity of a board. Thus, functional area knowledge is 
critical to both the scope and the ultimate quality of directors’ decision-making. Roy 
(2008) contended that board activism increases when cognitive capacity matches the 
cognitive demands of a corporation’s business environment.   Consequentially, that 
deduction that can be made is that a board’s involvement in the affairs of a corporation 
increases as cognitive diversity is applied to the cognitive needs of a corporation’s 
competitive environment.   
 
Maharaj (2007) argued that informed decision making is a function of the knowledge 
base, depth and breadth of knowledge and learning capabilities.  In the execution of 
their duties board members are able to analyse and synthesise information to make 
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empowered decisions. Further, the organisation benefits immensely from the depth and 
scope of the board members’ knowledge and expertise and can be considered a 
resource strength that contributes to competitive advantages over rivalries.  In addition, 
compositional dimensions of the board are a function of the demographics, the calibre 
and knowledge base and learning capabilities of the board members and also how they 
interact with each other, with management and with other stakeholders. 
 
(Maharaj, 2007) argued that one way to ensure that companies do not nominate board 
members with a groupthink mentality may be accomplished by formulating a well-
developed skill matrices.  The skills matrices is aligned to the industry trends and the 
organisation’s strategic needs with the dimensions of knowledge, experience and the 
behavioural characteristics / patterns of potential and existing board members.  This 
exercise ensured that there is congruence between the corporation’s needs and the 
board members’ capabilities. The recruitment matrices for the selection of board 
members measured the depth and sufficiency of knowledge to make an adequate 
contribution.  The selection matrix that was used to assess the level of functional 
knowledge and skills was further refined by Dulewicz, MacMillan and Herbert (1995).  
The selection tool identified 37 skills required of directors and subsequently researchers 
further divided the required competencies into 6 groups.   Similarly earlier research by 
Leblanc and Gillies (2003) contended that a combination of directors with different 
behavioural characteristics will lead to a more effective decision-making process by the 
board. 
 
Brown (2007), Dulewicz and Herbert (2008) and Roy (2008) emphasised paying 
attention to board processes aimed at developing and improving board expertise.  
These scholars argued that to ensure strong oversight and relevant input into strategic 
decisions, companies must ensure that board members have the required skills and 
knowledge. The cultivation of board expertise is achieved through education 
programmes, director nomination and board performance evaluations.  For the 
development of board expertise Carlson (1998) added that directors could benefit from 
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reciprocal learning. Mistrust at the inception stages of new boards are reduced or 
minimised through the exchanges in knowledge and experience.  Consequentially, 
boards with a wide range of knowledge are able to meet the demands of the 
organisation and are more involved in the affairs of the organisation. Thus, a wide range 
of functional area knowledge amongst board members facilitates the board to be more 
active in its governance roles.   
 
Consistent with the findings of Zona and Zattoni (2007) Scarborough et al (2010) found 
empirical support for the positive association between functional area knowledge and 
board activism.  These scholars recognised that both internal and outside Boards of 
directors are resource strengths and invaluable asset.   Directors contribute diverse 
experiences, judgments, and functional area knowledge that is potentially applicable to 
the cognitive needs of the corporation. Prahalad and Bettis (1986) argued that to cope 
with complexity and uncertainty, directors develop perceptual filters and dominant logics 
that correspond to their experiences as leaders and directors of their own organisations. 
In the execution of their fiduciary responsibility board of directors bring multiple and 
diverse perceptual filters and dominant logics to the governance of an organisation and 
increases board activism.  For the decision process, directors scan larger volumes of 
environmental and organisational data and analyses the data through multiple 
perspectives and logics. Directors’ varied knowledge domains thereby reduce the risk of 
competitive blind spots (Zajac and Bazerman, 1991). Directors categorise information 
they receive and create links to pre-existing knowledge areas and beliefs, and use 
these links to conceive actions and consequences.  
 
Another perspective by Hillman, Cannella and Harris (2002) are that although there are 
varied measures of board knowledge, the extant literature recognises that several 
moderating variables determine the board’s ability to translate board knowledge into 
sound strategic decisions.  In addition there should be sufficient diversity among board 
members to generate a comprehensive list of possible alternatives (Hillman, et al., 
2002).  Further these scholars argued that active participation, sharing of knowledge 
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and transparency of opinions is enabled by the group norms and good decision 
processes. Sonnenfeld (2002) contended that the benefits of specific types of 
knowledge are context specific. For example, context specific knowledge for mergers or 
acquisitions for a specific industry improved monitoring, advise and counsel to attain a 
competitive position (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). This, in turn, improves firm 
performance in specific contexts.   
 
Board members human capital is a function of their diverse experience and industry 
specific experience positively influence board decision outcomes and consequentially 
results in board decision quality.   In the case of boards, the measures of knowledge 
refers to technical expertise, governance best practice, business strategy, succession, 
finance, law, technology, society and operations management (Baysinger and Butler, 
1985; Conger, Lawler III and Finegold, 2001 and Sonnenfeld, 2002). 
 
The extant literature recognised that there are a number of ways to measure the 
presence of functional area knowledge or cognition.  To assess the knowledge and 
skills present on the board researchers using a Likert scale created as a measure of the 
degree to which both types of expertise are present on the board. In the extant literature 
the scale used to assess the presence of functional area knowledge and skills might 
include items to gauge the presence of knowledge in domains, such as finance, 
accounting, marketing, and law. These items could then be summed to obtain a 
composite score. Alternatively, because some functional areas are liable to vary in 
importance across industries, researchers may want to ask respondents to rate the 
importance of various functional areas to their businesses and use an additive measure 
that weights more important areas more strongly.  In assessing firm-specific knowledge 
and skills, researchers could draw on measures similar to those developed by McGrath, 
MacMillan, and Venkataraman (1995) to measure "comprehension" within executive 
teams. Specifically, researchers could ask respondents to assess the degree to which 
the board understands cause- effect relationships involving the needs of customers, 
sources of risk to the firm, and impediments to output quality.   
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2.14 Cognitive Conflict  
 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) defined cognitive conflict as differences in judgment among 
group members in the execution of board duties. Whereas Jehn (1995) defined 
cognitive conflict as disagreements about the content of the tasks performed, including 
differences in viewpoints, ideas and opinions.  Jehn (ibid) provided other characteristics 
of cognitive conflict as being primarily concerned with the presence of issue related 
disagreement among members. Furthermore, cognitive conflict is eminent in groups 
that, like boards, are interdependent and face complex decision-making tasks. Dutton 
and Jackson (1987) agreed that the environment and context in which boards operate 
are complex and ambiguous.  Moreover, board members instigate differential analysis, 
interpretation, problem solving approaches and decision outcomes.  However, boards 
are likely to differ considerably in the degree to which they experience cognitive conflict 
(Byrne, 1997; Monks and Minow, 1995).  Amason (1996: 104) argued that cognitive 
conflict involve the use of critical and investigative interaction processes that can 
enhance the board's cognitive and evaluative performance in executive the control role 
of its duties. Amason (1996) deduced that the degree, intensity and rigour of 
disagreement and critical investigation of the board exerts pressure on CEOs to explain, 
justify, possibly modify positions and consider diverse alternate perspectives on 
important strategic issues.  The above scholars agreed that presence of cognitive 
conflict enriches decision making as the board generates diverse alternatives and 
critically evaluates the options in pursuit of shareholder interest.  In addition, cognitive 
conflict generates diverse alternative options and possibilities and rigorous evaluation of 
alternatives-processes that contribute to quality strategic decision making in uncertain 
environments (Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, and Bourgeois, 1997; Jackson, 1992; Milliken and 
Vollrath, 1991). Likewise, Wanous and Youtz (1986) found that diverse thinking 
positively influence the quality of group decisions.  Schweiger, Sandberg, and Ragan 
(1986) found that conflict-inducing techniques contribute to the effectiveness of strategic 
decision-making groups.  Teams benefit from different ideas and diverse perspectives 
that are generated in the execution of duties (Bourgeois, 1985; Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1990; Jehn, 1995). Cognitive conflict improved decision quality because 
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the synthesis that emerges from the conflict is generally superior to the individual 
perspectives\thinking on particular issues (Schweiger and Sandberg, 1989; Schwenk, 
1990). 
 
Despite the beneficial effects of cognitive conflict, cognitive conflict also can arouse 
negative emotions (Nemeth and Staw, 1989) that diminish interpersonal attraction 
among members.  Findings by Jehn (1995) and Schweiger and colleagues (1986) 
demonstrated that members of groups with high levels of cognitive conflict experience 
lower levels of satisfaction with the group and express less desire to remain with the 
group. Mace (1986) has found evidence that these dynamics can apply to boards as 
well.   In considering the effects of cognitive conflict Mace (1986) found that the 
competing demands and the nature and intensity of cognitive conflict results in board 
directors reducing their commitment to the board.     Similarly research finding by 
(Roseman, Wiest and Swartz, 1994; Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981) indicated that 
cognitive functioning is reduced with the anxiety produced by interpersonal animosity, 
may inhibit performance and distract team members from the task, causing them to 
work less effectively and produce suboptimal products (Kelly, 1979; Wilson et al., 1986). 
 
Based on the analysis of the research studies it would be appropriate for the 
chairperson to manage the level of conflict and the impact thereof.  Jehn and Shah 
(1997) agreed that for certain types of tasks moderate levels of cognitive conflict have 
been beneficial to group performance. 
 
Jehn and Mannix (2001) and Schweiger, Sandberg, and Ragan (1986) distinguished 
between three types of conflicts that occur in a group which will affect group 
performance. The three types are conflict is cognitive conflict, affective conflict and 
process conflict.  Cognitive conflict pertains to the dissonance relating to the 
performance of tasks due to generating diverse perspectives, ideas and opinions.  
Research done by Engle (2011) attempted to address the deficit in research by 
assessing affective and cognitive conflict in the decision making process and its impact 
on decision outcomes.   
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Studies by (Jehn, Northcraft and Neale, 1999) identified process conflict as the 
awareness of controversies about aspects of how task will be accomplished.   
Dimensions of process conflict relate to issues of duty and resource delegation, 
allocation of responsibility and the level of responsibility.  Few empirical studies on 
process conflict by Jehn (1992) generated lower level of group morale, decreased 
efficiency and dissatisfaction.  Moreover, Jehn (1997) found that process conflicts 
meddle with task content quality and within this domain sometimes irrelevant and 
unnecessary discussions emerge.  Studies by Jehn, Northcraft and Neale (1999) found 
that group members that continue to engage in rigorous debate about processes related 
to the task damages relationships and cripples the ability of members to do their work 
effectively. 
 
 
A number of scholars provided measures for cognitive conflict (Jehn, 1995; McNulty and 
Peck, 2010; Charan, 1998; Jehn, 1995).  Jehn’s (1995) conceptualisation and measure 
of cognitive conflict is the four-item scale for task conflict. Using a Likert scale 
respondents rate the frequency of conflicts about ideas and the extent of differences of 
opinion on the board. 
 
To measure cognitive conflict nine items was proposed by McNulty and Peck (2010); 
Charan (1998); Jehn (1995) and Smith, Smith, Olian, Sims, Bannon and Scully (1994).  
The measures for cognitive conflict included, inclusive participation and decision 
processes, reaching decision amicably, open and candid discussions, personality 
clashes amongst directors, win-lose relationships and the creation of an inclusive and 
positive board culture by the chairperson.  The measurements are on a 5-item Likert-
scale range from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Higher scores represent higher 
level of cognitive conflict.  Similarly, Smith et al (1994) developed measures for affective 
conflict using a Likert-scale.  The measures for cognitive conflict are whether (1) there is 
personality clashes among directors; (2) members do not get along very well and (3) 
relationships among members are "win-lose".   Higher scores represent higher level of 
affective conflict. 
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On process conflict, four items can be taken from studies by Shah and Jehn (1993), and 
Jehn and Mannix (2001). These measures include whether (1) board members tend to 
argue on the way things are done; (2) board members often differ about the resource 
allocation for work and (3) there are frequent arguments about who should do what in 
this board. Like the first two types of conflicts, process conflict can be measured on a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree". Greater scores 
mean higher level of affective conflict. 
 
2.15 Information Quality  
 
Maharaj (2007) argued that information accuracy, clarity, reliability and timeliness are at 
the heart of board process. Information quality is a function of board member’s ability to 
interrogate the content, process and perspectives of board members to preserve the 
veracity and integrity of the information and avoid groupthink. 
 
From the perspective of board effectiveness research advocates argued that 
information feedback from the environment is pivotal to the success of work groups 
(Katz, 1982). Information referred to data about occurrences, events, and activities that 
affect the business (Conger and Lawler, 2001). In the context of the board this 
specifically referred to business environment, competitor activities and information 
about performance against strategic objectives (Lawler, Finegold, Benson and Conger, 
2002).  Valuable, accurate and timely information can reduce transaction costs and 
uncertainty (Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999), provided access to opportunities 
(Pfeffer, 1991), increase competitive intelligence (Burt, 1983) and is widely advocated 
for good governance.  The extant literature strongly suggested that increased amounts 
of information available to executives and directors pertinent to board activities relate to 
board effectiveness (O’Neal and Thomas, 1996; Pound, 1995). 
 
Below a framework developed Fisher, Lauria, Chengalur-Smith and Wang (2006) 
delineated the antecedents of information quality.   
77 | P a g e  
 
 
MIT’s Information Quality Dimensions  
Accessibility  The extent to which data is available or easily and quickly retrievable.  
Appropriate Amount of Data  The extent to which the volume of data is appropriate for the task at 
hand.  
Believability  The extent to which data is regarded as true and credible.  
Completeness  The extent to which data is not missing and is of sufficient breadth 
and depth for the task at hand.  
Concise Representation  The extent to which data is compactly represented.  
Consistent Representation  The extent to which data is presented in the same format.  
Ease of Manipulation  The extent to which data is easy to manipulate and apply to different 
tasks.  
Free of Error  The extent to which data is correct and reliable.  
Interpretability  The extent to which data is in appropriate languages, symbols, and 
units and the definitions are clear.  
Objectivity  The extent to which data is unbiased, unprejudiced, and impartial.  
Relevancy  The extent to which data is applicable and helpful for the task at hand.  
Reputation  The extent to which data is highly regarded in terms of its source or 
content.  
Security  The extent to which access to data is restricted appropriately to 
maintain its security.  
Timeliness  The extent to which information is available in time to perform the task 
at hand.  
Understandability  The extent to which data is easily comprehended.  
Value-Added  The extent to which data is beneficial and provides advantages from 
its use.  
 
Table 2.2:  Fisher, Lauria, Chengalur and Wang (2006).  Introduction to Information 
Quality. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Information Quality Programme.  Alplaus 
Books. 
 
From the above boards are dependent on management for information on the very 
things they are expected to examine, assess and oversee, including management’s 
performance.  The board’s ability to provide meaningful oversight and useful advice is 
determined by the quality, timeliness and credibility of the information it has. Another 
area that is flagged for further analysis is information asymmetry being the difference 
between the information available to management and what is presented to the board. 
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Lawler, Finegold, Benson and Conger (2002) contended that a number of questions 
have to be explored in this regard.  Further they argued what are the minimum amounts 
and kinds of information that directors needed to make prudent business judgments and 
effective decisions.  In addition they contended that this is especially relevant if there 
are unethical lapses, directors may not be able to rely solely on information from 
management.  Directors may feel compelled by duty and law to seek sources of 
information that are free from management’s interpretations, analyses and biases. 
 
Thomas, Schrage, Bellin and Marcotte (2009) argued from an agency perspective that 
quality information is essential to board process and board decision quality. Thomas et 
al (2009) recognise that there is a gap in knowledge (information asymmetry) between 
insiders (management) and shareholders\directors.  Further they argue that for the 
board of directors to fully and effectively protect shareholder interest overcoming 
information asymmetry is critically important to navigate business challenges and risks. 
Another dimension proposed by Thomas et al (2009) is that the nature, quality and 
robustness of engagement between management and board, is affected by how much 
they know about each other’s interests, objectives, fears and aspirations.  The gaps in 
knowledge (blind spots) that exist (information not known about the self and the others) 
affect the interaction, process and decision outcomes.  Thomas et al (2009) identified 
four types of interactions below and a figurative illustration thereof in Figure 2.4 below: 
 Open discussion or review is possible when each side reveals what it knows to 
the other. 
 The board fulfils its role as adviser when members share insights and 
experiences with management. 
 Disputes are possible between management and the board when the line 
between management’s knowledge (of operations, for example) and that of the 
board is challenged by the board’s quest for further discussion or review. 
 The danger zone is the space where neither management nor the board has 
knowledge about a situation (for example, competitor behaviour or legal/ethical 
terrain). 
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Figure 2.4:  Types of interactions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4:  Source - Types of interactions Thomas, Schrage, Bellin and Marcotte (2009) 
 
The rosters of today’s corporate boards reflect pressures from legislators, regulators, 
investors and listed exchanges to enshrine independence as a major principle of 
effective governance. Tomorrow’s corporate boards, by contrast, will be expected not 
only to be independent in terms of their composition but also to act independently. 
Information asymmetry between management and the board is one of the major 
stumbling blocks along the path to this future.  As long as directors rely on management 
for information and analyses, they can neither make decisions independently nor 
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effectively monitor company performance. For this reason, the definition of 
“independence” for boards will increasingly embrace their own information and 
analyses. 
 
Morrison (1972) found that a study of some British and American companies continue to 
prosper and make profits during times of economic pressure and the primary reason is 
that the boards of directors have operated effectively. Morrison further argued the 
effectiveness of the board is a function of the quality of information provided.  The 
outside director makes a contribution of unique value-but only if provided with adequate 
information.  The outsider director is far more dependent than the executive director on 
the information provided by the company.  Further arguments were advanced by 
Morrison that it remains a key challenge to provide adequate information to outside 
board members and the board as a whole to discharge their responsibilities properly.  
Morrison further outlined the kinds of information which all board members need to 
make effective decisions, namely, a sound understanding of the present and 
prospective economic and competitive environment.  Furthermore, an understanding of 
the problems the company is likely to confront, the adequacy and validity of the 
company's objectives; ensure that long-term allocation of resources is sound; and to 
evaluate the company's key executives.  Despite the recognition that boards need 
quality information timeously, Morrison argued that the information provided to board 
members is too often archaic, excessively figure-oriented, and wholly inadequate to 
allow them to discharge their role and responsibilities.   He further suggested critical 
questions and information that should be provided to the board to effective decisions 
(Table 2.3). 
 
Table 2.3 Focus areas of the board  
Focus areas of the board   
Has the market for the industry's major products reached a plateau? If so, 
what changes in management tasks and priorities are likely to result? 
 
Is the company maintaining its leadership in innovation and new product 
development? 
 
How strong is the company's competitive position?   
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Is the company exploiting its full opportunities for its products worldwide?  
What are the reasons for the current trend in our profitability, and to what 
extent is it a function of management action or of general industry and 
economic forces? 
 
Will the forecasted capital expenditures build on the strengths of the 
business or merely reinforce its weaknesses? 
 
Are new funds going into high-profit businesses, or into businesses that are 
becoming mature? 
 
How sound is the company's geographic allocation of resources in view of 
variations of growth and risk between territories? 
 
Are the investments made by management paying off as originally 
projected? 
 
Table 2.3:  Source - Focus areas of the board (Morrison, 1972) 
 
 
Morrison (1972) further proposed that the board formulates an annual board agenda to 
provide structure and focus to the meetings.  He further argued that information will be 
provided to the board in accordance to the agenda item for a particular month.   
 
Table 2.4 Annualised board agenda  
 
Month  Proposed annual board agenda 
January  Examination of the future use of resources in the light of company objectives and 
capital requests 
 
February  Review of results achieved during previous year and reasons for variances from plan, 
both 
operating and capital expenditure, including comparisons with competitors 
March Annual review of management development, compensation programs, and 
succession plans 
April Annual reappraisal of company objectives and strategies, including consideration of 
specific 
areas for diversification warranting possible investigation 
May Review of major environmental, political, and technological trends, and their 
implications 
June Review of estimated results for current fiscal year and implications of these results for 
management priorities 
July  Presentation and discussion on specific studies arising out of long-term strategy or 
environmental trends 
August  Open agenda 
September & 
October  
Review of significant economic trends and their implications for the company 
November & 
December 
Assessment of the outlook for. and the strengths and weaknesses of, each of the 
company's major businesses (presented by the executive in charge of each business) 
Table 2.4 Source:  Morrison (1972) Danger: Directors in the Dark 
 
Nicholson and Kiel (2004) argued that effective meetings depend on planning, orderly 
conduct and active participation by all board members.  Nicholson et al. (2004) provided 
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further guidelines for board meetings.  The planning process for board meetings relate 
to the meeting agenda and the board packs.   A well-designed agenda facilitates the 
flow of information and shapes subsequent discussion by the board, while the board 
packs are the key source of information for board members.  Nicholson et al. (2004) in 
comparing and contrasting best practice of board agendas revealed that the common 
practice is that the formats of individual board submissions tend to be fairly similar in 
well-governed organisations.  The common practice and format for board packs states 
its purpose, provides background information on an agenda item, presents major issues 
for consideration and makes recommendations. The review by Nicholson et al. (2004) 
concluded that a full set of board packs prepared for directors should include an 
agenda, the minutes of the previous meeting, major correspondence, the CEO’s (or 
equivalent’s) report, including a report on risk/compliance (unless covered elsewhere), 
financial reports and documentation supporting submissions that require decisions. 
 
Nicholson and Kiel (2004) in a systematic review of its corporate governance 
processes, proposed that the board considers its workflow during the year. In general, 
scholars proposed that efficiency and effectiveness of board process is achieved by 
developing a structured annual calendar of major board events.  The annual agenda 
schedules specific items to be discussed at the appropriate times and the provision of 
sufficient time for preparatory work leading up to a major meeting (Morisson, 1972; 
Nicholson and Kiel, 2004).  These scholars proposed that another way of improving the 
efficiency of board process is through the creation of committees. Nicholson et al. 
(2004) further proposed that the improvement of board process is achieved through the 
creation of board committees.  Board committees adhere to specific decision processes 
and are required to analyse, review and summarise information and report back to the 
full board for decision, or can be delegated specific decision-making powers.  
 
2.16 Cohesiveness  
Summers, Coffelt and Horton (1988) defined cohesiveness as the extent to which 
directors are attracted to each other and motivated to stay with the board. As a result of 
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the nature of board participation of attendance of meetings being periodically creates a 
part-time status and partial inclusion among directors (Weick, 1979).  Furthermore, Park 
(1995) argued that the nature of board involvement is casual and that this involvement 
and partial inclusion of directors’ cause ineffective board performance. Drawing on the 
contributions of the above scholars, cohesiveness encompasses the effective 
relationship of directors and represents their ability to effectively work together.   
 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) addressed the potential for board cohesiveness to exert an 
immediate influence on board task performance.  The effective functioning of the 
Boards is determined by the degree of interpersonal attraction among members to 
execute complex decisions (Williams and O'Reilly, 1998). Williams et al. (1998) further 
argued that the relationship between board cohesiveness and board task performance 
is likely to be curvilinear. In addition these scholars debated that the interpersonal 
attraction to engage in robust discussion is a requirement of performing board tasks 
(service and control).  Extensive communication and deliberation is needed in order to 
engage in discussion to reach good decisions.  Further, board members must trust each 
others' judgment and expertise, and where there are low levels of interpersonal 
attraction it will become difficult to sustain the trust.  However, very high levels of 
cohesiveness are likely to prove detrimental to the quality of the board's decision 
making.  
 
O'Reilly, Caldwell and Barnett (1989) argued that the impact of cohesiveness on 
strategic decisions has two aspects, namely, generation and implementation. The 
generation of diverse ideas is negatively associated with consensus and social 
integration in groups. Such groups value teamwork, cooperation and are more cohesive 
and motivated to maintain cordial relations. Consequentially as cohesiveness cultivates, 
this leads to higher pressure for conformity, limiting the quality of both alternative 
generation of ideas and alternatives and the evaluation of decisions. 
 Within cohesiveness groups, there exists high level of cooperation, frequent 
communication and group identification, all of which will enhance the implementation of 
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decisions (Guth and MacMillan, 1986).  Furthermore Isbella and Waddock (1994) 
reasoned that consensus created feelings of satisfaction that give rise to greater 
decision acceptance and commitment.  Furthermore, cohesiveness enhances decision 
in promoting earlier and more extensive discussion of alternative scenarios (Hogg, 
1996). 
 
Cohesiveness has negative implications. In this regard Mullen, Anthony, Salas and 
Driskell (1994) contended that highly cohesive boards may be distracted by the 
proliferation of personal exchanges. In addition, cohesiveness is the most prominent 
and frequently noted antecedent of groupthink (Mullen, Anthony, Salas and Driskell, 
1994).  Group think is a dysfunctional mode of group decision making characterised by 
relentless unanimity and a reduction in independent critical thinking (Janis, 1983).  
Arguably some level of cohesiveness is needed for effective decision making but not 
crippling the process and functioning of the board.  Janis (1983) argued for a moderate 
level of cohesiveness for optimal functioning in decision making tasks.  In summation, 
the deduction is that group think is an antecedent of cohesiveness and is needed for 
effective decision process and board performance.  Below scholars put forth arguments 
on the effects of cohesiveness as it leads to group think and the conditions thereof.  
Although, as we have noted, cohesiveness is a key determinant of groupthink, it is not 
sufficient to produce groupthink (Janis, 1983; Mullen et al., 1994). In order to lead to 
groupthink, cohesiveness must also be accompanied by an absence of cognitive conflict 
among members. According to Janis (1983), groupthink occurred when members of 
highly cohesive groups engage in self-censorship and act as "mindguards," pressuring 
deviant thinkers to conform to majority opinions. Janis (1983) reasoned that high levels 
of both interpersonal attraction and task-oriented disagreement are probable in a 
cohesive environment.   
 
Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker (1994) argued that increased size of the board can 
significantly reduce cohesiveness among board members. Large boards may encounter 
more hindrances for a consensus on decisions. Shaw (1981) argued that in large 
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groups, directors might experience lower levels of motivation and satisfaction with the 
lack or restriction of effective participation. Gladstein (1984) added that larger teams are 
characterised by large number of potential interactions among members and hence 
maybe more difficult to coordinate. 
 
Shanley and Langfred (1998) provided indicators of group cohesiveness.  Examples of 
measures of cohesiveness that identify the extent to which (1) the board obtains 
feedback from the directors for decision-making; (2) the board gets help from the 
directors for decision-making and (3) cooperativeness of directors is present. These 
measurements are rated on a 5-point Likert scale from very low to very high and greater 
scores represent higher level of cohesiveness. 
 
2.17 Improving board process ad board effectiveness 
Nicholson and Kiel (2004) study recognised that governance in action is experienced 
through the board meetings.   Nicholson et al. (2004) further provided some of the 
criteria that characterise good governance through effective board meetings.  These 
scholars argued that the board meeting is the lynchpin of a corporation’s governance 
processes.  In addition, successful meetings is characterised by effective 
communication and collective action. The success of a meeting is a function of the 
personalities, needs and objectives of the people in attendance of the meeting.  
Similarly, the degree of complexity of the issues under consideration, the legal and time 
restraints that govern board process influence the outcome of a decision. 
 
In the study by Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) there was support that board 
independence maybe insufficient\inadequate in explaining board effectiveness and 
quality.  Finkelstein et al. (2003) identified five factors through an analysis of director’s 
interaction and behaviour as they achieve their duties. The determinants of board 
effectiveness are five interrelated process goals: (1) Engage in constructive conflict; (2) 
Avoid destructive conflict; (3) Work together as a team; (4) Know the appropriate level 
of strategic involvement; (5) Address decisions comprehensively. 
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McIntyre, Murphy and Mitchell (2007) asserted that boards are teams and some of the 
factors that lead to board effectiveness are the very same factors that lead to team 
effectiveness in general.  They further extracted lessons from Organisational Behaviour 
literature on team effectiveness for insights into board effectiveness. 
 
McIntyre et al. (2007) and Finkelstein et al. (2009) provide some guiding principles to 
improve governance and board effectiveness.  Reference is made to the principles, 
namely, engaging in constructive conflict, avoidance of destructive conflict, work 
together as a team, and an appropriate level of strategic involvement and addressing 
decisions comprehensively below.   
Engage in Constructive Conflict (Especially with the CEO) 
Constructive conflict occurs when directors hold and debate diverse views among 
themselves and with the CEO.  From the perspective that the whole is greater than the 
parts, constructive conflict help the board fully understand issues surrounding the 
decision context and synthesise multiple points of view into a decision that is often 
superior to any individual perspective. In other words, constructive conflict improves 
decision-making in a board and is an important determinant of effectiveness. 
Avoid destructive conflict 
Constructive engagement had multiple levels of impact such as feeling threatened, the 
evoking of personal and emotional issues cause destructive conflict, dissenting views of 
directors and personal tensions that affect decisions and functioning of the board. 
Work Together as a Team 
In the research done by Finkelstein et al. (2009) 84% of the board members claimed 
that team work is essential in making complex and ambiguous strategic decisions.  
Unfortunately, boards often do not act like teams. Developing strong team norms is 
difficult because boards spend little time together (4-6 meetings per annum) and, hence, 
has few opportunities to coalesce as a group.  Board teamwork is affected by having a 
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small number of dominant directors take over deliberations.  The fear is to avoid the 
development of fiefdoms.   
Know the Appropriate Level of Strategic Involvement 
The strategic issues with which the board is involved will vary, often in ways that affect 
not only how boards work as a group but to how boards perform.  The role of directors 
extend beyond monitoring the CEO to knowing more on the company but to be involved 
in micro-management.  The directors interviewed stated that board can encroach on the 
role of management and become prescriptive about some decisions.   
Address Decisions Comprehensively 
Boards often tackle problems in a less than comprehensive manner-they often address 
decisions with little depth, avoid seeking help from experts, and limit their exploration of 
decision alternatives. 
Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) proposed a number of recommendations to improve 
board effectiveness, namely:  (1) opting for directors with strategically relevant 
experience; (2) Directors to possess knowledge\skills and functional area knowledge (3) 
Directors to possess strategically relevant experience which is likely to improve decision 
comprehensiveness by adding richness to discussions; (4) Evaluation of the 
communication style of potential directors; (5)  the ability to question, be assertive and 
outspoken but with consideration of the views of others; (6) potential directors must 
have the time to serve; (7) assessment of committee structure to ensure that it does not 
result in unnecessary divisions among directors.  
 
McDonnell and Moynihan (2011) conducted a study on board effectiveness and argued 
that a key focus on good governance is the presence of an effective board that has 
keen oversight. They too recommend a number of strategies to improve board 
effectiveness, namely: (1) the role of the company secretary; (2) board effectiveness 
can be improved by assigning responsibility to the company secretary; (3) Ensure that 
high quality information is available both to the Board as a whole and to its committees; 
(4) In addition, the Chairman and the Secretary should periodically review whether the 
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governance processes within the organisation - such as the Board and committees - are 
fit for purpose.  In addition, to facilitate the decision-making process, the Board should 
have at its disposal high-quality information, access to expert opinions (where required), 
and sufficient time to debate and challenge the issue at hand.  In terms of the decision-
making process, Boards should be aware of factors which can limit effective decision 
making, such as limited information, dominant personalities or agenda restrictions.  The 
potential risks associated with the decision being made should also be considered.  
Boards should also be aware of the factors which may distort judgement in the decision-
making process such as conflicts of interest, emotional reliance or inappropriate 
reliance on previous experience.   
 
In addition, McDonnell and  Moynihan (2011) proposed that there are a number of 
safeguards for situations where judgement may be distorted, or appear to be distorted, 
including obtaining expert advice, introducing a devil's advocate or establishing a sub-
committee for the area under review.  A useful tool to safeguard against poor judgement 
and decision-making is to have separate discussions on the concept of the proposal, 
proposal for discussion and proposal for decision, so as to avoid the Board being used 
as a simple 'sign-off' mechanism.  In summation, appropriate composition, appointing 
directors with the right skill set, appropriate experience, knowledge, and independence 
is vital to the effectiveness of the Board.  McDonnell et al. (2011) further argued that 
processes need to be in place to avoid the risk of group think.  These scholars further 
argued that diversity in terms of personal attributes, psychological type, background and 
gender must be achieved in the composition. 
 
The Board evaluation process is vital in order to ensure that a Board is effectively 
carrying out its duties and can provide useful feedback to help monitor and improve 
performance.  To be effective, this valuation process must be an objective and rigorous 
review of the Board, sub-committees and Board members.  McDonnell et al. (ibid) 
proposed that both the effectiveness of the Board is dependent on the effectiveness of 
the contributions made by the individual members. 
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These scholars further recommended that the board should retain responsibility for 
making the decisions for areas of remuneration, audit and risk.  Concepts and proposals 
can be developed at committee level but decisions are made at the board level.   
In addition McDonnell et al. (ibid) further argued that the Chairman of the Board should 
ensure that there is sufficient time allowed at Board level for the discussion of such 
matters.   Further sufficient time should be provisioned on the board agenda for the 
Board to consider the concept papers and proposals made to the Board by sub-
committees.  The minutes of sub-committee meetings should be circulated to all Board 
members to ensure a transparent process of the issues discussed.   
 
Ethics and decisions  
A critical ingredient of good corporate governance is the making of good decisions.  The 
board, management and staff are required to embrace ethical behaviour and 
mainstream ethical thinking in all actions and decisions.  Boatright (2012) proposed that 
ethical thinking and behaviour must be inculcated and embedded in the culture of the 
organisation.  Ethical behaviour should be designed in the strategic management 
processes and operationalised through the development of policies, processes, 
procedures and practices.   
 
Below Landman (2012) proposed that on a continuum an organisation’s ethical 
practices or orientation can be classified as either adjunct on the on end (survival 
category) or full integrated into how business is done (ethical society).  
 
Survival  Reactive ethics  Compliance Integrity Ethical society  
Bread first, 
morals later 
Mere awareness 
of ethical “rules” 
 
“Cold 
adherence”  to 
norms and 
checklists 
 
Internalised 
personal ethical 
behaviour and 
benevolence 
 
Ethics 
entrenched in the 
“way we all live 
and work” 
 
Unethical Ethical standards,  Rules and Values, virtues Unethical 
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practices 
endorsed 
 
but no 
enforcement 
 
external 
enforcement  
 
and internal 
commitment  
 
practices 
regarded as 
“stupid” 
 
Figure 2.5:  Adapted from: Landman, W. (2012). Governing and managing ethics in the 
university. 
 
 
The decisions made by the board focus primarily on overall strategic issues that impact 
upon the firm as a whole. As a result, issues related to ethical materials should not only 
be considered by the board but positive ethical values should be incorporated in all the 
strategic decisions of the board. 
 
Ethics and decision making  
Decision-making is improved through good governance practice.   The mainstreaming 
of ethical behaviour in decisions would improve corporate governance.  Ethics can be 
mainstreamed in decision making through consideration of the end results 
(consequentialism), the generation of the greatest pleasure (utilitarianism) and that 
ethics is a continuous process (total responsibility management).   
  
Boatright (2010) made a distinction on some of the ethical theories.  Consequentialism 
theory stated that actions are goal-directed and are justified by virtue of the end 
achieved. The greatest happiness of all is the right, proper and universally desirable end 
of human action.  Whilst Utilitarianism contended that something is morally good to the 
extent that it produces a greater balance of pleasure over pain for the largest number of 
people involved – the greatest good of the greatest number.  Bentham (1832) argued 
that an action is right from an ethical point of view if and only if the sum total of utilities 
(net benefits) produced by that act is greater than the sum total of utilities produced by 
any other act that the agent could have performed in its place – that one action whose 
net benefits are greatest by comparison to the net benefits of all other possible 
alternatives. 
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Total Responsibility Management  
Boatright (2010) proposed that Total Responsibility Management (TRM) is a useful tool 
to use to understand how ethics management is a continuous process.  TRM serves to 
continually improve the organisation’s performance from an ethical perspective.  Ethics 
management requires continuous investment of time and resources by the organisation 
so that the organisation’s ethical vision can evolve with the changing perceptions of the 
stakeholders 
 
Ethics can be embedded in the culture and in how the organisation operates.  Below 
Boatright (ibid) proposed a number of strategies to improve overall governance and 
consequentially board decision quality.   
 
Ethics and Strategic Planning 
Strategic planning is the process in which future courses of action are developed to 
achieve the organisation’s short- and long-term goals. Governance can be improved 
through mainstreaming ethics in the policies, procedures, processes and practices 
through the strategic management processes.  Part of the strategic planning process 
means that trust is developed with all the stakeholders of the company. 
 
In order to understand the interconnectedness between ethics and strategic planning, a 
learning tool that could be used is the Ethical SWOT analysis. The Ethical SWOT 
analysis allows the decision maker to visualise the pros and cons of a decision that 
could have ethical implications. 
 
In accordance with an ethical SWOT analysis ethical strengths and weaknesses are 
identified.   Strengths are the internal strong characteristics within the organisation that 
can be used to help implement the ethical decision. Some examples of strengths could 
be strong corporate reputation, positive image; corporate ethical philosophy; ethical 
vision of top managers; the results of previous ethical decisions; a formal code of ethics; 
having an effective ethics training program; having an ethics officer; having a strong 
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relationship with stakeholders; using a triple line evaluation of performance and having 
a strong financial performance which allows continued ethics based investments. 
 
Whereas ethical weaknesses are internal policies, procedures, systems and practices 
that needs to be resolved.  Some examples of weaknesses are negative corporate 
reputation and image; no ethical vision for top level managers; zero or minimal ethics 
based training for the firm’s employees; ignoring the needs and expectations of at least 
some of the stakeholders; focusing solely on financial goals; no formal code of ethics; 
no formal ethics training program; no ethics officer and no ethics evaluation process. 
 
Opportunities are future courses of action which the company can take to enhance their 
ethical standing. Some examples of opportunities include benchmark ethical 
performance against the industry and an ethical trend setter; give employees incentives 
to suggest improvements in their current ethics programs; give employees incentives to 
identify ethical violations to the responsible party with the firm; use state of the art 
technology to help facilitate the monitoring and ethical control procedures of the 
employees; establish liaisons with government agencies which monitor the firm’s 
industry; establish membership in voluntary industry based organisations that support 
strong ethical standards; review how both domestic and international competitors 
address the same ethical issues. 
 
Threats are external factors that can impact the ethical standards of an organisation. 
Some examples of threats are: change in government regulations; change in 
competitor’s focus; addition of new competitors; downturn in the economy of the 
countries in which the organisation competes in; changes in technology which the firm 
has failed to adopt; changes in customer’s perceptions of the image of the organisation; 
change in other stakeholder’s perceptions of the image of the organisation and change 
in the demands and expectations of the stakeholders. 
To improve governance practices through ethics (Robertson and Crittenden, 2003) 
recommend a number of strategies.  Some of the strategies are discussed below.  
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Establishing an ethics training programme 
Organisations can use ethics training programmes as part of a control system. An ethics 
training programme is a useful tool for an organisation to ensure that the employees 
behave properly and appropriate in the workplace setting. 
 
Establishing a Global Ethics Training Programme 
As a company broadens its strategic position globally it must also broaden its ethics 
training programme. The organisation must be aware that different cultures warrant 
different approaches on how to address ethical issues. Not only must the firm move 
beyond rule formalism and provide universal human rights guidelines, the firm must 
embrace the differences in the different country cultures in the ethics training program. 
 
Corporate Ethics Officers 
Corporate Ethics Officers play a critical role as the link between the ethical vision of the 
organisation and the acceptance of that vision by the organisation’s employees. The 
corporate ethics officer roles include company security, counsellor and compliance 
officer. In the role of company security, counsellor and compliance officer the corporate 
ethics officer has to be both “good cop” and “bad cop” depending on the circumstances. 
 
Ethical Auditing 
Ethical Auditing is a useful tool used by management to access the current validity of 
their ethical training programme and the level of compliance of the ethical standards 
established by the organisation. Through written and oral feedback, an ethical audit can 
help ascertain whether adjustments need to take place in the training programmes as 
well as evaluate the level of knowledge the employees has pertaining to the ethical 
commitment of the organisation. 
2.18. Conclusion  
The literature review confirms that a lot of research has been undertaken worldwide on 
board decision making (Engle, 2011; Coleman, 2007; DeSanctis and Gallupe,1999; 
Judge and Zeithami,1992; Hosking,1991; Schweiger, Sandberg and Ragan, 1986; Nutt, 
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1984; Schwenk, 1982b, 1984; Cosier, 1978, 1980; Cosier and Aplin, 1980; Schwenk 
and Cosier, 1980; Cosier, Ruble, and Aplin, 1978; Mitroff, Barabba, and Kilmann, 1977; 
Mintzberg, 1976; Lourenco and Glidewell, 1974). The literature has looked at various 
angles: contribution to board activism, board decision process, and board decision 
quality.  There has also been a specific focus on board activism (Baker, 1945; Copeland 
and Towl, 1947; Blair, 1950; Zahra and Pearce, 1987; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; 
Salmon, 1993; Conger, Finegold and Lawler, 1998; Scarborough, Haynie and Shook, 
2010). Most of the focus has been on identifying a stable set of explanatory variables 
which explain the major reasons for board performance.  A number of variables are 
identified that could have an impact on board decision quality.   
 
In the African context most focus has been on board structure as an explanation for 
improved board performance.  The level of independence of the board was largely used 
as a measure for improving the decisions and performance of the board (Ong and Wan, 
2001; Atkinson and Atkinson, 2010; Maharaj, 2007; Roy, 2008 and Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Focus on government regulations, access to finance and lack of managerial 
skills as the key determinants of high mortality of micro and small enterprises. There 
has been limited focus on the board process variables. Only Scarborough, Haynie and 
Shook, 2010, have looked at board process variables and its relationship to board 
activism.  These scholars argued that board performance is largely attributed to board 
process.   
 
Process variables were identified, based largely on existing research by (Engel, 2011; 
Scarborough, Haynie and Shook, 2010; Atkinson and Atkinson, 2010; Maharaj, 2007; 
Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Spetzler, Arnold & Lang, 2005; Ong and Wan, 2001; Pettigrew, 
1997; Wageman, 1995; Kanfer, 1992; Forbes and Milliken, 1999 and Zahra and Pearce, 
1998) 
 
From an analysis of the literature review above the deduction that can be drawn is that 
very limited attention is dedicated to studies on the role of board process variables on 
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board decision quality (Scarborough, Haynie and Shook, 2010).  This research will 
pursue one strand of the research gap – the role of board process variables to improved 
board decision quality. It is clear from the literature review that globally, board 
performance is studied abundantly from the perspective of board structure but not much 
attention on board variables to improve board decision quality.  The study will pursue 
the role of board process variables in facilitating board decision quality in public entities 
in South Africa. 
 
This research will follow this line of inquiry. The problem statement, research questions 
and the hypothesis have been derived directly from this literature review. 
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CHAPTER 3:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
3.1 Introduction and Overview  
The focus area of the study is on the relationship between Board Structure and Board 
Process Variables causing board decision quality. The study will draw on various 
perspectives, methods, techniques and models used to interpret and analyse what has 
been published on corporate governance constructs.   Collis and Hussey (2009) 
provided a definition of literature as all sources of secondary data that are relevant to 
study. Secondary data on corporate governance refers to research reported in books, 
articles, conference papers and reports, journals, newspapers, broad cast media; 
government and commercially produced statistics, industry data; internal documents, 
records of organizations, E-resources, such as on-line database and the internet. 
 
To formulate the research gap it is important to extract relevant information to create an 
understanding of the corporate governance practices with regards to increased 
performance, effectiveness of the board and improved board decision quality 
 
The structuring of the literature review is done in accordance with an eight step process.  
The steps taken in the literature review were as follows:  (1) The definition of the 
concept of governance from several perspectives.  The objective of this section was to 
illuminate a thorough understanding of what is meant by the word governance and to 
describe how it will be used in this research.  This relates to conceptual validity of the 
proposed measure;      
(2) The literature provided a description of how the concept governance relates to 
others variables (like board process variables – effort norms, cognitive conflict, 
functional area knowledge and information quality).  In this part, the theories and 
models of governance relating to the concept will be presented. This information was 
used as a basis for making comments regarding the concurrent, discriminate and 
possible predictive validity of the proposed measure; (3) further refinements in Step 3, a 
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process was undertaken to compile several lists of the elements, if any, of which the 
concept comprises.  Here, the objective was to identify the building blocks of the 
concept. The goal was to find the elements that needed to be included in the measure. 
This related to the construct validity of the measure.  For Step 4, notes are recorded of 
the validity and reliability of a measure and the characteristics of a good measure and 
its items; Step 5 covered a list of the measures on board process used in other studies 
and to describe the measures of board process variables.  The idea in this section was 
to find a measure that could possibly be used to measure board decision quality in the 
local context, or model items to be included in a new measure.  The process is refined 
in Step 6, by describing how the measures relate to the elements of the concept, board 
process variables.  In step 6, the measures found were evaluated to determine 
construct validity by revisiting step 3.  In Step 7, a description on how the measured 
concept related to other variables.  With step 7, a search for information regarding the 
criterion-related validity of the existing measures was made. Here, the intention was to 
find journal articles that indicate the theoretical explanations that are supported by 
empirical findings. 
Step 8: Suggested the selected measure or pool of items to be considered as a 
measure of the concept. 
 
3.2 Defining corporate governance  
Various authors, organizations and governance practitioners defined corporate 
governance differently; there is no universally accepted definition.  Governance can be 
defined from two perspectives from an internal perspective (governance practices of the 
board) and the external perspective, the context of the institution.  The latter approach 
proposed that the governance culture is influenced by the political and economic 
context.  This governance culture permeated into the governance thinking and practise 
of the institutions.  Similarly Otobo (2000) argued that governance featured prominently 
on Africa’s Development Agenda and is prominent in the development discourse.   
Otobo (2000) further argued that in the past forty-five years most of Africa’s problems 
have been linked to governance issues to the rule or control by the State construed as 
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political governance.  Hence, the poor economic performance of many States in Africa 
has been blamed on an inappropriate political environment, particularly poor 
governance. Economic change or transformation is dependent on the willingness of the 
political elite to steer the economy in some preferred direction. It is a well-known fact 
that the political environment defined the context in which economic governance and 
corporate governance are practised. Otobo (2000), stated that the relationship between 
political governance, economic governance and corporate governance can be likened to 
concentric circles in which the political governance circle forms the outside, followed 
inwards by the economic governance circle, with the corporate governance circle at the 
centre. 
 
From an internal perspective, the definitions below suggested that corporate 
governance is an evolving phenomenon, is dynamic ad contextual in nature.  The 
definition further connoted that corporate governance is embedded and owned by a 
‘group’ of people (board of directors), with a common reference point (policies, practices 
and processes), who share common beliefs and have transferred these beliefs to new 
members of board members.  
 
Herein below corporate governance is defined from a technical perspective, a relational 
perspective and a macro perspective.  Cadbury committee (1992) defined corporate 
governance as a system by which companies are directed and controlled. Likewise 
OECD (2004) defined governance as a set of relations among a firm’s management, its 
board, shareholders and stakeholders, which is one of the key elements that improve a 
firm’s performance.  Differently, Gill, Vijay and Jha (2009) proposed that corporate 
governance relates to the ability to respond to the fluctuation of capital markets, 
stimulating the innovative activity and development of enterprises. 
 
From a control perspective, Shleifer and Vishny (1996), state that corporate governance 
is a dynamic relationship between providers of capital and management of organisation 
in executing good decisions to derive a return on investment.   From a regulatory and 
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legal perspective, Oman (2001) defined corporate governance as laws, regulations and 
accepted business practice in both the private and public institutions.  Oman (2001) 
proposed that a market economy governs the relationship between corporate managers 
and shareholders.  Solomon and Solomon (2004) defined corporate governance as the 
internal and external system of checks and balances, which ensures that companies 
discharge their accountability in a socially responsible way in business activity.  The 
Economic Commission for Africa’s (2007) definition of corporate governance is the 
relationship between management, board members and other shareholders but also 
contextual forces outside the corporation that influence corporate governance 
standards.   
 
Definitions by Naidoo (2009) proposed that corporate governance is about policy, 
practices, systems and leadership.  More specifically Naidoo recommended that 
corporate governance covers a number of facets, namely:  (1) the creation and on-going 
monitoring of an appropriate and dynamic system of checks and balances to ensure the 
balanced exercise of power within a company; (2) the implementation of a system to 
ensure compliance by the company with its legal and regulatory obligations; (3) the 
implementation of a process whereby risks to the sustainability of the company’s 
business are identified and managed within acceptable parameters; and (4) the 
development of practices which make and keep the company accountable to the 
company’s identified  stakeholders.  
 
Naidoo (2009) provided another definition of corporate governance as essentially the 
effective leadership that is characterised by ethical values of responsibility, 
accountability, fairness and transparency that regulates the exercise of power in the 
achievement of organisaton’s objectives.  Corporate governance regulates the exercise 
of power (that is, authority, direction and control) within a company in order to ensure 
that the company’s purpose is achieved (namely the creation of sustainable shareholder 
value. It encompasses: 
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• The creation and on-going monitoring of an appropriate and dynamic system of 
checks and balances to ensure the balanced  exercise of power within a 
company; 
• The implementation of a system to ensure compliance by the company with its 
legal and regulatory obligations.  
• The implementation of a process whereby risks to the sustainability of the 
company’s business are identified and managed within acceptable parameters, 
and  
• The development of practices which make and keep the company accountable to 
the company’s identified stakeholders. 
 
3.3 Overview of Governance Theories 
 
Research done by Gabrielsson & Huse (2004) revealed that the status and extent of 
empirical studies in corporate governance.  According to this secondary research study 
majority of the articles had a rigorous theoretical base. Gabrielsson et al. (2004) found 
that in 69 empirical studies (about 54 percent) used agency theory as the main 
theoretical perspective, either alone or in combination with other theories. Further they 
claimed that 19 articles (about 15 percent) used resource dependency theory, and 
social network perspectives were used in 17 articles (about 13 percent).  Finally, their 
analysis of corporate governance studies discovered that the remaining articles 
employed a broad variety of theoretical perspectives, such as, for example, legalistic 
perspectives, institutional theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, and gender 
and diversity theories. In addition, they found that 22 articles (about 18 percent) did not 
rely on any clearly articulated theory in their studies but used various arguments from 
previous literature and empirical results.  
 
3.4 International landscape of corporate governance:  codes of practice  
Corporate governance is provided by different board types and configurations globally.  
Governance is realised throughout the world by the King Reports in South Africa (King 
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Report on Corporate Governance in 1994, King II Report in 2002 and King III Report in 
2010); Public Sector Working Group Position Paper for Local Government (2010); 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles of 
Governance in 2004 (Chalker, 2006); OECD Global Corporate Governance Guidelines 
in 2004 (Mardjono, 2005); China Corporate Governance Report in 2003 (Weng and 
Deng, 2006); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the United States of America (Allio, 2007); 
the Combined Code on Corporate Governance in 2003 of the United Kingdom 
(Chamber, 2005); the report on corporate governance in 1999 in Malaysia (Abdullah, 
2006b); Hampel in 1998; Greenbury in 1995 and the Cardbury Report in 1992.  
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles of 
Governance (2004) revealed that a number of institutions and even countries or a 
grouping of countries have been trying to develop corporate governance standards to 
improve the way corporations behave and the way stakeholder interests are protected. 
Some of the most prominent efforts so far include the following: 
• The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles 
      of Corporate Governance; 
• the 10 principles set out in the United Nations Global Compact Principles;  
• The King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (2002); 
• The New Economic Parnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Peer Review 
Principles; 
• The Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance – CACG Guidelines, 
• Principles for Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth States and other 
standards such as those developed by the Benchmarks Foundation of South Africa. 
 
Table 3.1 depicts the evolution of thinking in corporate governance from its inception 
and from different perspectives.   
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3.5 Evolution of thinking of governance 
 
Date and Author  Contribution  
Fama, 1980; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; 
Vance, 1983 
The primary monitoring mechanism available to organisational owners is the 
board of directors 
Eisenhardt, 1989  The goal conflict inherent when individuals with differing preferences engage 
in cooperative effort 
Daily and Johnson, 
1997; Dalton and 
Rechner, 1989 
Outside directors (individuals who are not current or former employees of an 
organisation) are seen as providing more independent, shareholder-interested 
monitoring. 
(Ali-brandi, 1985; 
Carpenter, 1988 
Outside directors advice and counsel to supplement that provided by top 
management  
Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1988 
Shifted the focus to understand the dynamics of CEO succession processes 
and the impact on board composition.  
Pfeffer, 1972, 1973 Outside directors provide access to needed resources and assistance in 
managing critical external linkages 
Vance, 1978 One of the first scholars to assess board dimensions with a finding that there 
is there an optimal formula and no two firms have identical boardroom 
dimensions 
Shleifer and Vishney, 
1997  
Presented a few mechanisms to curb or deal with agency problems and 
managerial opportunism (called as corporate governance mechanisms).  
Dennis and 
McConnell, 2003 
These mechanisms can be internal or external, where internal mechanisms 
operate through the board of directors (ownership structure).  
Roberts, McNulty and 
Stiles, 2005 
Argues that the literature has been dominated by the assumptions of agency 
theory and that these continue to have a profound influence on governance 
reform and practice 
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Date and Author  Contribution  
Also agrees that a better understanding of board independence and the non-
executive directors influence on board effectiveness and performance.   
Hart, 1995 Proposed that it was essential to reduce the managerial opportunism to the 
maximum extent possible.  
Luo, Chung and 
Sobczak, 2009  
Prominent distinctions have been made between the shareholder model, 
which characterises the US and UK, and the stakeholder model, which 
characterises Japan and Germany (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005; Fiss & Zajac, 
2004) and the family model (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Luo & Chung, 2005). 
Ameer, Ramli and 
Zakaria, 2010 
A high representation of outside and foreign directors are associated with 
better performance compared to those firm boards that have a majority of 
insider executive and affiliated non-executive directors 
Donaldson, 1990a and 
1990b and Barney, 
1990.  
An alternative to agency theory is stewardship theory  
Erakovic and Goel, 
2008  
Resource dependence theory, organizations are dependent upon resources 
and these dependencies influence organisational  decisions  
Corley, 2005; Daily et 
al., 2003; Roberts, 
McNulty and Stiles, 
2005. 
There is a growing body of literature on Board processes or dynamics, 
referred to behavioural theories by some scholars, to better predict why 
boards function in the manner they do, and how board process can be 
improved. 
Leblanc and Gillies, 
2005; Roberts, 
McNulty and Stiles, 
2005. 
Board dynamics may be the single most important factor in determining the 
effectiveness of the board in carrying out its duties of overseeing management 
in the best interests of the corporation 
McIntyre, Murphy and 
Mitchell, 2007  
The true economic role of the board is one of decision control, not only in the 
sense of preventing negative management, but also in the sense of 
encouraging positive management.  The board’s network role is likely to 
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Date and Author  Contribution  
create economic value for a firm when board members possess superior 
connections with key providers of resources (e.g. suppliers, potential and 
current investors, government agencies, financial institutions).  
Carney, 2005; 
Castanias and Helfat, 
2001 
Companies’ governance practices vary across sectors or industries in term of: 
(1) firmness, reciprocity and sustainability of effective board-management 
relationships; (2) knowledge, reputation, behaviour and values of individual 
directors and executives; and (3) broader institutional context in which the 
company operates  
Table 3.1:  Evolution of governance thinking  
 
Different perspectives have preoccupied the agenda on governance, namely, 
monitoring of management, board composition, improving corporate governance, 
improving the financial performance and the sustainability of organisations.  There has 
been a preoccupation with agency theory and this has permeated the thinking of 
scholars from 1976 to 2013.  In addition, the literature gravitates towards studies on 
board structure to improve board performance.  Empirical work on stewardship emerged 
in 1991, and then came the resource dependency, the stakeholder theory, resource-
based view followed by contemporary thinking on board process with a focus on effort 
norms and board activism. 
 
There are different views on the use of corporate governance theories to improve board 
performance.  Most of the literature on corporate governance gravitated towards board 
structure to improve board performance (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Vance, 1995; 
Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996).  Alternatively, (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Johnson, Daily 
and Ellstrand, 1996; and Dalton and Daily, 1999) for example argued that to a large 
extent, studies on improving board performance must gravitate towards board process 
variables. These are raging debates, to date.  
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Governance models postulated that there are many factors that affect the governance 
of all entities and therefore no one theory fully explains it.   A number of theories go 
some way to look at variables that affect the performance of the board.   Below a 
number of theories on corporate governance are discussed, namely, Agency Theory, 
Policy Model, Stewardship Theory, Resource-based view, Resource Dependency 
Theory, Evolutionary Theories, Behavioural Theories, Contingency Theory, Board 
Process Variables and Stakeholder Theory.    
 
3.6 Governance Theories  
Agency Theory  
 
Abdullah and Valentine (2009) defined agency theory as the relationship between the 
principals, such as shareholders and agents, the company executives and managers. 
 
Corporate governance thinking has been preoccupied by agency theory thinking for 
decades and this is highlighted by the work of Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983), Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Perry and 
Shivdasani (2005).  
 
More than 80 years ago, Berle and Means (1932) classic work instigated the proposition 
that ownership and control in the modern corporation must be separated.  The thinking 
behind agency theory was that there are two primary actors in every corporate activity, 
the principal and the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989).  From the perspective of Fama (1980) 
the board is viewed as a market-induced institution, the ultimate internal monitor of the 
set of contracts called a firm and whose most important role is to scrutinise the highest 
decision makers within the firm.  
 
Agency theory proposes the separation of ownership and control to ensure 
organisational performance and sustainability.  Much of the subsequent research has 
been dedicated to identifying the optimal ownership structure and how it influenced a 
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firm’s performance.  This issue of separation of "ownership" and "control" has been the 
preoccupation of many scholars from Adam Smith to Berle and Means (1932) and 
Jensen and Meckling (1976).  From the perspective of these scholars the separation of 
ownership and control, referred to as the agency problem, is controlled by decision 
systems that separate the management (initiation and implementation) and control 
(ratification and monitoring) of important decisions at all levels of the organisation.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) was the first to advance Agency theory and was concerned 
with resolving two problems that can occur in agency relationships.  The first is the 
agency problem that arises when (a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent 
conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is 
actually doing.  The problem identified was that the principal cannot verify that the agent 
has behaved appropriately.  The second is the problem of risk sharing when the agent 
and principal have different attitudes to risk.  The problem here is that the principal and 
agent may prefer different actions because of different risk preferences.  
 
Berle et al. (ibid) claimed that separation of ownership and control creates many 
situations in which the interests of managers and owners many not coincide.  In aligning 
the interest of principals and agents Berle et al. (ibid) proposed stock ownership plans 
and performance contingent compensation.  He further argued that agents can monitor 
performance of managers to ensure that they use their knowledge and the firm’s 
resources to generate the highest possible return for principals.  More specifically, 
agency theorist suggested that the best option was for owners to design contracts that 
align manager\owner interests.   
 
A study by Mace (1971) demonstrated that despite agency theory thinking guiding 
board practice, the board’s participation in directing the corporation was minimal.  The 
study further found that the CEO selected the directors and that the poor performance 
of the CEO was not sanctioned.  Further the study revealed that the boards of directors 
did not ask evaluative questions, did not formulate strategic objectives, policies and 
strategies and only sanctioned the CEO when in crisis mode.   
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The study of Jensen and Meckling (1976) was the first to provide a detailed description 
of agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involved delegating some decision making authority to the agent. Like Berle et al. (ibid), 
Jensen and Meckling agreed that if both parties to the relationship are utility maximisers 
there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of 
the principal. Further the study exposed that the principal can limit divergences from his 
interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring 
costs designed to limit the aberrant activities, of the agent.  Jensen et al. (1976) 
concluded that the thinking of the principal-agent relationship was representative of a 
nexus of contracts among self-interested and potentially opportunistic parties.   
 
Vance (1978) was one of the first scholars that proposed and studied 15 boardroom 
attributes or directorate dimensions, and the relationship with company performance.  
The finding of this study by Vance was that there is no substitute for technical 
experience and internal managerial expertise. Neither is there an optimal formula. No 
two firms have identical boardroom dimensions.  
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) too being a proponent of agency theory recognised that an 
important factor in the survival of organisational forms is control of agency problems. 
Agency problems arise because contracts are not costlessly written and enforced. 
Fama and Jensen was more explicit in specifying that the agency costs would include 
the costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts among agents with 
conflicting interests, plus the residual loss incurred because the cost of full enforcement 
of contracts exceeds the benefits. 
 
Agency theorist conclude that the primary monitoring mechanism available to 
shareholders are the board of directors to ensure that the CEO and top management 
carry out their duties in the achievement of organisational objectives (Fama, 1980; 
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Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Vance, 1983).  Agency theory is based on the premise that 
governance structures in the form of the board can be the monitor of the implementation 
of organisational activities.   Shareholder interests are safeguarded by the market for 
corporate control and the board of directors.  From the perspective of agency theory the 
corporate board is regarded as the internal governance mechanism to protect 
shareholder interest.  In particular, outside directors have no connections with the 
organisation, are independent and objective and hence provide more superior 
shareholder-interested monitoring (Daily and Johnson, 1997; Dalton and Rechner, 
1989).  These scholars further argue outside directors’ are not associated with the 
organisation in any other format and hence have no conflict of interest and therefore 
their judgement cannot be contaminated in anyway.  In addition, outside directors 
provide other performance-enhancing benefits:  complementary advice and counsel to 
the top management (Ali-brandi, 1985; Carpenter, 1988), as well as access to critical 
resources and support in managing alliances and critical partnerships (Pfeffer, 1972, 
1973). 
 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) argued that the board of directors has the power to hire, 
fire, and compensate senior management teams, serve to resolve conflicts of interest 
among decision makers and residual risk bearers.  Although scholars (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) recognised the need to separate ownership 
and control, these scholars were largely silent on matters concerning the size, 
composition, and structure of boards; directors' compensation; place, time, and 
frequency of board meetings; and so forth.  As a result of the lack of prescripts and 
legislation on the above issues caused a lack of uniformity in key board dimensions.  
Consequently, governance proponents proposed a more activist governmental role in 
advancing higher standards of board practice.   
 
In 1988, Hermalin and Weisbach shifted the focus to understand the dynamics of CEO 
succession processes and the impact on board composition.  The research provided 
evidence that when firms perform poorly, they tend to remove insider directors and 
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replace them with outsider directors.  This finding is consistent with the agency theory 
that poor performance is attributed to poor management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983) and hence the need for greater monitoring of management.  
Thus, the shareholders response to poor performance is to force the CEO to appoint 
more outside directors to monitor management. Similarly, these scholars argued that 
agency theory can be used to explain CEO-tenure effects on board composition.  The 
explanation is that the new CEO is an unknown quantity with less power and 
consequently shareholders require more scrutiny by outside directors.   
 
Weisbach (1988) further advanced other research with the correlation between CEO 
turnover and board performance.  Boards of directors are widely believed to play an 
important role in corporate governance, particularly in monitoring top management. 
Directors are supposed to supervise the actions of management, provide advice, and 
veto poor decisions. The board is the shareholders’ first line of defence against 
incompetent management; in extreme cases, it will replace an errant chief executive 
officer (CEO). 
 
Eisenhardt (1989) criticised agency theory in that it represents a partial view of the 
world that, although it is valid, it fails to consider the complexity of organisations.  
Eisenhardt in support for his claim provided the dimensions that represent gaps in 
agency theory in table 3.2 below. 
 
Key ideas  Principal-agent relationships should 
reflect efficient organisation of 
information and risk-bearing costs. 
Unit of analysis  Contract between principal and agent  
Human assumptions  Self interest  
Bounded rationality  
Risk aversion  
Organisational assumptions  Partial goal conflict among participants  
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion  
Information asymmetry between principal 
and agent  
Information assumption  Information as a purchasable commodity  
Contracting problems  Agency (moral hazard and adverse 
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selection)  
Problem domain Relationships in which the principal and 
agent have partly differing goals and risk 
preferences (e.g. compensation, 
regulation, leadership, impression 
management, whistle blowing, vertical 
integration, transfer pricing) 
Table 3.2:  Agency theory overview (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
 
 
In accordance with agency theory CEO duality is not questioned and if retained, 
shareholder interest must be protected by aligning the interests of the CEO and 
shareholders by a suitable incentive scheme for the CEO (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; 
Kesner and Dalton, 1986).  
 
Hart (1995) also in favour of agency theory proposed that it was essential to reduce the 
managerial opportunism to the maximum extent possible.   In this regard Shleifer and 
Vishney (1997) presented a few mechanisms, called corporate governance 
mechanisms to curb or deal with agency problems and managerial opportunism.  
Research suggested that corporate governance mechanism deal with the ways in which 
capital providers guarantee firms of getting a return on their venture.  Further Vishney 
suggested that corporate governance support and protects the investors from the 
agents, to reduce agency costs. 
 
Dennis and McConnell (2003) also argued in their study that, to overcome problems in 
corporate governance, different mechanisms can be applied. These mechanisms can 
be internal or external, where internal mechanisms operate through the board of 
directors and ownership structure (managerial ownership). Some of these mechanisms 
are: board of directors, ownership concentration and disclosure. However, whether 
these mechanisms actually serve the purpose of protecting the principles and creating 
value for them needs to be researched. The value creation can be measured through 
the performance of the firm. 
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As Robert, McNulty and Stiles (2005) expounded that there is a well-established and 
widely researched body of research into corporate governance based on the principals 
of agency theory yet in comparison, relatively little is known about the effective 
execution of roles and behaviour of boards and directors.  Robert et al. (2005) proposed 
that an alternative to board structure studies is needed.  The body of knowledge can be 
extended through the study of board process variables from different perspectives 
instead of creating an alternative view to agency theory.  
 
Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) argued that the literature has been dominated by 
the assumptions of agency theory and that these continue to have a profound influence 
on governance reform and practice.  Roberts et al. further argued that there is 
increasing criticism of agency theory by management scholars and economist. 
 
 
 
McIntyre, Murphy and Mitchell (2007) suggested that the Board’s main purpose is to 
minimise defalcation, malfeasance, self-indulgence, and other negative behaviours.  
These scholars further argued that the governance responsibility of the board should be 
delineated and that directors must be held accountable for such.  McIntyre et al. (2007) 
further proposed that the significance of the board’s role relate to decision control, in 
minimising negative management practices and encouraging good governance practice.  
The decision control function is critical to the success of the organisation and hence 
protocols, procedures and positive practices must be created in the interest of 
shareholders.  Therefore, the Board as a team develops, selects and refines creative 
ideas for the advancement of the firm. 
 
Many researchers acknowledged that delinquent or negligent behaviour of management 
is eminent when the management behaviour is not aligned to shareholder interest.  
Secondly, if the board is weak or compromised then there will be a failure to serve the 
interest of the shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976;  
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Demsetz, 1983; Williamson, 1983). The definition expounded 
by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) is that the agency problem relates to the misappropriation 
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or waste of financial resources. From an agency perspective they further argued that 
the separation of ownership from control creates effective management of divergent 
interest (Demsetz, 1983). Jensen (1993) and others (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Leighton 
and Thain, 1995; Millstein and MacAvoy, 1998; Williamson, 2002) too contended that 
the Board provides important decision control functions to alleviate agency problems in 
pursuit of shareholder value.  These scholars argued that additional empirical research 
is required on the antecedents and measures of board effectiveness.  A broad range of 
studies covered some dimensions of board effectiveness.  In this regard some 
researchers investigated the apparent contributions of CEO duality (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Dey,1994; Monks, 1995; Daily and Schwenk, 1996), other studies involved board 
compensation schemes (Leighton and Thain, 1993; Baker et al., 1988), still others 
looked at board ownership of the firm (Jensen, 1993; Monks, 1995; Becht, Bolton and 
Roell, 2002), many studies covered the proportion of inside versus outside directors 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Cadbury, 1992; Dey, 1994; Eisenberg, Sundgren  and Wells, 
1998; Becht, Bolton and Roell, 2002), and  still others involved aspects of the board 
diversity variables of cultural and gender dimensions (Orser, 2000; Brown, Brown and 
Anastasopoulos, 2002). 
 
According to Choi, Park and Yoo (2007) given the separation of ownership and 
management of a modem corporation, the board of directors has been created as an 
internal governance mechanism to represent and protect shareholders from managers 
who may pursue their own personal interests or not act in the best interests of 
shareholders.  These scholars argued that the presence of independent outsiders is 
crucial to timely monitor and, if necessary, discipline the management. The general 
expectation, therefore, is that, the firm performance increased with the independence of 
the board.  They further argued that governance legislation induced firms to improve 
transparency and the oversight role of the board by installing independent outside 
directors. 
 
The above studies provided stimulating insights into Board characteristics but the 
empirical evidence provided inconclusive results.  Some studies correlated board 
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characteristics with firm performance.  The conceptualisation of board structural 
variables to firm performance is inconclusive and lacks an underpinning theoretical 
foundation.  The research above demonstrated that board effectiveness in addition to 
board structure is also a function of and dependent in part on how well the Board 
functions as a group (or as a team) to achieve board decision quality.  There was no 
agreement on the variables of Board effectiveness and hence remains an elusive 
concept.  Further there still remains substantial debate about the duties, roles and 
responsibilities of Boards.  Lawler, Finegold, Benson, and Conger (2002) proposed 
three Board effectiveness variables: external analysis of environment to explore threats 
and opportunities; CEO guidance, counsel and constructive feedback; and extending 
alliances, network of contacts and partnerships to gain invaluable knowledge to 
enhance firm performance. This conceptualisation of board effectiveness goes beyond 
the traditional boundaries of governance literature where Board roles are characterised 
by the control in monitoring managers as fiduciaries of stockholders.  
 
Johnson, Daily, Ellstrand (1996) too contributed to a delineation of Board 
responsibilities to include advising on strategic issues, the facilitation and acquisition of 
scarce resources critical to the firm’s success. The conceptualisation of board 
effectiveness goes beyond mitigating agency costs.  Many authors (Barnhart and 
Rosenstein, 1998; Daily and Schwenk, 1996 and Lawler, Finegold, Benson and Conger, 
2002) too advocated for the board to indulge in a strategic beyond the traditional 
preoccupation of monitoring of management decisions.  
 
The above scholars argued that board effectiveness is multi-dimensional and hence full 
consideration is given to the all stakeholders.  From this perspective Boards are to fulfil 
their potential responsibilities to internal and external stakeholders (human capital and 
communities).   A stakeholder approach may warrant a change in Board membership to 
be more representative of stakeholder levels (Lawler et al., 2002).  The transition from 
an insular board to responsive and inclusive Board is challenging and may take time to 
implement.  There is a burgeoning expectation from stakeholders for boards to be more 
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inclusive and increased public expectation of ethical considerations, consistent with a 
stakeholder approach. Lawler et al (2002) argued that the mandate of the Board should 
be aligned with its membership.  These scholars argued that the extended definition of 
board effectiveness is an important ingredient in firm performance.  In addition, the 
extended definition of board effectiveness provided an opportunity to do further 
empirical research but also because it forces researchers to rethink the roles and 
responsibilities of Boards. As stated, Boards are arguably responsible to shareholders, 
members of the organisation and communities. The challenge for an ‘effective Board 
may be to manage competing interests while attempting to add value to an organisation. 
However, the link between Board characteristics and firm performance is often simply 
assumed with widely varying research results (Johnson, Daily, Ellstrand, 1996).  
 
From the organisational behaviour literature board effectiveness is determined by 
composition of the team, the task and roles assigned that are specific to the firm and 
industry context.  Another stream of thinking to consider is growth in board process 
literature.   Numerous scholars have called on behavioural theories to better predict 
board functioning and how board process can be improved (Corley, 2005; Daily, Dalton 
and Cannella, 2003; Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005). The research studies of both 
Leblanc and Gillies (2005) and Roberts et al. (2005) gained access to Directors in order 
to explore the behavioural dimensions of Boards. Leblanc and Gillies (2005) reported on 
the inner workings of 37 Boards and 194 directors. The authors examined how Boards 
made decisions and argued that the governance literature largely focused on structure 
at the expense of developing knowledge about what constitutes Boards effectiveness in 
various contexts.  
 
Further, Leblanc and Gillies (2005) postulated that board process is significant in 
determining the effectiveness of the board.  Adhering to a particular process framework 
that board is able to execute duties in monitoring management to achieve the strategic 
objectives of the organisation.  Similarly, in a review of the extant literature for the Higgs 
Review Roberts et al. (2005) concluded that board composition and structure rather 
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than determine Board effectiveness was emphasised.  Further, the authors argued that 
accountability must extend beyond traditional agency perspectives.  They argued that 
accountability can be improved by the Director’s questioning the status quo, challenge, 
question, probe, fully discuss, and exploring issues (Roberts et al., 2005). Scholarly 
work also framed the significance of board practice.  In this regard Stiles (2001) argued 
that Board processes and activities are multi-functional and assist with demarcating the 
strategic parameters in which the firm operates Stiles (ibid) proposed that future 
research should create and test a theoretically sound model of Board effectiveness.  
The empirical studies to date equate team processes and attributes to board 
effectiveness and firm performance.  . The first step toward a more holistic 
conceptualisation of Board effectiveness can be found in the work of McIntyre and 
Murphy (2005), and the purpose of this paper was to empirically test some aspects of 
their conceptual framework. 
 
The scholars that instigated studies on board effectiveness and the creative 
contributions that boards can make propose a holistic framing of board effectiveness to 
extend beyond structure and the monitoring perspective.   
 
The Policy Model 
Carver and Carver (1996) argued that Policy Governance is constructed on similar 
principles to ‘management by objectives’ approach.  The approach is based on ten 
basic principles (Carver and Carver, 1996).  The basic principles are set out below.   
Firstly, the board governs and represents the interest of all stakeholders.  Trust is an 
absolute foundation of governance and hence the board must establish, maintain, clarify 
and protect the relationship of trust with shareholders.  Second, the board is a cohesive 
structure and there is full collaboration and collegiality amongst board members.  
Thirdly, board decisions should predominantly be at a policy level.  Policies provide the 
framework for human behaviour and interactions. Fourthly, policy formulation should be 
constructed in layers, starting from broad statements and working down in logical 
succession. Fifthly, the board’s focus is strategic to delineate and delegate, rather than 
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react and endorse.  Sixthly, the board has to achieve the strategic objectives\outcomes. 
Seventh, the board’s control mechanism is to prohibit behaviours that are not in sync 
with the objectives of the organisation.  Thus the board maintains prudent control of the 
organisation but without unduly interfering in the work of staff.  Eighth, boards should 
explicitly design their own products and process.  Ninth, the link between the board and 
the CEO must be empowering and safe. Decisions taken by the CEO should not be 
unduly interrogated provided his or her decisions are consistent with any reasonable 
interpretation of the board’s policy (Carver, 2002). Tenth, CEO performance must be 
monitored rigorously, against policy criteria explicitly established by the board. 
 
According to Carver (2001) Policy Governance, policies are developed in four areas:  
• Ends: The board defines which human needs are to be met, for whom, and at 
what cost. Written from a long-term perspective, these mission-related policies 
embody most of the board’s part of long-range planning.  
• Executive Limitations: The board establishes the boundaries of acceptability 
within which staff are able to execute their responsibilities  
• Board-CEO linkage: The board clarifies the method in which it delegates 
authority to staff as well as how it evaluates staff performance in accordance with 
the ends\outcomes and Executive Limitations policies.  
• Governance process: The board determines its philosophy, its accountability, 
and scope of board responsibilities (Carver, 2001). 
 
Hough (2002) provided an extensive review of the criticism levied on the Policy Model 
by numerous critics.  Hough (2002) concluded that of the numerous objections that two 
of the criticisms deserves any weight of any significance or consideration. The first 
criticism levied was that is the lack of empirical verification of the model. Hough 
explained that this observation is valid for many other approaches to governance.  
Although extensive empirical investigation was done the studies only demonstrated 
correlation between board performance and organisational performance. The second 
objection is that without structured empirical studies on the longevity of Policy 
Governance in adopting organisations, it cannot be known whether the model is, or is 
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not, sustainable given the realities of non-profit boards. Essentially there has only been 
anecdotal evidence of organisations maintaining the model for longer periods. The lack 
of empirical demonstration of sustainability in the long term is true for all so-called 
‘heroic’ approaches to governance. 
 
Resource Dependency  
Resource dependency theory concentrated on the role of board directors in providing 
access to scarce resources critically needed by the firm.  Hillman, Canella and Paetzold 
(2000) contended that resource dependency theory focused on the role that directors 
play in providing or securing essential resources to an organisation through their 
linkages to the external environment.  Indeed, Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) 
concurred that resource dependency theorists provide focus on the appointment of 
representatives of independent organisations as a means for gaining access to 
resources critical to firm success. For example, outside directors who are partners to a 
law firm provide legal advice, either in board meetings or in private communication with 
the firm executives that may otherwise be more costly for the firm to secure.  It has 
been argued that the provision of resources enhances organisational functioning, firm’s 
performance and its survival (Daily et al., 2003).  According to Hillman, Canella and 
Paetzold (2000) that directors bring resources to the firm, such as information, skills, 
access to key constituents such as suppliers, buyers, public policy makers, social 
groups as well as legitimacy. 
 
Barney (1991) gave the resource-based view of the firm, according to which, a resource 
could be considered as a competitive advantage if it is rare, creates value for the firm, 
inimitable and not easily substitutable. 
 
In accordance to Erakovic and Goel (2008) resource dependence theory, argued that 
organisations are dependent upon critical resources and these dependencies influence 
organisational decisions (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Resource dependence theorists 
have emphasised the role of directors as providers of resources such as advice and 
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counsel (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  Under this 
perspective, outside members provides access to valuable resources needed by the 
firm indicating the importance of board independence (Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993).    
 
Resource dependence perspective allows for greater understanding of how resource 
dependencies establish specific governance arrangements in terms of the formal 
governance structures and the actions of directors and management.  Resource 
dependence theory is one of the mainstream approaches in analysing board behaviour 
(Boeker and Goodstein 1991; Boyd 1990; Geletkanycz and Hambrick 1997; Hillman et 
al. 2000; Pfeffer 1972). This perspective is concerned with the tendency of firms to co-
opt the sources of uncertainty or to create collaborative relationships to increase control 
over their environments. Criticality and scarcity of resources defines the organisation’s 
position among other organisations, particularly with respect to resource providers. 
According to this perspective, organisational decision makers (board and management) 
are given an active role in seeking alternative sources of resources and reducing 
environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer 1972).  Moreover, various links and arrangements 
with different organisations from the environment can be developed (Pfeffer and 
Salanick 1978). As such, resource dependence theory emphasised the importance of 
power relations within and outside the organisational boundaries. 
 
Resource dependence requirements are critical in discussing board-management 
relationships (Daily and Schwenk 1996).  A balance between resource scarcity and 
resource criticality (Boyd 1990; Pfeffer and Salanick 1978) for a focal organisation may 
determine the board’s involvement in the company’s affairs and interactions inside and 
outside the boardroom. Proponents of resource dependence perspective argue that the 
board provides critical resources for the company, protect the company from the 
environmental uncertainties and reduce transaction costs in managing external 
relationships (Huse 2005; Lynall, Golden and Hillman, 2003). Outside directors, in 
particular, play an important role in providing (1) specific resources otherwise 
unavailable to management (Erakovik and Goel, 2008) (e.g., financial funds, 
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information), (2) access to external institutions and influential organisations (e.g., 
regulatory bodies, consulting firms, and international organisations), (3) legitimacy, and 
(4) expert knowledge and advice (Hillman, Canella and Paetzold, 2000; Lynall, Golden 
and Hillman, 2003; Pfeffer and Salanick 1978). Resource scarcity prompted corporate 
boards to engage in inter-organisational relationships in an attempt to moderate 
influences of external pressures upon their organisations (Pfeffer and Salanick 1978).  
 
Walters, Kroll and Wright (2008) maintained that an effective board positively impacts 
on firm outcomes.  To derive optimum board effectiveness Walter et al. (ibid) argued 
that substantial levels of CEO ownership, decision control and the alignment of CEO 
and shareholder interest is needed.  By the same token, interest alignment is not 
achieved if CEO ownership is negligible (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Kroll, et al 
(ibid), found that director incentives and the relevant human capital of the board induce 
decision control.  Consequently, a board with both incentives and human capital can 
successfully manage acquisitions and mitigate actions that reduce shareholder welfare.   
At moderate levels of CEO ownership, these scholars argued that there is a direct and 
positive relationship of stock ownership and good financial returns.  CEO’s industry-
related expertise aids management in assessing the intrinsic value of the firm.  Directors 
with sufficient industry related knowledge are able to assess acquisitions and judge the 
merits, regardless of director incentives. Resource dependence theory emphasises the 
impact of directors’ advice and counsel (Boyd, 1990; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; 
Dalton and Daily, 1999; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer, 1972).  In sum, executive 
ownership incentives reduce management’s propensity to undertake non-value-
maximising strategies, reducing the need for board monitoring; but without significant 
managerial incentives, active monitoring by directors becomes essential. Thus, CEO 
ownership incentives and board monitoring have often been normatively viewed as 
efficient substitutes. 
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Stakeholder Theory  
Abdullah and Valentine (2009) stakeholder theory can be defined as any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s 
objectives.  Theorists suggested that managers in organisations have a network of 
relationships to serve – this include the suppliers, employees, government, investors, 
trade associations, communities, business partners, etc. 
 
Figure 3.1: The Stakeholder Model (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) 
 
Esser and Dekker (2008) pointed out that Directors are expected to manage a company 
in the best interests of the shareholders collectively. This traditional view is increasingly 
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being questioned. There is pressure on companies and directors to take into account 
not only the shareholders when they manage a company, but rather the interests of all 
stakeholders, such as employees, creditors, consumers, suppliers, the environment and 
the community.  A company is represented by several interests, including those of 
shareholders, employees and creditors.   Below Esser and Dekker (2008) explained the 
intersections between stakeholder theory, BBBEE and corporate governance.  Esser et 
al. (ibid) argued that it is undeniable that BBBEE and good corporate governance 
overlap. This overlap is especially unique in the South African context due to the 
political past of the country and the need for socio-economic upliftment.  The BBBEE 
Act forces companies, directly or indirectly, to consider the broader South African 
community within its political and socio-economic context. First, on a direct level, a 
BBBEE strategy of a company will ensure an increase in black participation (on the level 
of ownership, management, expertise and control) in all levels of the company. The 
strategy can also increase the extent to which rural and local communities, workers, 
cooperatives and women own and manage existing enterprises and develop new 
enterprises, as well as increase their access to economic resources, activities, 
infrastructure and skills training. It also develops appropriate human resources and 
skills. Secondly, at an indirect level, preferential procurement, involvement in enterprise 
development and socio-economic upliftment projects will ensure that the community at 
large reaps the benefits of corporate socially responsible conduct. The effect of BBBEE 
will therefore filter through to the community at large and the country. This amounts to 
compliance with the triple-bottom line.   All BBBEE measures will qualify as socially 
responsible conduct, while all socially responsible conduct will not necessarily amount 
to BBBEE measures. In the South African business environment these two aspects 
should therefore be viewed as inter-linked and not as two separate issues.  Donaldson 
and Preston (1995) argued that this theory focused on managerial decision making, the 
interests and the intrinsic value of all stakeholders and no sets of interests is assumed 
to dominate the others. 
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Stewardship Theory 
An alternative to agency theory is stewardship theory coined by Donaldson (1990a & 
1990b) and Barney (1990).  This theory proposed that the executive manager 
essentially aims to do a good job and that there is no inherent general problem of 
executive motivation.  With the absence of self interest of executive management the 
focus is on the degree to which executives achieve good performance.  Consequently, 
this theory is also contingent on the extent to the structural circumstances in which the 
executive is located facilitates effective action by the executive.  By implication this 
requires that structures will be facilitative of this goal to the extent that they provide 
clear, consistent role expectations and authorise and empower senior management.   
 
Donaldson (1990) argues that in terms of the role of the CEO, structures will assist them 
to attain superior performance, that the CEO exercises complete authority over the 
corporation and that their role is unambiguous and unchallenged.  Further proponents of 
this theory (Donaldson, 1990 and Barney, 1990) argued that good performance is 
attained readily where the CEO is also the chair of the board.  This theory proposed that 
the power and authority is concentrated in the CEO.  Furthermore, the focus is on the in 
providing facilitative and empowering structures for CEO duality to produce superior 
returns for shareholders   
 
Interestingly, some empirical studies failed to find support for agency theory (Stigler and 
Friedland, 1985).  Whilst other studies was favourable to stewardship theory (Vance 
1978; Sullivan, 1988 and Donaldson and Davis, 1991) and again other studies obtained 
mixed results (Rechner and Dalton, 1988; and Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  This indicates 
that stewardship theory deserves further investigation in future work and board 
composition and performance should not be restricted to agency theory and 
organisational economics.  
 
Another development in governance thinking and practice by Luo, Chung and Sobczak 
(2009) in the developed world, is one of the most prominent distinctions has been made 
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between the shareholder model, which characterizes the US and UK, and the 
stakeholder model, which characterises Japan and Germany (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 
2005; Fiss and Zajac, 2004) and the family model (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Luo and  
Chung, 2005). 
 
Resource-based view 
Resource-based view (RBV) was used to emphasise how effective board-management 
relationship can be considered as internal critical capability and hence can be a source 
of competitive advantage. In accordance with Barney (1991) a resource that provides a 
sustainable competitive advantage satisfies three criteria, namely, it is rare, creates 
value, be inimitable and not easily substitutable.  Barney’s research provided a 
framework for the characteristics of a value creating resource.  First, the resource must 
be valuable and able to generate high financial value to the firm. Second, the resource 
must be rare and scarce and not possessed by competing firms in the same industry.  
Finally, in order to render a sustainable competitive advantage, a resource must be 
difficult to imitate by a firm’s competitors.   
 
From the RBV perspective, the unique characteristics of corporate governance systems, 
processes, policies, protocols and practices can serve as a critical capability which 
generates sustainable competitive advantage especially when it meets the three above-
three conditions (Carney 2005; Castanias and Helfat 2001; Gadhoum 1998). 
 
First, the board member’s extended network of superior connections to providers of 
critical resources (e.g. suppliers, potential and current investors, government agencies, 
financial institutions) is likely to create economic value for a firm.  Secondly, companies’ 
use varied governance practices in comparison to competitors in an industry.  The 
varied governance practices could relate to:  (1) firmness, reciprocity and sustainability 
of effective board-management relationships; (2) knowledge, reputation, behaviour and 
values of individual directors and executives; and (3) broader institutional context in 
which the company operates. Therefore, board-management relationships in each 
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company are individually embedded and constitute tacit knowledge or a distinctive 
resource.  
 
Leonard (1998) argued that from the RBV perspective there is an emphasis on the 
notion of ‘path dependency’ which suggested that rare resources are developed over 
time through opportunities that do not repeat themselves (Leonard, 1998). Below 
Leonard (ibid) explained some of the characteristics of the resource-based view.  For 
example, board-management relationships evolve in tandem with major organisational 
transitions instigated by significant business growth or downturn.   These business cycle 
transitions influence and affects the evolution of board-management relationships which 
often develop into capabilities that are unique to the organisation. Thirdly, there is a 
barrier to imitation that emanates from peculiar governance practices rooted in close 
relationships with customers and suppliers and the reputation of individual board 
members and top level executives.  The varied interactions of executives and board 
members with various stakeholders create strong trustful relationships.  The 
maintenance of long-standing connections with various stakeholders cultivates strong 
ties characterised by mutual trust and it is this reputation which enables the firm to gain 
a competitive edge over its competitors.  Another barrier to imitation is the intricacy of 
board dynamics and interpersonal chemistry, which makes board-management 
relationships a socially complex resource. Although there is a myriad of literature 
(Carter and Lorsch 2004; Demb and Neubauer 1992; McNulty et al. 2003) available 
regarding effective board functioning there is a lack of methodology of developing close 
relationships and initiating team-work.  The extent literature does not provide definitive 
measures for growing effective board-management relationships and still remains highly 
ambiguous. These scholars argued that growing effective board-management 
relationships is often an intricate and complex social interaction process that reflects 
constraints of institutionalised norms, individual values and effort. This socially complex 
resource increased the difficulty to imitate by competitors. 
125 | P a g e  
 
Contingency studies 
From a contingency or contextual perspective Gabrielsson and Huse (2004) 
governance practice are influenced and the relative power of the board of directors 
depends on the firm’s surrounding context. The secondary analysis of 27 literature 
sources by (Gabrielsson et al, 2004) reveals that 13 articles (about 5 percent) covered 
the contingency approach.   Further the analysis of contingency studies suggested that 
efficiency is not generic and emanated from and is on contingent on what is efficient in a 
particular firm, industry, or country, its context.  In addition, Gabrielsson et al (ibid) 
further argued that corporate governance designs and conceptualisations are 
embedded in a broader institutional and social environment and it is the efficiency of the 
context that influences the relative power of the board.  The relative power of the board 
is determined by the evolving and developing relationships between internal and 
external stakeholders and other environmental issues.  Another perspective is that 
various governance theories are adapted to the context in selecting a governance 
regime.  (Gabrielsson et al., 2004) used a broad variety of data collection instruments 
including statistical analysis of archival data, survey data, interviews, and content 
analysis of media sources.   
 
The table 3.3 below depicts the three groups of contingency variables that have 
emerged from an analysis of secondary data.   
 
Research Stream  Contingency variables  Scholars  
First sub-group  The selection, composition, 
and interlocks of board 
members reflect the 
strategic contingencies a 
firm faces in its internal and 
external environments 
Boyd 1990; Grundei and 
Talaulicar 2002; 
MacCanna, Brennan, and 
O’Higgins 1999; Pearce 
and Zahra 1992; Westhead 
1999) 
Second sub-group  Governance structures are 
seen as configurations of 
Beatty and Zajac 1994; 
Coles, McWilliams, and 
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interdependent elements. 
 
Hence, the scholars in this 
subgroup have begun to 
study them as 
complements or substitutes 
rather than regarding any 
particular aspect of 
governance as essential. 
Sen 2001; Rediker and 
Seth 1995; Zajac and 
Westphal 1994 
Third sub-group  studies focusing on how 
differences in stakeholder 
power influence corporate 
governance and boards of 
directors 
Buck, Filatotchev, and 
Wright 1998; Gedajlovic 
and Shapiro 1998; Huse 
and Rindova 2001 
Table 3.3:   Source - Three Groups of Contingency Variables (Gabrielsson and Huse, 
2004)  
 
Gabrielsson’s et al (2004) analysis of contingency studies revealed that governance 
practices of boards vary depending on the firms’ internal and external contexts. 
Consequentially, the characteristics of a firm’s internal and external context shape 
decisions surrounding corporate governance. 
Behavioural studies 
Behavioural studies included the assessment of processes, decisions, interactions and 
relationships amongst board stakeholders Gabrielsson and Huse (2004).  Among the 
127 corporate governance articles reviewed, 13 articles (about 5 percent) were placed 
in this category. Gabrielsson et al. (ibid) suggested that scholars of behavioural studies 
agreed that effective governance is cultivated through formal regulations and policies as 
well as behavioural dynamics of boards.  These scholars proposed that future studies 
should consider processes and relational dynamics of boards and the impact on board-
level and firm-level outcomes.  Gabrielsson et al. (2004) further proposed that boards 
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may play various roles in carrying out their duties, and that actual board task 
performance may diverge from stakeholder expectations of board roles (Forbes and 
Milliken 1999; Mace 1971). They further also suggested that multiple theoretical 
perspectives are required to fully understand board behaviour. Previous primary 
research on behavioural studies analysed a number of data collection instruments 
including in-depth interviews, content analysis and longitudinal field studies 
 
Two subgroups could be identified in this category.  
 
Gabrielsson et al. (2004) categorise the behavioural literature into two categories.   
Research stream Behavioural variable  Scholars  
First sub-group  Board processes are included as 
variables between board 
composition and firm performance, 
thus splitting the overall board 
composition and corporate 
performance link in intermediate 
steps.  Intervening board 
processes are argued to influence 
the decisions of the board 
members. The working structures 
and processes in and around the 
boardroom are predicted to have a 
major impact on the efficiency of 
the board members. Several of the 
authors publishing in this subgroup 
are also publishing studies in the 
input–output category. 
Carpenter and Westphal 2001; 
Golden and Zajac, 2001; Gulati 
and Westphal 1999; Judge and 
Dobbins 1995; Judge and 
Zeithaml 1992; Pearce and 
Zahra 1991; Westphal 1998, 
1999; Westphal and Zajac 
1998; Dobbins 1995; Judge and 
Zeithaml 1992; Pearce and 
Zahra 1991; Westphal 1998, 
1999; Westphal and Zajac 1998 
The second 
subgroup 
Studies that are more directly 
focused on the locus of power in 
Ng and DeCock 2002; Pitcher, 
Chreim, and Kisfalvi, 2000; 
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and around the boardroom, as well 
as the behaviours, decisions, and 
activities of the directors. Attention 
is particularly directed to their 
internal relationships with one 
another, in order to understand 
conditions for effective boards and 
governance. 
Stewart 1991; Stiles 2001 
Table 3.4 Source - Categories of behavioural literature Gabrielsson and Huse (2004) 
Evolutionary studies 
(Gabrielsson et al., 2004) proposed evolutionary theories which are studies that explore 
both context and behaviour. These studies consider governance as a system 
enshrouded by power and the attributes of internal and external stakeholders in and 
around the boardroom.  .   Gabrielsson et al. (2004) motivated that these variables are 
best depicted by the research done by Christensen and Westenholz (1999) and Pye 
(2002).  Research by Christensen and Westenholz (1999) focused on the relational 
dynamics and the development of relationships with varied internal and external 
stakeholders.  
 
The second article by Pye (2002) reported that the rhetoric leans towards creating 
shareholder value emanating from the concentration of power of directors, investors, 
and financial analysts.  There is little or no focus on other conceptions of corporate 
governance and the discourse is biased towards shareholder thinking.   Gabrielsson et 
al. (2004) argued that both articles take an evolutionary perspective by comparing and 
contrasting longitudinal data to better understand changes in context.  In addition 
(Pettigrew 1992), recognised that boards can be considered as open systems that are 
influenced by changes in both the internal and external environments and board 
develop over time.  
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3.7 Board structure    
The extant literature on corporate governances argued that board structure can improve 
board performance and consequentially corporate governance.  Tricker (1994) argued 
that board structure distinguished between inside directors and outside directors.  In 
addition, Zahra and Pearce (1989) identified other dimensions of board structure, such 
as the number and types of board committees, committee membership, the flow of 
information among these committees and patterns of committee membership.  The 
section below cover the scholar contributions of board structure to improved corporate 
governance.    
 
Research done by Dey and Chauhan, (2009) indicated that board composition play a 
substantial role in corporate performance. Dey and Chauhan (ibid) go further to fully 
define all the dimensions of board composition that have to considered that impact 
performance.  Board composition referred to the number of directors (board size) and 
the type, as determined by the usual insider-outsider classification. Insiders are the 
current members of top management teams, and employees of the company or its 
subsidiaries. Outside directors have no such association, but are further classified into 
affiliated or non-affiliated (independent).  Affiliated outsiders are not members of the 
current management, or employees of the company, but have some influential link with 
the firm, for example, as consultants. Non-affiliated outsiders are usually referred to as 
independent directors. These independent directors are recruited primarily because of 
their expertise, name, recognition and skills (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). 
 
A review of studies that focus on board structure revealed that the proportion of internal 
versus external directors was a focus of many scholars (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Cadbury, 1992; Dey, 1994; Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells, 1998; Becht, Bolton and 
Roell, 2002), whereas other studies covered board diversity with a focus on cultural and 
gender dimensions was studied by (Orser, 2000; Brown, Brown and Anastasopoulos, 
2002). 
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Table3.5:  Compositional factors of the board  
Author  Compositional factors of the board   
Ammer, Ramli 
and Zakaria 
(2010) 
Claim that outside directors are believed to be more effective monitors 
of management on behalf of shareholders and their theory has been 
supported by other researchers 
Scarborough, 
Haynie, and 
Shook (2010) 
Having a proportion of outside members on the board helps to alleviate 
the extent to which there are conflicts of interests.  When these 
scenarios arise, a board’s independence allows it to challenge 
management, thus promoting board activism 
Dey and 
Chauhan (2009).   
Outside directors have no such association, but are further classified 
into affiliated or non-affiliated (independent). 
Affiliated outsiders are not members of the current management, or 
employees of the company, but have some influential link with the firm, 
for example, as consultants. Non-affiliated outsiders are usually 
referred to as independent directors. 
McIntyre, Murphy 
and Mitchell 
(2007).   
A finding from research showed that a high average proportion of 
directors who hold outside Board positions is associated with 
decreased levels of firm performance. 
Choi, Park and 
Yoo (2007) 
Board independence is measured by the ratio of outside directors to 
the board size. Directors are classified in a manner similar to the 
schemes used by Weisbach (1988), Byrd and Hickman (1992), 
Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994), and Hermalin and Weisbach (1998). 
Dahya, 
McConnell and 
Travlos, (2002) 
In 1992, the Cadbury Committee issued the Code of Best Practice 
which recommends that boards of U.K. corporations include at least 
three outside directors and that the positions of chairman and CEO be 
held by different individuals. The underlying presumption was that 
these recommendations would lead to improved board oversight. 
Weisbach, 
(1988) 
Outside directors will have an incentive to ensure the effective running 
of the company because directors of well-run companies signal their 
competence to the market. 
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Author  Compositional factors of the board   
Jensen (1986) Claims that the internal control mechanism of corporations, which 
operate through the board of directors, generally work well. 
Fama and 
Jensen, (1983) 
Agency theory emphasised the role of the board in monitoring the 
behaviour and performance of executives 
Jensen and 
Meckling, (1976) 
Agency theory attempted to describe this relationship using the 
metaphor of a contract.   
Table 3.5:  Mapping of scholarly view on the composition of boards 
 
Vance (1978) pointed out that boards of directors in American enterprises are unique in 
that they are reconstituted periodically through co-optation, that is, they are elected and 
re-elected by the votes of the existing members.  Technically, of course, each 
prospective member is nominated by the board and the nomination is then formalised in 
proxy statements sent to stockholders who ratify the election at the stockholders’ annual 
meeting. Because this is just a formality, contested elections become a rarity and by this 
process of co-optation, boards of directors perpetuate themselves. 
 
Ammer, Ramli and Zakaria (2010) claimed that outside directors are believed to be 
more effective monitors of management on behalf of shareholders and their theory has 
been supported by other researchers (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Daily and Johnson, 1997; Dalton and Rechner, 1989; Weisbach, 1988; Dahya, 
McConnell and Travlos, 2002). 
 
Ameer, Ramli and Zakaria (2010) applied a board typology (human capital, social 
capital and resource-based factors) to 227 Malaysian firms over the period 2002-2007. 
The findings showed that firm boards with a high representation of outside and foreign 
directors are associated with better performance compared to those firm boards that 
have a majority of insider executive and affiliated non-executive directors. Also the 
findings seem to imply that in widely owned firms, a higher proportion of outsiders on 
the board may reduce under-investment and agency problems compared to insider- and 
affiliated director-dominated boards. 
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According to Choi et al (2007) outside directors are defined as those that are neither 
current nor former employees nor members of management of the firm or their relatives. 
Independent directors are outside directors that have no current or potential business 
ties with the firm. Choi (ibid) made a further distinction with gray directors defined as 
outside directors who appear to have current or potential business ties with the firm by 
virtue of their professions, such as lawyers, accountants, consultants, or bank 
executives 
 
Some scholars conducted research to unravel and develop knowledge on outside 
directors impact on firm performance and share prices.  Existing empirical studies of 
U.S. firms show inconclusive results. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) showed that the 
appointment of outside directors is positively related to stock price reactions. However, 
other studies such as Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Mehran (1995), Yermack (1996), 
Klein (1998), and Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson (1998) found no association 
between the presence of outside directors and firm performance. Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) even reported that firm performance is negatively related to the percentage of 
outsiders on the board, with the implication that boards are not optimally constructed to 
maximise firm value. 
 
Within the Malaysian context Ammer, Ramli and Zakaria (2010) defined three types of 
directors: 
 A director as a non-independent director if that director is a former employee of the 
company or any of its associated companies under any designation (including 
executive director, CEO, chairman, or member of any committee). In the literature, 
such directors are also referred to as ‘‘grey directors’’.  This category also includes 
CEO/CFO/chairman/director who sits on the boards of other firms besides the 
‘‘home firm’’ (also referred to as cross-directorship).  Director existence on more 
than one board makes them less independent as they will become more sympathetic 
with others in similar situations.  Shultz (2001) called this the ‘‘kindred spirit’’ 
phenomenon. Since Malaysia permitted a director to hold up to 25 directorships at 
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one time, of which ten may be in publicly listed companies and 15 in unlisted 
companies. In most Malaysian firms, non-independent directors are often re-elected 
at the AGM, which seems to be in line with the resource-dependence perspective.  
An outside director as an independent director in two ways: 
 A director who has no shareholdings and no current or potential business ties with 
the firm and who represents any of the five major institutional investors in Malaysia.  
 (Douma, George and Kabir, 2006) argued that the value of a director who is a 
foreign national registered on the board.  They argue that by having a foreign 
investor appointed as a member on a board brings different cultural and ethical 
values and norms (Sullivan, 1994) that might produce changes in the corporate 
internal controls and ethical practices of the firm. Furthermore, Pass (2004) 
extended his approval of such action because as members of such committees, 
foreign directors can monitor executive actions and question executive decisions 
more objectively than other outside directors. 
 
Daily and Dalton (1997) CEO duality is highly contested and a recurring argument in 
this controversy is the assertion that a board chair should be an independent 
monitor/arbiter/counsellor of a firm's management, especially of the CEO. Separate 
CEOs and board chairs provided this independence. With CEO duality, Daily and Dalton 
argued that, oversight maybe compromised, directors may feel unable to ask the right 
questions, raise the right issues, or make the right judgements. According to Agency 
Theory another harsher view is that many fund managers want to see outside directors 
installed as chairmen of the board because they do not trust CEOs to serve the 
shareholders interest.  
Race and gender representivity on boards in South Africa  
 
Women made up 52% of the South African population in 2012 but accounted for just 
3.6% of CEO positions, 5.5% of chairperson positions, 17.1% of directorships and 
21.4% of executive management positions (Women in Leadership Census, 2012).    
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According to the census, women account for 17.1% of directorships in 2012, up from 
last year’s 15.8%, while 21.4% of executive managers are women, around the same as 
last year. These figures are based on 329 companies comprising 252 main board JSE 
companies, 57 Alt-X companies and 20 state owned enterprises. Just over 89% of the 
companies included in the census verified their details. 
 
When it comes to total numbers of women directors, the number is rising slowly. There 
are 669 in 2012 compared to 646 in 2011, holding 1,224 directorships compared to 
1,127 in 2011. Executive directors number 498, up from 467, while non-executive 
directors number 726, up from 660. From the companies included in the census, female 
executive managers number 1,452 in 2012, down slightly from 1,461 in 2011. 
Significantly, the census showed that there are more white women than black women in 
executive manager positions, but more black women in director positions. 
 
Table 3.6 Demographic characteristics of public entities in South Africa  
Companies Total number of 
directorship positions  
No. of Black Directors  
Industrial Development 
Corporation  
9 6 
Denel 23 12 
Eskom Holdings  15 11 
Eskom Enterprises  12 9 
Transnet 17 13 
Telkom 11 7 
Table 3.6:  Demographic characteristics of public entities (Annual Reports, 2003)  
 
Table 3.6 above reflects that in the Public Sector a number of board of director positions 
were awarded to black directors.  
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3.8 History of Corporate Governance  
Kneale (2012) argued that the history of corporate governance is marked by the 
publication of a series of reports, codes of best practice and legislation, designed to 
address failings in the ways in which business is regulated and conducted.  The impetus 
for corporate governance regimes emerged from financial scandals involving UK listed 
companies during the 1980s.  There was a concern with poor quality and accuracy of 
financial reporting.  In 1992, the publication of the Cadbury Code laid the groundwork 
for a series of follow-up committees, reports and codes of practice culminating in the 
Combined Code, first published in 1998.  The Combined Code was subsequently 
revised by the Higgs and Smith Reports.  
 
Developing countries required foreign direct investment and this is contingent on 
providing sound institutional structures and good governance practice.  This was the 
basis of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, published in 1999.   This 
development of these principles led to the development of first report of the King 
Committee in 1994.  Development of the King Report resulted in formation of the 
Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CACG) and the production of 
corporate governance guidelines.  The US was a late comer to the corporate 
governance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a result of corporate scandals of 2001 and 
2002. 
3.9 Importance of good corporate governance 
Khosa and Adam (2005) argued that concerted efforts were made by various economic 
development agencies in Africa to ensure that corporate governance become part of the 
African corporate personality, both in law and practice.  They further surmised that when 
a company has good governance practices in place, the board can rely with confidence 
on its processes and systems, particularly the mechanism for control and monitoring.  
The consequence they argue is that the board can empower management by 
delegating effectively within the governance framework.   
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Aggressive competition exists in the global market for capital and this market is 
characterised by the movement of capital, people and information.  The consequential 
outcome is that it has led to the development of new markets and new sources of the 
products and services required to satisfy them.   
 
The developing world is dependent on the developed world for needed capital with 
which to stimulate local economic growth.  The increased cross border flow of capital 
brings with it the requirement for uniform standards of good governance.  Institutional 
investors, in particular, are wary of the risks associated with investments in the 
developing world.  The myriad of investors extend beyond meaningful returns to the 
manner in which that return is generated.  
 
In Africa, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) has provided an 
impetus for improving the corporate governance framework across the whole continent.   
The intense competition for capital thus increases the pressure for effective governance 
in developing countries.  This presents a unique opportunity to improve the performance 
of public entities, like state-owned enterprises through better governance frameworks.  
 
Khosa and Adam (2005) postulated that every scandal and every lapse in good 
governance sets back a country’s case for foreign inward investment.  Shareholders are 
entitled to expect that their capital is used for it intended purpose.  Every act of 
corruption represents an abuse of that expectation.   
3.10 Governance regimes and reforms in South Africa  
Fraser-Moleketi (2003) argued that there are a number of anti-corruption structures, 
although there is a need to clarify their respective legislative mandates.  Asset forfeiture 
through the civil process, is a powerful weapon in the fight against corruption. The Asset 
Forfeiture Unit and the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) have used this weapon 
effectively. The Office of the Auditor General, the Public Protector and the Independent 
Complaints Directorate are in line with global best practice.  The experience gained 
from the Special Commercial Courts illustrates some of the options that are available. 
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Many government departments have introduced Anti-Corruption Units and efforts are 
underway to address delays in disciplinary cases. 
 
The Corruption Assessment Report (2003) was commission by the Department of 
Public Service and Administration.  An overview of various studies on corruption in 
South Africa immediately revealed that there was no standard approach in terms of 
definitions, methodologies, samples and sources. Based on the information that was 
available, a reliable answer could not be provided for the extent of corruption within 
South Africa.  In order to be able to answer that question, one would require reliable and 
compatible information on at least three aspects of the corruption: firstly, the public 
and/or specialised groups’ perception about how much and which type of corruption 
exists; secondly, the actual experience of corruption of the target populations; and 
thirdly, records of reported and processed cases of corruption within the public, private 
and civil society sectors. 
The National Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy 
Achieving good governance and fighting corruption are among the most important 
challenges facing South Africa and its Government. Indeed, a number of anti-corruption 
initiatives were undertaken post-1994, culminating in the adoption of the Public Service 
Anti-Corruption Strategy. Among the many anti-corruption initiatives, of particular 
importance for the development of strategic anti-corruption partnership and guidance 
were: 
• 1997: Adoption of the Code of Conduct for the Public Service; the establishment of an 
Inter-Ministerial    Committee on Corruption tasked with the development of a national 
anti-corruption campaign. 
 
• 1998: Moral Summit held by the religious and political leaders and the adoption of the 
Code of Conduct for leadership; the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Conference which 
adopted the key points for fighting corruption in a partnership manner 
• 1999: The National Anti-Corruption Summit which adopted parameters for the 
development of South Africa’s National Anti-Corruption Programme; the first meeting of 
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the Cross Sectoral Task Team on Corruption; hosting of the 9th International Anti-
Corruption Conference 
 
• 2000: Government and UNODC/ROSA holding jointly the International Anti-Corruption 
Expert Round Table 
 
• 2001: Government and the UNODC/ROSA signed an agreement on the United 
Nations Support to the National Programme against Corruption; Public Service Anti-
Corruption Workshop with main stakeholders on the development of the anti-corruption 
strategy; launch of the tripartite (Government, Business and Civil Society) National Anti-
Corruption Forum 
• 2002: Cabinet adopted the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy 
Legislative Framework 
Managerial policies and rules play a crucial role in the prevention and detection of 
corruption. The legislative framework for the financial and general management of the 
public service is both strong and comprehensive. However, the survey of the provincial 
governments has revealed that the ability to implement risk management procedures is 
uneven and limited. 
 
Reporting and whistle blowing  
Whistle blowing is crucial to the detection of fraud and corruption.  For a whistle blowing 
mechanism to be effective, there must be effective protection of the identity of the 
whistle blower and there must be effective follow-up of all bona fide disclosures. Most 
government departments do not have policies and procedures in place to comply with 
the Protected Disclosures Act 
 
Anti-Corruption Co-ordinating Committee 
Cabinet has decided against establishing a single anti-corruption agency. Instead, it has 
decided to implement incremental improvements to the existing agencies as proposed 
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in the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy. As a result, the Anti-Corruption Co-
ordinating Committee has been established. 
 
Chronology of National Initiatives 
March 1997: the Government Ministers responsible for the South African National 
Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) established a programme committee to work on 
corruption within the Criminal Justice System. 
 
June 1997: by June 1997, the Code of Conduct for the Public Service had become part 
of the regulations governing every public servant and was the subject of an ethics 
promotional campaign by the then Public Service Commission. 
 
September 1997: the South African NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) took the initiative to 
develop a Code of Ethics. This challenged other sectors to identify their core values 
relating to issues of governance, accountability and management. 
 
October 1997: an Inter-Ministerial Committee on Corruption consisting of the Ministers 
of Justice, Public Service and Administration, Safety and Security and Provincial Affairs 
and Constitutional Development, was appointed on the strength of a cabinet decision. 
Its mandate was to consider proposals for the implementation of an anti-corruption 
campaign at both the national and the provincial level. After research and consultation 
with numerous role-players, an Inter-departmental Committee appointed by the 
Ministers finalised a report containing proposals for an effective national campaign 
against corruption. 
 
September 1998: the proposals set out by the Inter-departmental Committee on 
Corruption were endorsed by the Cabinet Committee for Social and Administrative 
Affairs and approved by Cabinet on 23 September 1998 as part of a National Campaign 
Against Corruption. 
 
140 | P a g e  
 
October 1998: in response to what they described as the “deep moral crisis”, the 
country’s religious leaders called a Moral Summit in October 1998. A Code of Conduct 
for people in leadership positions and a humanitarian ethics pledge was adopted by 
President Nelson Mandela among others. 
 
November 1998: the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Conference was held in Parliament, 
Cape Town from 10-11 November 1998: This conference was attended by over 200 
delegates. The aim of the conference was to develop aconcrete plan of action to 
combat and assist in the prevention of corruption within the public sector.6 
 
January 1999: a strategic co-ordination meeting of most governmental agencies was 
convened in response to the call for closer cooperation made at the Public Sector 
Conference. 
 
April 1999: the National Anti-Corruption Summit was held in Cape Town on 14-15 April 
1999. The purpose of the Summit was to discuss the importance of eliminating 
corruption in both the public and private sectors; to develop recommendations to 
improve investigation and prosecution procedures; to implement effective and co-
ordinated anti-corruption structures; to review legislation; to enhance business's role in 
the fight against corruption. 
More than 300 representatives, including government leaders, businesses, organised 
religious bodies, the NGO sector, donors, the media, organised labour unions, 
academics, professional bodies and the public sector participated in the Summit. 
 
August 1999: the Public Service Commission convened the first meeting of the Cross 
Sectoral Task Team on Corruption.  Comprised of representatives from government, 
business and civil society. This body was tasked with implementing the resolutions from 
the National Summit and engaging all sectors in the fight against corruption. 
 
October 1999: the South African government co-hosted the 9th International Anti-
Corruption Conference in Durban with Transparency International from 10-15 October 
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1999. The conference was attended by more than 1600 delegates from over 135 
countries. Delegates were drawn from government, business, civil society and 
international organisations. 
 
February–June 2000: on 23 February 2000 President Mbeki established the 
Investigating Directorate: Corruption (IDCOR) as a new unit within the Directorate of 
Special Operations of the National Director of Public Prosecutions. The unit was given a 
broad mandate to deal with “offences related to corruption”. 
 
October/November 2000: Cabinet instructed the Department of Public Service and 
Administration (DPSA) to develop and implement a comprehensive and holistic anti-
corruption strategy. 
 
June 2001: on 15 June 2001 the National Anti-Corruption Forum was launched in 
Langa, Cape Town. 
 
August 2001: the Public Service Commission completed an audit of national 
departments and agencies, which had an anti-corruption mandate in place. The findings 
from this report fed into the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy. 
 
June-December 2001: the Public Service Commssion commissioned research into the 
functioning of hotlines, risk management by provinces, blacklisting of businesses and 
financial disclosure. The research findings and recommendations were revealed to 
Parliament in May 2002. 
 
January 2002: a draft discussion document on Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy 
was prepared and presented to the Cabinet Lekgotla in January 2002, where it was 
adopted. The strategy proposes a holistic and integrated approach to fighting 
corruption. The approach combines a strategic mix of preventive and combative 
activities and a consolidation of Government’s institutional and legislative capabilities. 
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The Prevention of Corruption Bill (April 2002) 
The Prevention of Corruption Bill provides a workable definition of corruption. It 
reinstates the common law crime of bribery; it creates a presumption that acceptance of 
a favour is corrupt in order to facilitate prosecution; and it extends the scope of the Act 
to all public officials, private persons and their agents. 
 
The Criminalisation of Corruption 
Corruption is a statutory offence in South Africa and bribery will once again be regarded 
as a common law offence.  The Prevention of Corruption Bill creates new offences 
within the broad category of corruption.  It also, reinstates the common law offence of 
bribery. The Bill criminalises corrupt actions undertaken outside South Africa by any 
South African citizen; anyone domiciled in South Africa, or by any foreigner, 
 
Public Finance Management Act 29 of 1999 
The Public Finance Management Act No.1 of 1999 (as amended by Act No.29 of 1999) 
is one of the key pillars of public sector governance in South Africa.  It is therefore 
important to discuss its implications for state-owned enterprises.  
 
The emphasis in the Act is on the prevention of mismanagement and unauthorised 
expenditure, rather than on detection after the event and remedial action. The Act 
applies to National and Provincial government institutions and the entities under their 
control. 
 
Chapter 5 of the Act ensures that all National and Provincial institutions and entities 
have Accounting Officers. It spells out their responsibilities and the disciplinary 
sanctions that will apply in the event of negligence in fulfilling these responsibilities. 
Accounting Officers are required to produce monthly and annual financial reports for 
their political heads (Executive Authority). The Act outlines the responsibilities of 
political heads and Accounting Officers to prevent over-spending on budgets. The 
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shifting of funds between programmes (or the main divisions within a Vote) is regulated 
by the Act. 
 
Chapter 10 of the Act defines financial misconduct and deals with the procedures for 
disciplining public officials found guilty of financial misconduct. Provision is made for 
criminal prosecution in the event of gross financial misconduct. 
 
Chapter 11 establishes an Accounting Standards Board, which has the power to 
determine generally, recognised accounting practices for the public sector. 
 
The Public Finance Management Act is comprehensive piece of legislation.  The 
objective is to secure accountability and sound management of revenue, expenditure, 
assets and liabilities of the institutions.  The PFMA make the below mentioned 
provisions: 
 It establishes the National Treasury, and deals with its composition, functions, 
powers and responsibilities. 
 It establishes provincial treasuries and deals with their composition, powers and 
functions, and the management of provincial revenue funds. 
 It addresses the budget process and deals with the timing and content of national 
and provincial budgets  
 It ensures that all departments and constitutional institutions have accounting 
officers, and sets out their responsibilities.  The Act requires that accounting officers 
produce monthly and annual financial reports in an attempt to promote accountability 
and sets out their fiduciary duties and general responsibilities. 
 It addresses the financial responsibilities of ministers and members of the provincial 
executive councils (MECs) who are in essence ministers at a provincial level.  
 It set out specific provisions relating to public entities (state-owned enterprises). 
 It prescribes specific requirements regarding loans, borrowings, and other financial 
commitment like the issuing guarantees, indemnities and securities. 
 The National Treasury is empowered to issue Treasury Regulations and instructions.  
144 | P a g e  
 
 It introduces and defines the concepts of fruitless and wasteful expenditure and 
financial misconduct  
 It establishes an Accounting Standards Board that will have the power to determine 
generally recognised accounting practices for the public sector. 
 The Public Finance Management Act prevails and supersedes other legislative 
guidelines in the event of inconsistency with any other legislation.  
 
The Public Finance Management Act is a broad instrument and applies to government 
departments, public entities (which includes state-owned enterprises) listed in schedule 
2 and 3, constitutional institutions, Parliament and the provincial legislatures.  In 
essence the intention is that the Act is applicable to all spheres of government (except 
local government, which is subject to the Municipal Finance Management Act, No.56 of 
2003) 
 
Shortcoming of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA, 1999) 
Khosa and Adam (2005) argued that in particular the provisions that raise concern are 
those applied to state-owned enterprises that have commercial objectives (especially) 
those that have been established as companies.  The question that should be asked is 
management act apply to state-owned enterprises (especially those that have been 
incorporated as companies) that have a commercial objective and are ultimately 
required to compete on an equal footing with the private sector.  Or could the objectives 
of effective corporate governance, accountability, and transparency be achieved without 
the Public Finance Management Act in the case of state-owned enterprises.  
 
Khosa et al. (ibid) further argued that in implementing the practice of good governance it 
is important that state-owned enterprises with a predominantly commercial objective are 
not burdened unnecessarily with requirements that do not apply to private sector 
companies.  Additional requirements could mean that that state-owned enterprises incur 
higher in delivering the same product, thereby tilting the playing field in favour of private 
sector companies.  State-owned enterprise that are incorporated as a company abide 
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by the existing principles of company law and this is sufficient to secure appropriate 
accountability and good governance.  The Public Finance and Management Act does 
provide a mechanism for state-owned to apply for a total or partial exemption from its 
provisions.  Khosa and Adam (2005) contended that in practice, the National Treasury 
is not keen to provide exemptions and the only successful application thus far for a total 
exemption has been that of Telkom (a provider of telecommunications).   
 
More insights by Khosa and Adam (2005) are that state owned enterprises with a 
predominantly commercial objective found that the provisions of the South African 
Public Finance Management Act impede their ability to achieve their goals for the 
following reasons: 
 The provisions of certain sections have the potential to interfere with the efficient 
and smooth running of a state-owned enterprise on a commercially viable basis.  
It establishes requirements that are administratively and logistically difficult to 
comply with and that may cause unnecessary delays.  In particular, the need to 
apply for approval of certain transactions in terms of section 54 is a concern, as 
well as the wide powers of the Minister to make regulations on a range of issues 
including financial management and internal control, the framework for a 
procurement system or any other matter that may facilitate the Application of the 
Act.  Consequently, the discretion of the board and its ability to conduct the 
affairs of the state-owned enterprise decisively may be compromised. 
 The competitiveness of the state-owned enterprise dictates that the board and 
management are empowered to conduct its affairs appropriately.  Restrictions in 
opening bank accounts, delegation of powers and with regard to certain 
transactions relating to loans, guarantees and other financial commitments are 
not conducive to competitiveness.  
 The Public Finance and Management Act create uncertainty regarding the 
standard of conduct that is required from a director.  Unless one is able to 
interpret the obligations imposed by the Act in terms of the ordinary company law 
duties of a director (to act in good faith, exercise fiduciary duties and to act with 
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reasonable care and skill), the obligations that flow from the Public Finance 
Management Act are unclear and unpredictable.  Consequently, the provisions of 
the Act will be more difficult to enforce.  Incidentally, this is not a problem for 
directors appointed to state-owned enterprises, but also affects all public sector 
employees.  
 The lack of clarity coupled with the onerous obligations imposed on state-owned 
enterprises may also result in talented people not taking up positions as directors 
in state-owned enterprises.   
 
From the perspective of strengthening governance in the Public Service came the 
introduction of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) in 1999, which introduced 
much more rigorous standards for reporting and accountability.  The approach to 
financial management in public sector institutions focused on performance in service 
delivery, and economic and efficient deployment of state assets and resources. It was 
also followed by a government policy protocol that laid down comprehensive guidelines 
for good corporate governance in public sector institutions. This emphasised the 
government’s own requirements for high standards of accountability and good 
governance in public institutions falling under its direct control and supervision.  
 
Municipal Finance Management Bill (2002) 
A municipal official to whom a power or duty is delegated commits an act of financial 
misconduct if that official wilfully or negligently fails to exercise that power properly or 
perform that duty. Financial misconduct is ground for dismissal or suspension. 
 
The Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (5 of 2000) 
The Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act of 2000 gives effect to Section 
217(3) of the Constitution by setting out a framework for the implementation of a 
preferential procurement policy which provides for preferential procurement from certain 
categories of persons. The National Treasury is formulating a preferential supply chain 
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policy strategy for government. The strategy will establish short and medium term 
national targets for preferential procurement policies. 
 
Promotion of Access to Information Act (2 of 2000) 
The Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) gives effect to the right of access to 
information enshrined in Section 
32 of the Constitution, namely; that everyone has the right of access to: 
• Any information held by the state; and to 
• Any information that is held by another person and that is required for the exercise or 
protection of any rights. 
 
The constitutional entrenchment of a right to access to information legislation is unique. 
This is undoubtedly a reaction to the secretive and bureaucratic tendencies of the 
apartheid state. The entrenchment of this right is intended to ensure that a secretive 
and unresponsive culture in both public and private sectors does not develop. Such a 
culture is often associated with the abuse of power, human rights violations and 
corruption. The Act over-rides other legislation which provides for secrecy. 
The Act promotes good government and good corporate governance. It will foster a 
culture of transparency and accountability in public and private bodies. 
The PAIA provides the public with a statutory right of access on request to any record 
held by the state, with certain limited exceptions. Requests for public sector records in 
terms of the Act do not have 
 
Promotion of Access to Information (2000)  
The Promotion of Access to Information Act creates a right of access to the information 
of public and private bodies.  A public body includes government departments at all 
levels of government, any functionary exercising a power or performing a duty in terms 
of the Constitution or any functionary exercising a public power or performing a public 
function in terms of any legislation.  Any public entity, state-owned enterprises and 
private body contracted to perform a public function would fall into the latter category.  
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This means that as long as the requestor complies with formalities, and the information 
is in the possession or under the control of the public body to which the request is being 
directed, no reason for the request is required.  The information must be disclosed 
unless the public body can rely on one of grounds for refusal specified in the Promotion 
of Access to Information Act.  
 
In terms of the Act, private and public bodies are required to publish a manual that is 
available to the public, setting out certain prescribed information to facilitate requests for 
records (section 14 and 51).  The Promotion of Access to create a balance and 
acknowledge the objective of giving effect to a right of access in a manner that is 
balanced with other rights and that is subject to limitations for the reasonable protection 
of privacy, commercial confidentiality and effective, efficient and good governance 
(section 9).  Consequently, the Act sets out the grounds under which a request for a 
record can be refused.  These grounds comprise an exclusive list; this means if the 
body to which the request is being directed justify a refusal on one of the prescribed 
grounds, the request cannot be refused.  The grounds for refusal can be classified into 
three categories: 
 Refusal based on the content of the information and consequence of disclosure, 
for example, financial information (content) that may cause harm (consequence)  
 Refusal based on content alone (trade secrets), and;  
 Refusal based on the consequences only (for example, where disclosure could 
endanger the life of an individual).  
 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (3 of 2000) 
For most of South Africa’s past, administrative decisions have been shrouded in 
secrecy. The public did not know the decisions that were taken against them. The 1996 
Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act PAJA have made provision 
to reverse this culture and to promote an efficient, accountable and transparent 
Administration. 
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The PAJA was passed to give effect to the constitutional rights to lawful, reasonable 
and procedurally fair administrative action and the right to be given reasons for 
administrative action. Additionally, it contains provisions limiting those rights in the 
interests of administrative efficiency and good governance. Since coming into operation 
on 30 November 2000, the PAJA has become the legislative foundation of the general 
administrative law of South Africa. 
 
The Public Service Commission 
The Public Service Commission may, on receipt of a complaint, investigate and 
evaluate the application of personnel and public administration practice.  The 
Constitution established the so-called Chapter 9 institutions, including the Auditor-
General and the Office of the Public Protector. The constitution also provides for the 
appointment and removal of the Public Protector. 
 
The Public Protector Act 23 of 1994 
The Public Protector is a functionary to whom the public has recourse. This functionary 
is guaranteed independence by the Constitution. The Public Protector is required to be 
impartial and to exercise his or her powers and functions without fear, favour or 
prejudice. No person or organ of state may interfere with the Public Protector. Organs of 
state must protect and assist the office of the Public Protector. 
 
The President appoints a suitably qualified person to this office, based on the 
recommendation of the National Assembly. The appointment is not renewable: it is for a 
period of seven years. The Public Protector Act provides for matters incidental to the 
Office of the Public Protector, as contemplated in the Constitution. 
In terms of section 182 of the Constitution, the Public Protector has the power as 
regulated by national legislation to: 
• Investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the public administration in any sphere of 
government, that is alleged or suspected to be improper or to result in any impropriety 
or prejudice; 
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• Report on that conduct; and 
• Take appropriate remedial action. 
 
The Directorate of Special Operations 
On 25 June 1999 the President announced to Parliament that a special and adequately 
staffed and equipped investigation unit would be established to deal with all national 
priority crimes, including police corruption.  Three investigating directorates within the 
National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) were established in terms of the National 
Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998. Their mandate covers Serious Economic 
Offences, Organised Crime and Public Violence, and Corruption. The National 
Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act (61 of 2000) consolidated the directorates into 
one Directorate of Special Operations (DSO), headed by a Deputy National Director of 
Public Prosecutions.  The DSO consists of the following operational desks: 
• Organised crime; 
• Serious and complex financial crimes; 
• Co-ordination of money laundering and racketeering 
• Public integrity and corruption. 
 
Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act 
The Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act (74 of 1996 as Amended by 
Act No 2 of 2001) provides for the establishment of Special Investigating Units to 
investigate serious malpractices or maladministration in State institutions, State assets 
and public money, as well as any conduct which may seriously harm the interests of the 
public. 
 
The National Intelligence Agency 
The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) is mandated in the Constitution under certain 
conditions to pro-actively, professionally and impartially manage and provide the 
Government with domestic intelligence and counter-intelligence, in order to enhance 
national security and defend the Constitution, the interests of the State and the well-
being of the people of South Africa. 
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The NIA is a statutory body established in terms of section 3 of the Intelligence Services 
Act 38 of 1994. The Act regulates the establishment, organisation and control of the 
National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Service. 
 
National Prosecuting Authority 
The National Director of Public Prosecutions is appointed by the President in terms of 
the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 and reports to Parliament. 
Section 179 of the Constitution of South Africa provides for a single prosecuting 
authority. The prosecuting authority is the only institution with the power to institute 
criminal proceedings on behalf of the state.  The National Director of Public 
Prosecutions also has the power to delegate the authority to prosecute to either private 
individuals and/or other public entities. Thus, all investigations of corruption cases, 
whether investigated by the South African Police Service or any other agency, have to 
be referred to the prosecuting authority for criminal prosecutions. 
 
Despite having an array of legislative framework to regulate governance practice from a 
multi-dimesional perspective the public sector is still plagued with poor governance 
practices.  A number of weaknesses were cited in the Anti-corruption Strategy Report () 
 
Weaknesses related to the Anti-corruption strategy: 
• There are serious weaknesses and shortcomings in the capacity and will of public 
sector bodies to use the legislation and to comply with the laws. 
• Some bodies view some of the legislation (e.g. Access to Information) as too 
demanding of resources 
• There are overlapping mandates, which affect the law enforcement agencies and the 
constitutionally created bodies. 
• The legislation is focused on the public sector and does not deal adequately with the 
private sector. 
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• The 1992 Corruption Act is difficult to use and ineffective. (Therefore the major 
legislative change required is the passing by Parliament of the Prevention of Corruption 
Bill, and the inclusion of certain corporate governance issues in legislation.) 
• Legislation on private funding of political parties is lacking. 
 
Hence the need for the study to determine the level to which board decision can be 
improved to enhance the performance of Public Entities  
 
3.11 The Governance Environment of South African Companies  
Naidoo (2009) contended that efficiency with which the governance framework in a 
country operates depends on how effective the legal and regulatory environment is, the 
level of shareholder awareness and activism which exists, and the approach of funders 
and institutional investors to the companies in which they invest.   
 
Regulations exist to assist the primary legislative process.  The primary legislation such 
as the Companies Act contains provisions which allow certain bodies established under 
the law to make regulations, in terms of, defined process.  Regulations involve the 
prescripts of government agencies and regulatory bodies put in place by the state of 
governance of companies and the protection of investors. This could include organs 
such as the Competition Commission, Takeover Regulation Panel and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the US.  
Many different legislative regimes influence governance practices in South Africa.  
Below the legislation will be reviewed briefly, namely, the Companies Act (1973, 2008), 
Public Finance Management Act (1999), Listing Requirements, Insider Trading Act 
(1998), Promotion of Access to Information (2000), Broad-based Black Economic 
Empowerment (BBBEE Act, 2000) and the Codes of best practice – King Reports.  
 
The Companies Act 73 (2008) 
The Companies Act (1973, 2008) provided the legal structure in terms of which 
companies are created and empowered.  Companies are creatures of statute, and 
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cannot exist unless created in terms of law and given certain powers in terms of their 
founding documents, either the memorandum and articles of association (1973) or the 
memorandum of incorporation (2008).  Company law defines the manner in which 
companies come into existence; it defines their objects, authorities, rights and 
obligations as separate legal entities.  Typically, legislation also lays down the minimum 
requirements for reporting by companies to their stakeholders, determining what, how 
frequently and to whom information must be provided.    In addition, companies must 
also comply with a host of other laws that regulate, health and safety issues, 
competition, marketing, employment practice and tax obligations.  
 
Listing Requirements  
Securities exchange regulations such as the JSE Listings Requirements determine the 
requirements that companies must fulfil in order to have their shares listed on a stock 
exchange.  The Listing Requirements regulate the conduct of listed entities and 
companies planning to list their shares. 
 
The listing requirements of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), now known as 
JSE Securities Exchange South Africa, were comprehensively revised, first in 1995 and 
again in 2000, in accordance the King Report and international best practice. A number 
of amendments to the South African Companies Act recommended in the first King 
Report have also been promulgated, inter alia, compelling disclosure of the identity of 
beneficial owners of shares held by nominees 
 
Insider Trading Act (1998) 
The Insider Trading Act was introduced in 1998, which provides for rigorous supervision 
and monitoring of insider trading. For the first time in South African legislation the Act 
extended beyond criminal sanction to embrace civil remedies.  
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Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE Act, 2000) 
In 1994 the concept of BEE emerged to transform ownership and control of the 
economy aimed at empowering groups and individuals who had been negatively 
affected by the Apartheid system.    The initial focus of BEE was on increasing black 
ownership of shares in major corporations.  Progress towards achieved BEE was slow 
and enriched a small number of well connected politicians and business people in the 
context of persistent poverty.  This then in 2000 resulted in the introduction of broad-
based BEE (BBBEE).  BEE compliance is measured by means of a scorecard (a broad 
based BEE scorecard). The scorecard is based on various elements and your company 
is measured out of a maximum of 100 points (in some cases it is possible to obtain 
more than 100 points). 
The elements on which you are rated are what make BEE broad-based. It covers 
various aspects of the economy, society and the company 
The seven elements  
 Ownership - this measures the percentage of shares in the business that are owned 
by black people (as    per the definition above) 
 Management - the directors and top management of the business 
 Employment equity - the employees in the business 
 Skills development - this measures the amount of money spent of training of black 
employees 
 Procurement - your suppliers and their scores 
 Enterprise Development - your spend on helping other black owned enterprises 
 Socio-Economic Development - your spend on assisting charitable organisations 
 
Randall (1996) pointed out that an increasing number of blacks are being invited to join 
the boards of white enterprises as non-executive directors. Their main role is to attend 
periodic meetings where they have a say in determining the strategic direction of the 
company, but few are able to exercise a decisive influence on decisions concerning its 
management, investment and technology. Moreover, Randall (ibid) indicated that many 
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white board directors have had years of business experience and exposure, and most 
are technically and financially proficient.  The board process variable, functional area 
knowledge is critical to an effective functioning of the board but if not present will 
comprise the functioning of the board.  
 
In the same study an executive director of Sankorp, revealed that the main problem is 
that black directors do not have a track record, which caused inadequate levels of 
participation in the decision making process.  The functional area knowledge present 
relates to a particular set experience related to black community, the understanding of 
the interfaces between the different political parties, different ethnic groups and  
between politics, the economy and society. 
 
South Africa is in danger of moving towards ‘crony capitalism’.  Business is carried out 
by informal groupings of capitalists, often joined by family or ‘crony’ linkages which are 
often regional and international.  However, what they do suggest is the fluidity, 
overlapping and intimacy of South Africa’s new black elite, which is still relatively small, 
amongst whom personal and political linkages across political, state and business 
boundaries provide for a constant flow of exchanges and illuminate a sense of 
community (Southall, 2004).  Boards are plagued with practises of director interlock and 
‘cronyism’ which is likely to affect the quality of the decision-making process and the 
decision outcomes.  
Codes of best practice – King Reports 
An advantage of the proliferation of corporate governance codes around the world has 
been the adoption of these codes as a pre-condition to a stock exchange listing.  In a 
revision of the JSE Listing Requirements following the release of King II, it was made 
mandatory for listed companies to comply with the provisions of King II or to explain, in 
their annual reports, the extent of and reasons for any noncompliance.  
 
A contentious issue is whether the requirements of corporate governance codes should 
be mandatory, in other words,  policed and enforced by penalties and other punitive 
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measures) or recommended only, thereby giving them the advantage of being flexible, 
adaptable and responsive to changing business circumstances.  In contrast to King II’s 
“comply or explain” approach which implies an element of sanction for companies that 
fail to comply, King III’s approaches governance from the point of view that companies 
should apply the principles of the Code, but if they elect not to do so, they should 
explain their non-application to shareholders and stakeholders.  King III distinguished 
between statutory provisions, which are mandatory, and recommended governance 
practices and makes it clear that it is the board’s duty to override a recommended 
practice.  This can be done if the board believes that to do so would be in the best 
interest of the company.   
  
The King Code on Governance was enacted in 1994 and although one of the provisions 
was to have non-executive directors on board they were not required to be independent 
of management but compliance was voluntary.  Revision of the code in 2007 reversed 
the provision to make non-executive directors independent (Malherbe and Segal, 2007).  
Still, to attain greater levels of reform in corporate governance practises in South Africa 
the code was further reviewed.  The review culminated in the release of King 111 in 
2010.  King 111 is advocating for boards to include independent non-executive 
directors. 
  
In 2001 the Protected Disclosures Act came into effect, protecting public- and private-
sector whistle blowers who report corruption or illegal activities at their places of 
employment. In March 2001 the South African government signed onto the U.N. Global 
Programme Against Corruption, which prescribes a country assessment of corruption 
and anti-corruption activities 
 
In 2002 the cabinet adopted the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy, which includes 
a review and consolidation of the legislative framework to fight corruption. 
The High Court in 2005 dismissed a PAIA claim filed by the watchdog group Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) compelling the four biggest political parties—the 
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ANC, the Democratic Alliance, the Inkatha Freedom Party, and the New National 
Party—to disclose their funding sources. The court ruled that political parties are private 
bodies not obligated to disclose this information under the PAIA.  In July 2003, 
representatives from eleven South African civil society organisations established the 
Civil Society Network against Corruption.   
King 1 
In 1992 the King Committee on Corporate Governance was formed in South Africa, and, 
in line with international thinking, considered corporate governance from a South African 
perspective.  The result was the King Report in 1994, which marked the 
institutionalisation of corporate governance in South Africa. King 1 advocated an 
integrated approach to good governance, taking into account stakeholder interests and 
encouraging the practice of good financial, social, ethical and environmental practice.   
The King Committee has no official mandate (unlike nearly all the other similar initiatives 
in other countries), and thus its recommendations were self-regulatory 
(www.saica.co.za).  
It also aimed to promote corporate governance in South Africa and established 
recommended standards of conduct for boards and directors of listed companies, 
banks, and certain state-owned enterprises, with an emphasis of companies to become 
a responsible part of the societies. 
The corporate responsibility focus captured in the first King Report was reinforced and 
strengthened with the implementation of the Labour Relations Act (1995), the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act (1997), the Employment Equity Act and the National 
Environmental Management Act (1998). 
King II 
To be responsive to developments in the international environment and to align the 
governance practice with international trends King 11 emerged in (2002).  The report 
acknowledged a transition from single bottom line (profit for shareholders) to a triple 
bottom line reporting.  This required companies to report on social, health, ethical, 
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environmental practise, human capital and black economic empowerment.  The report 
stated: 
 
“The company must be open to institutional activities and there must be greater 
emphasis on the sustainable or non-financial aspects of its performance. Boards 
must apply the test of fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency to 
all acts or omissions and be accountable to the company but also responsive and 
responsible towards the company’s identified stakeholders. The correct balance 
between conformance with governance principles and performance in an 
entrepreneurial market economy must be found, but this will be specific to each 
company (King II Report”. 
 
It contains a Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct.  Although voluntary, the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange requested listed companies to comply with the King 
Report recommendations or to explain their level of non-compliance.  This report 
applied only to certain categories of business enterprises, namely, Companies listed on 
the JSE, Banks, financial and insurance entities and Public sector enterprises governed 
by the Public Finance Management Act and the Municipal Finance Management Act. 
 
The King II Report referred to seven characteristics of good corporate governance:  
Discipline - a commitment to behaviour that is universally recognised and accepted as 
correct and proper. 
Transparency - the ease with which an outsider is able to analyse a company's actions. 
Independence - the mechanisms to avoid or manage conflict. 
Accountability - the existence of mechanisms to ensure accountability. 
Responsibility - processes that allow for corrective action and acting responsibly 
towards all stakeholders. 
Fairness - balancing competing interests. 
Social Responsibility - being aware of and responding to social issues. 
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A particular emphasis in the second King Report was on the qualitative aspects of good 
corporate governance. King II was not designed as a regulatory instrument, but as a 
tool to identify core areas of good practice for boards, directors and companies, which 
extended beyond the existing legal and policy framework to embrace a number of 
aspirational principles.  
 
King III 
King III has opted for an "apply or explain" approach that more appropriately conveyed 
the intent of the Code. However, good governance and compliance with legislation are 
mutually inclusive.  In contrast to its predecessors, King III applies to both public and 
private entities regardless of the manner and form of incorporation.  The principles 
contained in the Code were therefore drafted so that they can be applied by every entity 
and in doing so achieve good governance across the entire economic spectrum in 
South Africa. 
 
Sustainability and triple bottom line 
According to Khosa and Adam (2005) the World Commission on Environment and 
Development defined sustainable development which meets the needs of present 
generations.  In a business context the term sustainability has been adopted to mean 
the achievement of balanced and integrated economic, social and environmental 
performance – referred to as the triple bottom line (King II, 2002).  In contrast, UK based 
organisations defined sustainability as a whole set of values, issues and processes that 
companies must address in order to minimise any harm resulting from their activities 
and to create economic, social and environmental value.  Khosa et al. (ibid) argued that 
the needs of all the company’s stakeholders – shareowners, customers, employees, 
business partners, government, local communities and the public must be considered.  
Below is a discussion of the three pillars of sustainability (Khosa et al, 2005). 
 
Economic Performance  
Economic performance does not equate with financial performance.  Khosa et al. (ibid) 
argued that economic indicators should focus on the impact of the business on 
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stakeholders.  Moreover, the economic status of the stakeholders changes as a 
consequence of the organisation, rather than on changes in the financial conditions of 
the organisation itself (Global Reporting Initiative, 2002).  According to the GRI 
guidelines, these impacts may be direct and\or indirect 
 
Social Performance  
The terms corporate social investment (CSI), corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
corporate citizenship tend to be used interchangeably.  CSI makes reference to a 
discretionary contribution (financial or other) made for charitable purposes.  However, 
the social aspect of the triple bottom line extends a company’s CSI initiatives.  For 
example, social indicators in the GRI’s guidelines include, human right issues, labour 
practices including health and safety, social issues such as the impact of the company’s 
activities on communities and product responsibility (GRI, 2002).  CSR is a broader 
concept which acknowledges an organisation’s responsibility to stakeholders that 
extends beyond philanthropy.  CSI may be one of the outcomes of a CSR strategy.  
Fakir (2004) argued that corporate citizenship is an organisation’s political and 
ideological approach – it is a process, attitudinal and relational issue.  The way the 
company lives out its corporate citizenship depends on the values that it chooses to 
prioritise.  Operating the business according to that system of values leads to 
appropriate CSR and CSI initiatives. 
 
Environmental Performance  
At the heart of sustainability is the need to preserve the environment for future 
generations.  The adherence to the principle of sustainability not only obliges a 
company to cease activities that cause harm, but also requires it to minimise the impact 
of those activities that cannot be stopped. 
 
One of the essential features of sustainable performance is the integration of economic, 
social and environmental performance.  In addition, one of the features of triple bottom 
line performance is effective disclosure and reporting – sustainability reporting.  
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Increasingly, organisations will need to provide integrated accounts of their economic, 
social and environmental stewardship and performance.   
 
Table 3.7 Principles of good governance  
 
1.Leadership and ethics 
Principle 1.1 The board should provide effective leadership based on an ethical foundation 
Principle 1.2 The board should ensure that the company is and is seen to be a responsible 
corporate citizen 
Principle 1.3 The board should ensure that the company’s ethics are managed effectively 
Principle 2.1 The board should act as the focal point for and custodian of corporate governance  
Principle 2.2 The board should appreciate that strategy, risk, performance and sustainability are 
inseparable 
Principle 2.3 The board should provide effective leadership based on an ethical foundation.  
Principle 2.4 The board should ensure that the company is and is seen to be a responsible 
corporate citizen 
Principle 2.5 The board should ensure that the company’s ethics are managed effectively 
Principle 2.6 The board should ensure that the company has an effective and independent audit 
committee. 
Principle 2.7 The board should be responsible for the governance of risk  
Principle 2.8 The board should be responsible for information technology (IT) governance  
Principle 2.9 The board should ensure that the company complies with applicable laws and 
considers adherence to non-binding rules, codes and standards 
Principle 2.10 The board should ensure that there is an effective risk-based internal audit  
Principle 2.11 The board should appreciate that stakeholders’ perceptions affect the company’s 
reputation 
Principle 2.12 The board should ensure the integrity of the company’s integrated report 
Principle 2.13 The board should report on the effectiveness of the company’s system of internal 
controls 
Principle 2.14 The board and its directors should act in the interests of the company 
Principle 2.15 The board should consider business rescue proceedings or other turnaround 
mechanisms as soon as the company is financially distressed as defined in the Act. 
Principle 2.16 The board should elect a chairman of the board who is an independent non-executive 
director.  The CEO of the company should not also fulfil the role of the chairman of the 
board 
Principle 2.17 The board should appoint the chief executive officer and establish a framework for the 
delegation of authority  
Principle 2.18 The board should comprise a balance of power, with a majority of non-executive 
directors 
Principle 2.19 Directors should be appointed through a formal process 
Principle 2.20 The induction of and ongoing training and development of directors should be 
conducted through formal processes. 
Principle 2.21 The board be assisted by a competent, suitably qualified and experienced company 
secretary 
Principle 2.22 The evaluation of the board, its committees and the individual directors should be 
performed every year.  
Principle 2.23 The board should delegate certain functions to well-structured committees but without 
abdicating responsibility. 
Principle 2.24 A governance framework should be agreed between the group and its subsidiary 
Boards  
Principle 2.25 Companies should remunerate directors and executive fairly and responsibly.  
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Principle 2.26 Companies should disclose the’ remuneration of each individual director and certain 
senior executives.  
Principles 2.27 Shareholders should approve the company’s remuneration  of each individual director 
and certain senior executives 
Audit Committees 
Principle 3.1 The board should ensure that the company has an effective and independent audit 
committee 
Principle 3.2 Audit committee members should be suitably skilled and experienced independent 
non-executive directors  
Principle 3.3 The audit committee should be chaired by an independent non-executive director  
Principle 3.4 The audit committee should oversee integrated reporting  
Principle 3.5 The committee should ensure that a combined assurance model is applied to provide 
a co-ordinated approach to all assurance activities. 
Principle 3.6 The audit committee should satisfy itself of the expertise, resources and experience of 
the company’s finance function  
Principle 3.7 The audit committee should be responsible for overseeing of the internal audit  
Principle 3.8 The audit committee should be an integral component of the risk management process 
Principle 3.9 The audit committee is responsible for recommending the appointment of the external 
auditor and overseeing the external audit process 
Principle 3.10 The audit committee should report to the board and shareholders on how it has 
discharged  
Governance of Risk 
Principle 4.1 The board should be responsible for the governance of risk  
Principle 4.2 The board should determine the levels of risk tolerance  
Principle 4.3 The risk committee or audit committee should assist the board in carrying out its risk 
responsibilities  
Principle 4.4 The board should delegate to management the responsibility to design, implement and 
monitor the risk management plan.  
Principle 4.5 The board should ensure that risk assessments are performed on a continual basis 
Principle 4.6 The board should ensure that frameworks and methodologies are implemented to 
increase the probabilities of anticipating unpredictable risks  
Principle 4.7 The board should ensure that management considers and implements appropriate risk 
responses.  
Principle 4.8 The board should ensure continual risk monitoring by management  
Principle 4.9 The board should receive assurance regarding the effectiveness of the risk 
management process 
Principle 4.10 The board should ensure that there are processes in place enabling complete timely, 
relevant, accurate and accessible risk disclosure to stakeholders 
IT Governance 
Principle 5.1 The board should be responsible for information technology (IT) governance  
Principle 5.2 IT should be aligned with the performance and sustainability objectives of the company 
Principle 5.3 The board should delegate to management the responsibility for the implementation of 
an IT governance framework  
Principle 5.4 The board should monitor and evaluate significant IT investments and expenditure   
Principle 5.5 IT should form an integral part of the company’s risk management  
Principle 5.6 The board should ensure that information assets are managed effectively. 
Principle 5.7 A risk committee and audit committee should assist the board in carrying out its IT 
responsibilities  
Compliance 
Principle 6.1 The board should ensure that the company complies with applicable laws and 
considers adherence to non-binding rules, codes and standards 
Principle 6.2 The board and each individual director should have a working understanding of the 
effect of the applicable laws, rules, codes and standards on the company and its 
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business  
Principle 6.3 Compliance risk should form an integral part of the company’s risk management 
process  
Principle 6.4 The board should delegate to management the implementation of an effective 
compliance framework and processes 
Internal Audit 
Principle 7.1 The board should ensure that there is an effective risk based internal audit  
Principle 7.2 Internal audit should follow a risk based approach to its plan  
Principle 7.3 Internal audit should provide a written assessment of the effectiveness of the company’s 
system of internal control and risk management  
Principle 7.4 The audit committee should be responsible for overseeing internal audit  
Principle 7.5 Internal audit should be strategically positioned to achieve its objectives  
Stakeholder Relations 
Principles 8.1 The board should appreciate that stakeholders’ perceptions affect a company’s 
reputation  
Principle 8.2 The board should delegate to management to proactively deal with stakeholder 
relationships  
Principle 8.3 The board should strive to achieve the appropriate balance between its various 
stakeholder groupings, in the best interest of the company  
Principle 8.4 Companies should ensure the equitable treatment of shareholders  
Principle 8.5 Transparent and effective communication with stakeholders is essential for building and 
maintaining their trust and confidence 
Principle 8.6 The board should ensure that disputes are resolved as effectively, efficiently and 
expeditiously as possible  
Reporting 
Principle 9.1 The board should ensure the integrity of the company’s integrated report  
Principle 9.2 Sustainability reporting and disclosure should be integrated with the company’s financial 
reporting  
Principle 9.3 Sustainability reporting and disclosure should be independently assured.  
Table 3.7:  Principles of good governance, King III Report (2009) 
 
 
King III:  board compositions and non-executive directors  
The issuance of King III was necessitated by the new Companies Act (2008) of South 
Africa and changes in international governance trends.  For board composition, in 
adhering to the principle of independence the Board should consist of a balance of 
executive and non-executive directors, with a majority of non-executive directors.  A 
balance of executive and non-executive directors, with a majority of non-executive 
directors should exist in the Board of Directors.  The King III guidelines specify that a 
minimum of two executive directors, the CEO and Chief Financial Officer\Director 
should be appointed.  
 
Some of the main defining characteristics will be summarised below (King III Report, 
2009).  Firstly, King III proposes a lead independent director that serves actively in this 
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capacity where the chairman is absent or not able to perform his duties for whatsoever 
reason or where the independence of the chairman of the board is questionable or 
impaired. 
 
Secondly, in accordance with international trends King III (2009) defines an independent 
non-executive as: (1) does not represent a controlling or major shareholder; (2) does 
not have a direct or indirect interest in the company; (3) has not been employed by the 
company in the past three financial years; (4) is not a member of the immediate family 
of an individual who has been employed in the past three financial years, or employed 
by the company in an executive capacity; (5) is not a professional advisor to the 
company; (6) is free from any business or other relationship with the company; (7) does 
not receive remuneration which is contingent upon the performance of the company. 
 
Third, another key requirement is that the Board should be led by an independent non-
executive Chairman who should not be the CEO of the company; be reappointed on an 
annual basis; be an independent non-executive director; the level of independence 
should be carefully monitored; the Chairman’s ability to add value should be taken into 
account at the annual evaluation. 
 
Transparency and reporting  
Khosa and Adam (2005) argued that transparency is linked to accountability and is one 
of the essential ingredients of good governance.   
 
The King Report (2002) defined transparency as 
“ …. the ease with which an outsider is able to make meaningful analysis of a 
company’s actions, its economic fundamentals and the non-financial aspects 
pertinent to the business.  This is a measure of how good management is at 
making necessary information available in a candid, accurate and timely manner 
– not only the audit data but also general reports and press releases. 
 Transparency enhances accountability and inclusivity.  It is through transparent 
practices that the accountability of organisations is enhanced. 
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 Transparency helps counter unethical practices.  Bribery and corruption have 
been highlighted as common breaches of good governance practices and 
destroyers of value in companies. 
 Transparency heightens confidence in organisations and builds trust.  Disclosure 
of information helps boost confidence in the sustainability of an organisation by 
instilling trust in all stakeholders who deal with the organisation. 
 
When management has credibility, the market will support management’s actions, even 
when the cost of those actions, even when the cost of those actions dilutes current earnings 
(Khosa and Adam, 2005). 
  
Khosa and Adam (2005) argued that traditionally, reporting and disclosure focused 
predominantly on financial matters.  Financial reporting has evolved over time and has 
resulted in the development of certain policies, standards and procedures that 
contribute to consistent reporting.  For example, organisations use Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principle (GAAP) or International Accounting Standards (IAS) to ensure that 
financial reporting enables one to compare relevant information and assess whether or 
not a company is doing well.   
 
Further Khosa et al (2005) claimed that integrated reporting requires reporting on 
economic, social and environmental performance of the company.  However, there is no 
standard reporting mechanism or agreed criteria that can be applied.  Hence, it then 
becomes difficult to make comparisons across organisations.  Therefore one cannot 
assume a common understanding of the non-financial issues and is contingent on the 
organisation to provide sufficient background information and explain technical terms of 
be understood.   
 
There are at least two sets of guidelines to which organisations can turn to improve 
practices of integrated sustainability reporting.  The King Report 2002 sets out 
guidelines with regards to best practice in relation to disclosure and reporting to 
stakeholders.  King II stressed that each company needs to determine for itself what is 
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relevant for disclosure.  In addition, the code propagated that certain matters may 
require special consideration (for example, steps taken to manage HIV and AIDS, 
environmental practices and human capital development).  
Table 3.8 Key differences between King II and King III (Naidoo, 2009) 
 
Area King II King III 
Alternative 
dispute 
resolution  
This is not dealt with in King II Litigation is not always in the best interests of 
the company (costly, time to resolve and does 
not result in the best outcome).   
Application of 
the code  
Affected companies (those listed 
on JSE, banks, financial and 
insurance entities and SOEs).  It is 
an aspirational code for the other 
companies  
Applies to all companies, regardless of the size 
or structure.   
Audit 
committee 
The board should appoint an audit 
committee  
King III largely mirrors the provisions of the 
Company’s Act concerning the criteria for audit 
committee members and increased the scope of 
the audit committee’s duties. 
Performance 
Evaluation  
Individual and board performance 
is done annually and does not 
require disclosure 
Requires that companies to disclose the results 
of the board, board committees and directors  
Board 
Committees  
All companies should at least have 
audit and remunerations 
committees 
The board should appoint audit, risk, 
remuneration and nomination committees.  Risk 
and sustainability can be delegated to the audit 
committee 
Board 
composition  
A balance of executive and non-
executive directors, preferably with 
a majority of non-executive 
directors of whom a sufficient 
number should be independent  
The board should be made up to a majority of 
non-executive directors.  The majority of 
directors should be independent  
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Area King II King III 
Business 
rescue  
This is not dealt with in King II The board has a duty to constantly monitor the 
solvency and liquidity of the company and must 
commence business rescue proceedings as 
soon as it becomes aware that the company may 
be in financial distress.  
Integrated 
sustainability 
reporting  
The board is required to monitor 
the non-financial aspects relevant 
to the company 
Sustainability reporting should be regular, 
relevant, comprehensive and clear in reporting 
on the positive and negative aspects of the 
company to provide a balanced view.  Reports 
should be independently assured.  
Chairmanship  The board should be led by an 
independent non-executive, 
chairman.  Where the CEO is the 
chairman then select a non-
executive director as deputy 
chairman  
The board must be led by an independent non-
executive director of suitable stature.  
Chief 
Executive 
Director  
This is not specifically dealt with in 
King II 
Sets out a number of defined responsibilities for 
the CEO with regard to achieving strategy, 
ensuring compliance and providing ethical 
leadership  
Compliance  Compliance with laws and 
regulations is dealt with as part of 
the board’s duty to manage risk  
Compliance is separated into laws and 
regulations which are mandatory.  The board 
should develop an ethical culture of compliance.  
Directors  Sets out some criteria to determine 
whether directors are executive, 
non-executive or independent  
The independence of non-executive directors 
should be reassessed annually.  Directors that 
have been in office > 9 years to be assessed 
rigorously for independence  
Chairmanship  The board should be led by an 
independent non-executive, 
chairman.  Where the CEO is the 
chairman then select a non-
executive director as deputy 
chairman  
The board must be led by an independent non-
executive director of suitable stature.  
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Area King II King III 
Chief 
Executive 
Director  
This is not specifically dealt with in 
King II 
Sets out a number of defined responsibilities for 
the CEO with regard to achieving strategy, 
ensuring compliance and providing ethical 
leadership  
Compliance  Compliance with laws and 
regulations is dealt with as part of 
the board’s duty to manage risk  
Compliance is separated into laws and 
regulations which are mandatory.  The board 
should develop an ethical culture of compliance.  
Directors  Sets out some criteria to determine 
whether directors are executive, 
non-executive or independent  
The independence of non-executive directors 
should be reassessed annually.  Directors that 
have been in office > 9 years to be assessed 
rigorously for independence  
Internal audit  The focus was on the adequacy of 
the internal controls.  Internal audit 
was primarily compliance-based 
and if the board decides not to 
have an internal audit function full 
reasons must be disclosed in the 
company’s financial report.   
Companies should establish and maintain an 
effective internal control function.  Internal audit 
has been moved from a compliance-based to a 
forward-looking risk based function.  The scope 
of the audit has been increased to include 
business processes, internal controls, 
governance and ethics  
IT Governance  There was no special focus on IT 
governance. 
The responsibility for IT governance is  vested 
with the board.  The director’s should ensure the 
integrity of the company’s information and IT 
systems. 
Remuneration 
approval and 
disclosure  
Requires companies to seek prior 
approval of non-executive 
director’s remuneration from 
shareholders in general meeting 
and to disclose the remuneration 
and benefits paid to non-executive 
directors in their annual reports 
Companies to seek shareholder approval of their 
remuneration policies.  Non-executive directors’ 
remuneration should be approved by a special 
resolution of shareholders in general meeting.  
The remuneration packages of the three highly 
paid executives must be disclosed in the 
integrated reports. 
Risk 
management 
and risk 
governance  
The board should identify key risk 
areas and key performance 
indicators for the business  
The board is responsible for risk governance 
while management is responsible for risk 
management.  The board is therefore 
responsible for the overall efficacy of risk 
management, although management remains 
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Area King II King III 
responsible for implementation. 
Stakeholder 
relations  
The board should take account of 
stakeholder interests in its 
decision making. 
The board must play a key role in identifying the 
company’s stakeholders and must engage with 
them on an ongoing basis to ensure that their 
legitimate expectations are met. 
Standards of 
compliance  
All affected entities are required to 
comply with the prescripts of the 
Code or explain the areas of non-
compliance  
Companies are required to apply the principles 
of the Code or explain why their boards have 
made an informed decision not to do so.   
Table 3.8:  Source - Corporate Governance:  An essential guide for South African Companies 
(Naidoo, 2009)  
 
3.12 International Corporate Governance Frameworks and Protocols 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance  
The importance of an appropriate legislative and policy framework that provides the 
basis for effective corporate governance cannot be underestimated.  The OECD 
Principles of Governance is there to ensure an effective corporate governance 
framework.  Moreover, it is necessary that an appropriate and effective legal, regulatory 
and institutional foundation is established upon which all market participants can rely on 
in establishing their private contractual obligations.  The corporate governance 
framework typically comprises elements of legislation, regulation, self-regulatory 
arrangements, voluntary commitments and business practice that are the result of a 
country’s specific circumstances, history and tradition.  The desirable mix between 
legislation, regulation, self-regulation, voluntary standards and business practices from 
country to country.   
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International code:  The GRI Guidelines  
The GRI guidelines provide more specific guidance than the King Report 2002 and 
serve as an excellent tool to assist organisations with appropriate disclosure and 
reporting practices.  The guidelines promote effective sustainability reporting to facilitate 
the consistency and comparability of sustainability reports.  It is observed in the 
guidelines,  
 
“effective corporate governance depends on access to relevant, high quality information that 
enables performance tracking and invites new forms of stakeholders engagement” (GRI, 2002). 
 
Adherence to the GRI Guidelines will help companies develop reports on their economic, social 
and environmental performance that are balanced, credible and comparable. 
 
Table 3.9 Key aspects of GRI Guidelines 
 
Key aspects of the GRI Guidelines  
 
GRI Reporting Principles  
The GRI guidelines (GRI, 2002) cite four clusters of reporting principles: 
 
Framework for the report  
 Transparency:  full disclosure of the processes, procedures and assumptions  
 Inclusiveness:  engage stakeholders  
 Auditability:  information is disclosed in a way that makes it possible for assurance 
providers to attest to its reliability  
 
Informing decisions about what to report 
 Completeness:  all information that is material should be included  
 Relevance:  the degree of importance and threshold at which information becomes 
significant enough  
 Sustainability context:  locate performance and its impact in the broader context 
 
Quality and reliability  
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 Accuracy:  striving for exactness  
 Neutrality:   reports should be balanced and unbiased  
 Comparability:  maintaining consistency in order to compare performance  
 
Informing decisions about access to the report  
 Clarity:  clear, understandable and sufficient information  
 Timeliness:  keeping a regular and predictable reporting schedule  
 
GRI report content  
Part C of the guideline sets out the information that should be included in a sustainability 
report.   
 
 Vision and strategy  
 Profile  
 Governance structure and management systems  
 GRI content index  
 Performance indicators  
Table 3.9 Source:  The Power of Governance:  Enhancing the Performance of State-owned 
Enterprises (Khosa and Adam, 2005)  
 
The International Corporate Governance Network  
The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) is an umbrella organisation 
comprising a number of large institutional investors.  The investment criteria are 
modelled on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
recommendation.  In evaluating investments ICGN assesses financial criteria but more 
importantly the governance of the corporation is an essential factor that investors take 
into consideration when deciding how to allocate their investment capital.   
 
The Corruption Perception Index 
The Corruption Perceptions Index is regarded as the world's most credible measure of 
domestic, public sector corruption.  In terms of the research problem South Africa’s 
rating in the Corruption Perceptions Index for 2012 was 43 and slipped to position 69 
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amongst 176 countries (Corruption Perception Index, 2013).  This rating ranks countries 
and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be.   A rating a 
country or territory’s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a 
scale of 0 - 100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 
means it is perceived as very clean 
 
South Africa is an emerging market where there are major agency and information 
problems; major sources of potential benefits of group affiliated firms are access to 
foreign capital, access to latest technology, and some control over political groups. 
 
3.13 Governance practices and its impact on global ratings  
Effective corporate governance of boards can become a sustainable competitive 
advantage for organisations.  Singh and Msweli (2012) argued that poor governance 
practises across all sectors has negatively tainted economic investments in South Africa 
consequentially affecting economic growth.  Below South Africa’s competitive rating 
(53rd) and the corruption index (69th) rating is given to show marked improvement is 
needed in corporate governance.  
Global Competitiveness 
The Global Competitiveness Report (2013 – 2014) features a record number of 144 
economies, and is the most comprehensive assessment of its kind. The 
competitiveness analysis is based on the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), a highly 
comprehensive index for measuring national competitiveness, which captures the 
microeconomic and macroeconomic foundations of national competitiveness.  
Competitiveness is defined as the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine 
the level of productivity of a country. 
 
South Africa is ranked 53rd this year, remaining the highest-ranked country in sub-
Saharan Africa and overtaking Brazil to place second among the BRICS in the Global 
Competitiveness Rating Report (Schwab, 2014).   Ratings in relations to dimensions 
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that are ranked and rated in relation to participating countries are discussed in detail 
below.   
 
South Africa does well on measures of the quality of its institutions (41st), including 
intellectual property protection (18th), property rights (20th), and in the efficiency of the 
legal framework in challenging and settling disputes (13th and 12th, respectively).  The 
country benefits from the large size of its economy, particularly by regional standards (it 
ranks 25th in the market size pillar). 
 
The high accountability of its private institutions (2nd) further supports the institutional 
framework. Furthermore, South Africa’s financial market development remains 
impressive at 3rd place. The country also has an efficient market for goods and services 
(28th), and it does reasonably well in more complex areas such as business 
sophistication (35th) and innovation (39th). But the country’s strong ties to advanced 
economies, notably the euro area, make it more vulnerable to their economic slowdown 
and likely have contributed to the deterioration of fiscal indicators: its performance in the 
macroeconomic environment has dropped sharply (from 69th to 95th). Low scores for 
the diversion of public funds (99th), the perceived wastefulness of government spending 
(79th), and a more general lack of public trust in politicians (98th) remain worrisome, 
and security continues to be a major area of concern for doing business (at 109th). 
Building a skilled labour force and creating sufficient employment also present 
considerable challenges. The health of the workforce is ranked 133rd out of 148 
economies—the result of high rates of communicable diseases and poor health 
indicators more generally. The quality of the educational system is very poor (146th), 
with low primary and tertiary enrolment rates. Labour market efficiency is poor (116th), 
hiring and firing practices are extremely rigid (147th), companies cannot set wages 
flexibly (144th), and significant tensions in labor-employer relations exist (148th). 
Raising educational standards and making the labor market more efficient will thus be 
critical in view of the country’s high unemployment rate of over 20 percent, with the rate 
of youth unemployment estimated at close to 50 percent. 
 
174 | P a g e  
 
3.14 The Public Sector South Africa:  Schedule 1, 2 and 3 
Khosa and Adam (2005) contended that public entities, and in particular, state-owned 
are often large employers that operate on a heavily subsidised basis that creates little 
long-term value.  Furthermore, Khosa et al. (ibid) public entities are often over-staffed, 
inefficient and prone to corruption and nepotism.  Within the South Africa context, state-
owned enterprises play a pivotal role in the transformation of society to remove the 
distortions created by the apartheid system.   
 
3.15 Board Failure 
Martinelli, (1998) provided a number of reasons to explain why some boards do not 
function effectively. These factors can actually be used as a checklist for assessing and 
helping boards to identify problem areas.  The reasons for board failure pertain to 
micromanaging of the organisation, an ineffective nominating committee, size of the 
board, non-functioning committee structure, and absence of strategic plan, no 
orientation\induction plan and no rotational plan.  Other reasons for board failure related 
to poor corporate governance practice and oversight.  Below is a timeline of corporate 
governance practise in South Africa over an eleven year period.   
 
In 1999 the South African Local  Government Association unearthed millions of rands 
worth of rampant fraud and corruption in the administration of more than 30 local 
government pension funds with an asset base of R30  billion.   
 
In 1999, the Commissioner, Khulekani Sithole of Correctional Services misappropriated 
government funds and there were instances of conflict of interest.   
 
In 2000, Finance Director Nico Krugel of the Mpumalanga Parks Board (MPB) is 
sentenced to 10 years in prison for his role in a scheme involving the funnelling of funds 
from MPB coffers to the ANC and various politicians. Also implicated in the scandal are 
MPB chief executive Alan Gray, former MPB accountant Maxi Green, and ANC Youth 
League Secretary James Nkambule and ANC Youth League organizer Alfred 
Thumbathi.  
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In 2000, the Strategic Fuel Fund (SFF) Board, Mineral and Energy Affairs Minister 
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka uncover a secret deal where the country's oil trading 
operations was sold without the government's knowledge. Several officials involved 
admit they accepted bribes. Mlambo-Ngcuka fires the entire SFF board and repudiates 
the deal. 
 
In 2000, the Auditor General finds irregularities in the arms deal.  The Mail and 
Guardian confirms that British arms manufacturer BAE Systems paid millions in secret 
commissions to win a contract to supply Hawk jets to South Africa. 
 
In 2001, Tony Yengeni, ANC chief whip and former chair of the defense committee, 
received a substantial discount on a Mercedes Benz from an arms deal bidder. In 
October, he is arrested and resigns from Parliament. In March 2003, he receives a four-
year sentence for defrauding Parliament.  The Star publishes a list of 33 cars supplied 
at a discount by the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company to prominent 
defense committee officials. 
 
In 2001, Minister of Defense, Joe Modise's luxury home was being built by Denel, a 
state-owned arms manufacturer. After he left Parliament in June 1999, Modise became 
chairman of Conlog holdings, which had an indirect stake in the arms deal. 
In 2001, Judge Thabani Jali leads a commission to investigate wrongdoing in the 
country's prison system.  The Jali commission is soon inundated with allegations of 
corruption and maladministration in prisons throughout the country.   
 
In July 2002, Andile Nkuhlu, a chief director of the Department of Public Enterprises, is 
suspended and later resigns following allegations he received payments from a 
company that won a state forestry contract. 
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In January 2003, Interim Management Team (IMT) investigates Eastern Cape Province 
governmental inefficiency and corruption in the scandal-plagued region. The IMT 
exposed hundreds of cases of corruption, many of which result in criminal convictions. 
 
In February 2003, the "Scorpions" arrested former Western Cape Premier Peter Marais 
and former Deputy Minister David Malatsi on corruption charges. They were charged 
with accepting kickbacks from the developer of a golf resort.  
 
In July 2003, a preliminary investigation uncovers widespread fraud in magistrate courts 
President Mbeki signs a proclamation authorizing a high-level investigation of senior 
magistrates, prosecutors, court clerks and national and regional department of justice 
offices. 
 
In July 2005, forty current and former members of Parliament are charged in the 
"Travelgate" affair, which involves the misuse of government travel vouchers. Over the 
following months, several MPs reach plea agreements that involve punishments of fines 
and imprisonment. 
 
In July 2005, Shabier Shaikh is convicted and charged with corruption arising from 
dealings with foreign companies in the arm deal.  
 
In July 2006, the Department of Social Development uncovers more than 400 000 
private individuals earning salaries received social grants.  The investigation has 
already resulted in the conviction of about 650 government employees and savings to 
the social development department of roughly R2 billion (US$270,716,587). 
 
In 2007, a full investigation by the Department of Labour, showed mismanagement of  
SETA Funds.  The former CEO of the Mining SETA, Menzi Mthwecu was accused of 
Violating the organisation's   internal procedures when authorising payments for 
projects.  The Whole and Retail SETA was embroiled in a travel scam involving more 
177 | P a g e  
 
than R400 000, in which officials allegedly booked weekend getaway flights to Durban 
and Cape Town for themselves and their friends.  The Construction SETA, officials 
were being investigated by the Scorpions in relation to irregular payments amounting to 
R47-million to contractors.  For the Media, Advertising, Publishing, Printing and 
Packaging SETA, the CEO and financial director were Arrested and jailed for 20 years 
for corruption and fraud amounting to R3 million. The Tourism and Hospitality SETA 
was investigated for fraud involving R13 million.  The Agriculture SETA also indulged 
in fraud activity in that companies linked to board members were given\contracts worth 
million without following any procurement procedures.  The Chemical Industries SETA 
is also responsible for misappropriation of over R100-million budgeted for the Seta's 
discretionary grants.  The Transport SETA suffered losses amounting to over R245- 
million as a result of its dealings with the troubled asset management company, 
Fidentia.  In 2007, CEO of South African Airways, Khaya Ngqula without board 
authorisation issued bonuses of R27 million to executives.   
 
In 2008, Land Affairs Minister Lulu Xingwana dismissed for making several large 
suspect payments were allegedly. 
 
In 2009, Dali Mpofu (CEO) of SABC was implicated in an Auditor-General's report for 
"lack of leadership oversight" and "contraventions of policy and/or alleged 
mismanagement of funds”. 
 
In 2009, Carte Blanche broadcasted a series of programmes exposing widespread 
corruption, fraud, negligence, incompetence and nepotism within the Tshwane Metro 
Police Services. 
 
In 2009, The Mpumalanga Health Department’s budget for HIV/AIDS of over R6 million 
destined for the care of the sick and the dying had been squandered on plays, soccer 
matches, and prayer days. 
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In May 2011, a report was leaked to Carte Blanche and the Department of Energy for 
practices of corruption, nepotism and wasteful expenditure in PetroSA.  The CEO, 
Sipho Mhkize and CFO, Nkomsentu Nika was charged with tender irregularities.  
Further Sipho Mkhize had shares in companies that were awarded business by 
PetroSA.  
 
In October 2011, CEO of Cricket South Africa was charged with pocketing several 
million rand in unscheduled and unauthorised bonuses doing his tenure.  An amount of 
R1.3 million was paid following South Africa’s hosting of the Indian Premier League in 
2009 (Mail & Guardian, January 2012) 
 
In July 2004, the Auditor General, (Makwetu, 2014) reported that less than 10% of the 
country’s 340 municipalities and their entities obtained clean audits in the 2012-13 
financial year.  Local government consists of eight metropolitan municipalities, 44 
district municipalities and 226 local municipalities (totalling 278) as well as 62 municipal 
entities. In the 2012-13 financial year all municipalities and 41 municipal entities were 
audited. 
 
The 30 clean audits in the 2012-13 financial year represented 22 municipalities and 
eight municipal entities. The results marked an improvement from the 2011-12 financial 
year when only 13 achieved clean audits. 
 
The clean audits target set by government in 2009 was missed by just more than 90%.  
At least 67 municipalities received adverse opinions.  Municipalities and municipal 
entities had a total expenditure of R268bn in the 2012-13 financial year. About 23% of 
the expenses covered salaries — including those of councillors — 62% was for goods 
and services and the remaining 15% was spent on maintenance and infrastructure 
development.  The levels of unauthorised, irregular and wasteful expenditure remained 
high — R9bn of it was unauthorised expenditure, R11bn irregular expenditure and 
R815m fruitless and wasteful expenditure. 
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The State of Corruption and the Cost:  A review from 2001 - 2010 
 
Year Number 
of cases 
Amount of wasteful and 
Fruitless expenditure  
Cash recovered 
2011/12 1243 R229.9-million  
2010/11 1035 R932.3-million  
2009/10 1135 R346 529 568.20 R44 384 029.72, or 
12.8 percent 
2008/09 1024 R100 111 076.82 R9 946 013.83, or 
9.9 percent 
2007/08:
  
868 R 21 776 948.93 R 8 805 596.00, or 
40 percent 
2006/07 1042 R130 615 994.82 R20 838 681.74, or 
16 percent 
2005/06  R45 649 391.00  
2004/05  R120 497,731.02  
2003/04  R20 351 101.88  
2002/03  R331 213 430.16  
2001/02  R4 176 757.20  
Table 3.10: The real cost of corruption Louw (2013).  Corruption watch  
Louw (2013) presented a trend analysis of the levels of corruption and the costs thereof.  
Moreover, in 2009/10, there was unauthorised expenditure among six national 
government departments amounting to R802-million.  In addition, there was also 
irregular expenditure in 34 national government departments amounting to R2.3-billion, 
and fruitless and wasteful expenditure in 28 departments amounting to R1.6-billion 
 
Another alarming trend is that reports generated by the Public Service Commission 
underestimates the costs of corruption.  Studies generated by the Institute for Security 
Studies (1996), the Mail and Guardian (1997) and Casac (2006). 
 
Many studies show the extent to which funds that should have been spent on the 
country’s poor are misused. A study on Corruption and Social Grants conducted by the 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) revealed that in 1996 about R1.5-billion a year was 
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lost through corruption and maladministration in the delivery of social grants. At the time 
this amounted to 10 percent of the annual welfare budget of R11-billion (Casac, 1996). 
A study by the Mail and Guardian in February 1997 reported that R1-billion was being 
lost to pension fraud a year. The social security budget at the time was R14.3-billion. In 
1999, the Department of Social Development estimated that it was losing close to 
10 percent of its R20-billion budget to social grant fraud. 
Casac reported that the former minister of social development, Zola Skweyiya, stated 
that about R15-billion which had been allocated to pensions, social grants and other 
means of poverty alleviation was lost to corruption between 1994 and 2004. 
A more recent study by the Institute for Security Studies showed R1.4-billion was lost to 
fraud in 2006 out of a total social security budget at the time of R57-billion. The Minister 
of Human Settlements Tokyo Sexwale identified 20 problematic housing projects worth 
R2-billion.  Furthermore, 1570 arrests and 1189 convictions were made as a result of 
the abuse of the low-income housing subsidy scheme  
3.16 Board Functioning 
Above, the management of board structure was delineated to show the separation of 
control and ownership and the roles of the principals and agents (Agency Theory).   
The dominant theoretical position in the foregoing argument contends that board 
structure is inextricably linked to improved corporate governance and board 
performance.  From a meta-analysis study (Dalton and Daily, 1999) debated that 
despite a myriad of studies over several decades to explore the relationship between 
board structure and company performance the results have reveal an inconclusive, 
contradictory and inconclusive relationship between the two variables.  A meta-analysis 
of 159 research studies over a forty year period found that there is no evidence of a 
substantive relationship between board structure and financial performance with due 
consideration of intervening variables like type of performance measures, size of firm 
and board structure. Dalton and Daily (1999) and Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) 
concurred and queried the conceptualisation of a relationship between board structure 
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and firm performance. They argued that while board independence is a legitimate 
concern, it is not the only concern (Dalton and Daily, 1999). Further they argued that a 
number of intervening variables also influence and affect the performance of the board 
and consequentially the performance of the organisation.  Alternatively, in a board with 
a majority of inside directors, the directors may fail in its control and monitoring roles. 
Hence, it be can be concluded that board structure, in the form of independence is a 
consideration but is not the only consideration in improving corporate governance and 
board performance.   
 
Conforth (2001) contributed to a more nuanced understanding of corporate governance 
by arguing that there are many factors that influence board performance and these can 
be grouped in a simple monitoring frame that includes inputs, board structure and 
processes and outputs as can be seen in Figure 3.2. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Source: Adapted - A fully integrated model of Influences on board 
performance by Cornforth (2001)  
 
The two main inputs of the board are their skills and time, referred to effort norms in the 
extant literature (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Effort norms can be measured by using a 
6-item measure with a Likert scale ranging from 1, a low rating, to 5, a high rating.  The 
Effort Norms scale developed by (Wageman, 1995) has six items, namely, carefully 
INPUTS 
 
Board members’ 
skills and time 
BOARD STRUCTURE           
AND 
 PROCESSES 
E.g. board size,   
meeting practices 
OUTPUTS 
Board functions 
and/tasks e.g. 
supporting and 
advising 
management 
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scrutinizing the information provided by the firm prior to the meetings, researching 
issues relevant to the company, taking notes during the meetings, and participating 
actively during meetings.  To measure skills (functional area knowledge), Forbes and 
Milliken (1999) suggested a 23-item instrument with a Likert-type scale used to measure 
the extent of the presence of functional area knowledge on a board and the importance 
of the expertise to the firm’s success. The items of functional area knowledge included 
expertise such as Accounting, Corporate governance, Finance and Labour relations.  
The aforementioned inputs are then transformed into outputs through the board 
structure and processes.  Board processes refer mainly to the decision-making activities 
of directors of companies (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Jehn 
and Mannix, 2001; Spetzler, Arnold and Lang, 2005 and Scarborough, Haynie and 
Shook, 2010).  These processes include the board size membership, the existence of 
other sub committees, the frequency of meetings, clarity of board roles and the extent to 
which a common vision for the organisation exists.   Scarborough, Haynie and Shook 
(2010) added cognitive conflict, information quality and functional area knowledge to the 
list of board process variables.     
Information quality relates to the board’s ability to provide meaningful oversight and 
useful advice which is determined by the quality, timeliness and credibility of the 
information provided (Thomas, Schrage, Bellin and Marcotte, 2009).  Information quality 
is measured by a 8 item measure, information accessibility, relevance, sufficiency, 
concise, objective, timely, understandable and value-add.  Whereas cognitive conflict 
being the disagreement about the content of the tasks being performed, including 
differences in viewpoints, ideas and opinions (Jehn, 1995 and McNulty and Peck, 
2010).  The process variable, cognitive conflict is measured using a 9 item 
measurement scale, (1) ample opportunity to constructively challenge and debate 
decision brought to the board (2) culture within the board room encourages board 
members to express their disagreements and concerns (3) deliberations are based 
upon a healthy discussion of facts (4) reach collectively shared decisions following a full 
and frank debate (5) ample opportunity to influence the decisions made by the board (6) 
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personality clashes among directors,  (7) relationships are defined as win-lose best 
described as "win-lose" 
Cornforth (2001) also further contended that these processes and structures should be 
building on each other and reinforces one another.   They also lay the groundwork for 
board effectiveness.  In addition, Cornforth (2001) argued that board effectiveness is 
achieved through, namely, having a clear understanding of the roles and 
responsibilities, the right mix of skills and experience, time, and a common vision that is 
shared between management and the board and periodic review of the board.  
 
3.17 Measures for the board   
Process variables (effort norms, knowledge\skills, independence, cognitive conflict, 
information quality and cohesiveness) have been measured differentially in the extant 
literature.  A number of scholars have contributed to the development of measurement 
tools for the process variables (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; McGrath, MacMillan, and 
Venkataraman (1995); Shanley and Langfred (1998); (Daily and Dalton, 1995); Fisher, 
Craig, Eitel Lauria, Shobha Chengalur-Smith, and Richard Y. Wang, 2006; 
Scarborough, Haynie and Shook).  
 
Table 3.10 below provides a summary of the measurement tools that were adapted for 
the study on board decision quality.   
 
Variables  Measurement Tool Author, Study  
Develop measure for 
board quality 
 Gap in the literature  
Identify the strength 
and direction of the 
relationship between 
board quality and board 
activism 
23-item measure of board activism using a five-
point Likert-type scale 
Scarborough, Haynie & Shook 
(2010) 
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Functional area 
knowledge  
23-item measure using a Likert-type to measure 
the extent to which functional area knowledge 
are present on a board 
 
Assessment of  firm-specific knowledge and 
skills, measure the degree to which the board 
understands cause effect relationships involving 
the needs of customers, sources of risk to the 
firm, and impediments to output quality. 
 
Scarborough, Haynie & Shook 
(2010) 
 
Forbes & Milliken  (1999) 
 
McGrath, MacMillan, and 
Venkataraman (1995) 
Effort Norms The survey consisted of a 6-item measure using 
a rating, some of the measures are carefully 
scrutinizing the information provided by the firm 
prior to the meetings, researching issues relevant 
to the company, taking notes during the 
meetings, and participating actively during 
meetings 
Scarborough, Haynie & Shook 
(2010) 
Cognitive Conflict  Indicators of group cohesiveness.  Examples of 
these statements identify the extent to which (1) 
the board obtains feedback from the directors for 
decision-making; (2) the board gets help from the 
directors for decision-making and (3) co-
operativeness of directors is present. These 
measurements can be on a 5-point Likert scale 
from "Very low" to "Very high". Greater scores 
hence represent higher level of cohesiveness. 
Shanley and Langfred (1998) 
Table 3.11:  Measures for board process variables  
 
Board activism 
To measure the variable board activism a 23-item survey was used with a five-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1, a low rating to 5 a high rating, which reported the 
degree that the secretary agreed that the board was active in activities such as attend 
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board meetings, direct internal audit activities and regulatory compliance (Scarborough, 
Haynie and Shook, 2010). 
 
Functional area knowledge 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) suggested a 23-item measure using a Likert-type scale 
ranging from 1, a low rating, to 5, a high rating used to measure the extent to which 
functional area knowledge are present on a board. The items of functional area 
knowledge included expertise such as Accounting, Corporate governance, Finance, and 
Labour relations. Also, Forbes and Milliken (1999) suggested respondents rate and 
weight the importance of individual domains so that important domains more heavily 
weighted than less important domains. Thus, directors’ functional area knowledge was 
weighted based on the indicated importance of the directors’ functional expertise.  A 
composite score comprised of the weighted average was used in the analysis. 
 
In assessing firm-specific knowledge and skills, respondents could rate the 
comprehension levels of executive teams using the measure developed by McGrath, 
MacMillan, and Venkataraman (1995).  Specifically, researchers could ask respondents 
to assess the degree to which the board understands cause effect relationships 
involving the needs of customers, sources of risk to the firm, and impediments to output 
quality. 
Independence 
In the extant literature most empirical studies to measure the level of independence 
used the proportion of outside directors to inside directors (Daily and Dalton 1995). 
Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996), suggested using the SEC guidelines for 
determining director independence. The data source for this measure was archival data 
from the proxy materials of the companies surveyed. 
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Duality  
To measure duality previous studies had a close ended measure and required the 
company secretaries if the CEO also serves as the board chair. Then, dummy codes 
were created where 1 was Yes and 0 was No. 
Effort norms 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) suggested effort norms be measured using a six item 
measure developed by Wageman’s (1995) using a Likert type scale ranging from 1, a 
low rating, to 5, a high rating.  The measures included a number of variables such as 
carefully scrutinizing the information provided by the firm prior to the meetings, 
researching issues relevant to the company, taking notes during the meetings, and 
participating actively during meetings”. The directors’ effort norms were treated as an 
additive measure of the board’s expectations regarding the level of effort of the board as 
perceived by the corporate secretary. The Cronbach’s alpha was .90. 
 
To measure effort norms researchers may assess the knowledge and skills present on 
the board by asking board members to assess, using a Likert-type scale, the degree to 
which both types of expertise are present on the board. The scale used to assess the 
presence of functional area knowledge and skills might include items intended to gauge 
the presence of knowledge in domains that are common to virtually all businesses, such 
as finance, accounting, marketing, and law. These items could them be summed to 
obtain a composite score. Alternatively, because some functional areas are liable to 
vary in importance across industries, researchers may want to ask respondents to rate 
the importance of various functional areas to their businesses and use an additive 
measure that weights more important areas more strongly. 
Information Quality  
The board’s ability to provide meaningful oversight and useful advice is determined by 
the quality, adequacy, sufficiency, reliability; timeliness, accessibility and credibility of 
the information it has.  These variables were measured using a 5-point Likert scale from 
"Very low" to "Very high". Greater scores hence represent higher level of information 
quality. 
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Cohesiveness  
In the extant literature Shanley and Langfred (1998) provided indicators of group 
cohesiveness.  Examples of these statements identify the extent to which (1) the board 
obtains feedback from the directors for decision-making; (2) the board gets help from 
the directors for decision-making and (3) co-operativeness of directors is present. A 5-
point Likert type scale from "Very low" to "Very high" can be used to measure the 
degree of cohesiveness. 
3.18 Financial Measures and non-financial measures of Performance 
Ammer, Ramli & Zakaria (2010) research design entailed assembled data on boards 
and profiles of directors from the annual reports of listed non-financial firms. The final 
data consist of observations concerning firm-boards and directors. Besides information 
about the boards, financial data was used to develop performance measures using 
Thomson Worldscope. The sample was composed of firms from 2002 to 2007. The 
frequency of all variables was annual, and the values are measured at the end of each 
fiscal year 
 
Board composition was segregated according to director types to get percentages of 
insider, non-independent and independent directors and then, using these percentages, 
a board typology was developed.  
 
Following common practice in the literature a Tobin_ Q ratio as a measure of firm 
performance was, defined as the sum of the market value of common equity and total 
debt divided by total assets.  Besides board composition, firm performance also 
depends on other factors, such as profitability, access to capital markets, age, size, as 
well as industry environment. Return on assets was used as a proxy measure for a 
firm’s profitability, denoted by PROF, which is defined as the ratio of earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation to total assets.  Debt ratio, denoted by DA, 
was defined as the total long-term debt to total assets ratio; whereas BSIZE is the total 
size of the board; whilst AGE, is the log of the years for which a firm has been in 
operation; and SIZE is the log of the total sales. 
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There are multiple assessment criteria for evaluating performance, whether extrinsic or 
intrinsic.  Still another perspective, performance can be measured by the three “Es” 
(Economy, Effectiveness and Efficiency) of management.  Efficiency is defined as the 
optimisation of quantity and quality of goods and services produced in relation to the 
resources used in producing them.  Economy means good quality inputs at good costs, 
effectiveness means how far the expected organisational goals are being achieved and 
efficiency means the optimisation of quality and quantity of goods and services 
produced in relation to the resources used in producing them.    Eruteyan (2008) too 
claimed that a manager’s performance is the total of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness in the procurement and use of organisational resources to achieve 
organisational goals and objectives.  
 
 Zahra and Pearce (1989) suggested that the use of varied measures may also account 
for some of the observed variation on the monitoring-performance relationship.  Zahra 
et al. (ibid) observed and agreed that other authors have criticised the use of accounting 
measures to measure performance because they are too easily manipulated by 
managers (Cochran and Wood, 1984).  Moreover, earnings per share and return on 
investment are not considered reliable indicators of economic value (Branch and Cole, 
1983). Still another deduction was that in assessing the influence of board composition  
on financial performance there could be differential effects across the different 
measures of financial performance.    
 
In the extant literature the performance indices used in capturing company performance 
was return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS), profit 
margin (PM), earnings per share (EPS), market to book value (MTB), including Tobin’s 
Q. 
 
According to Ittner, Larcker and Rajan (1997) accounting based measures reflected 
historical performance patterns of historical data measures and therefore, encouraged 
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managers to engage in short-term backward looking actions.  On the other hand, 
market measures capture investor expectations of future performance and hence forces 
managers to consider the implications of their current actions on future cash flows.  
Measuring organisational performance is typically undertaken through the use of ratios.  
Profitability ratios measure the profit earned by the company.   
 
Return on Equity (ROE) was used in a study by Richard and Johnson (2001) in a 
study on strategic human resource management effectiveness and firm performance.  
According to Garrison and Noreen (1997) managers have both financing and operating 
responsibilities. Financing responsibilities relate to how one obtains the funds needed to 
acquire the assets in an organisation.  Operating responsibilities relate to how one uses 
the assets once they have been acquired.  The proper management of both 
responsibilities is vital to a well-managed organisation.  
 
Net profit is computed as net income divided by net sales 
 
Internal rate of return  
The internal rate of return (IRR) is the rate of discount at which future cash flows must 
be discounted in order to have their net present value equal the value of the cash flows 
on the investment.  The use of the IRR method is popular in practice, presumably 
because it gives a percentage which can be directly applied to the decision.  
 
Internal rate of return  = Investment required  
                Net annual cash inflow  
 
Return on assets  
Return on assets (ROA) provides a measure of effective utilisation of the company’s 
assets used to generate profit.  Return on Assets gives an indication of overall efficiency 
of operations and is measured by profit before interest and tax divided by total operating 
assets.  
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Return on assets   = PBIT 
     Total operating assets 
 
Return on Equity  
Return on Equity (ROE) indicates the return on shareholders’ investment and is not only 
concerned with the operations of the undertaking, but with all aspects including the 
financing policies and the tax management.  This is calculated taking profit after tax 
(PAT) divided by shareholders funds. 
 
 
Return on Equity   =  PAT 
     Shareholder funds 
 
 Profitability ratio  
 Earnings per share 
 SHARPE Index  
 
3.19 Chapter Summary  
 
The literature review confirmed that a lot of research has been undertaken worldwide on 
governance. (Berle and Means, 1932; Pfeffer, 1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Vance, 
1978; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Baysinger and Butler,1985; Hermalin & Weisbach, 
1988; Eisenhardt, 1989; Dalton and Rechner, 1989  Cadbury committee, 1992; Vance, 
1995; Hart, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny,1996;  Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996;.  Johnson, 
Daily and Ellstrand, 1996; Daily and Johnson, 1997; Otobo, 2000; Oman, 2001; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 2003; Dennis and McConnell, 2003; OECD, 2004; Solomon and Solomon, 
2004; Perry and Shivdasani, 2005; Robert, McNulty and Stiles, 2005; McIntyre, Murphy 
and Mitchell, 2007; Naidoo, 2009; Abdullah and Valentine, 2009). 
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The literature looked at various theories: identified key theories that underpin 
governance thinking, namely, Agency Theory (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen,1983; Baysinger and Butler,1985; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Vance,1978; Daily and Johnson, 1997; Dalton and Rechner, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Kesner and Dalton, 1986; Vance, 1995; Hart, 1995; 
Shleifer and Vishney, 1997; Dennis and McConnell, 2003; Robert, McNulty and Stiles, 
2005; McIntyre, Murphy & Mitchell, 2007; Choi, Park and Yoo, 2007), the policy model 
(Carver and Carver,1996a; Carver, 2001), resource dependency (Erakovic and Goel, 
2008; Hillman, Canella and Paetzold, 2000; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Johnson, 
Daily and Ellstrand,1996; Boeker and Goodstein 1991; Boyd 1990; Stearns and 
Mizruchi, 1993; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), stakeholder theory (Abdullah and 
Valentine, 2009; Esser and Dekker, 2008; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Donaldson, 
1990a & 1990b; Barney, 1990; Rechner and Dalton, 1988; Zahra and Pearce, 1989), 
resource-based view (Carney 2005; Carter & Lorsch 2004; Castanias and Helfat 2001; 
Barney, 1991; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Gadhoum 1998)  
 
In addition, there was also a delineation of the variables that influences governance 
practices, namely: board structure (Ammer, Ramli and Zakaria, 2010; Scarborough, 
Haynie, and Shook, 2010; Dey and Chauhan, 2009; McIntyre, Murphy and Mitchell, 
2007; Choi, Park and Yoo, 2007; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Cadbury, 1992; Dey, 1994; 
Orser, 2000).  Most of the focus has been on dimensions of board structure, identifying 
a stable set of explanatory variables which explain the major reasons for the different 
growth rates of firms, the resources, types of innovation and performance of the board 
and organisation.   
 
Governance regimes in South Africa (King III, 2009; Public Finance Management 
Act, 1999, The Insider Trading Act, 1998; JSE Securities Exchange South Africa Listing 
Requirements, 1995;   The Company’s Act, 1973, 2008; Protected Disclosures Act, 
2001; Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy, 2002; Broad-based Black Economic 
Empowerment , 1994) to encourage a climate and culture of accountability.   
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In the African context most focus has been on the causes of informality and the 
constraints that micro and small firms face rather than growth (Mead and Liedholm, 
1998, MacPherson 1996, King and McGrath 1999, Okech 2005, Tushabomwe – 
Kazooba 2006, Daniels 2003, Temtime and Pansiri, 2006, Behar, 2006). Focus on 
government regulations, access to finance and lack of managerial skills as the key 
determinants of high mortality of micro and small enterprises. There has been limited 
specific focus on the growth of small enterprises into medium enterprises. Only Mead 
and Liedholm, 1998, looked at growth from a national aggregate perspective – out of 
the total national population how many small enterprises have grown. 
 
In South Africa the research and international bulk of the literature focus on board 
structure as a mechanism to improve governance, board performance and some 
studies have looked at the relationship between board structure and company 
performance.   Some attention has been shown to look beyond board structure at board 
process variables (Scarborough, Haynie and Shook, 2010, Maharaj, 2007; Sonnefeld, 
2002; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Wan and Ong, 2001; Conforth, 2001).  In this regard a 
number of variables have been studied, namely, effort norms, cognitive conflict and use 
of skills\knowledge.  These variables are considered to be intervening or moderating 
variables that can lead to board performance and consequentially company 
performance.  Scarborough, Haynie and Shook (2010) looked at the relationship 
between process variables and board activism.  The process variables again are seen 
as intervening or moderating variable to increase board activism and consequentially 
board performance.   
 
This research will follow this line of inquiry. The problem statement, research questions 
and the hypothesis have been derived directly from this literature review. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY – PHASE 1 & 
PHASE 2 
 
4.1 Introduction   
After identifying the initial gaps in the literature around board process variables and 
board decision quality, a qualitative study was conducted to explore board process 
variables that impact board decision quality.  The study focused on the decision process 
and unravelled the moderating variables that influence the quality of decision outcomes  
The results of this research phase led to a quantitative study that sought to determine 
the measures of board decision quality.  In addition to board decision processes, 
particular attention was paid to decision quality and board members’ decision 
commitment (effort  norms) and how these vary with understanding and conflict 
(cognitive conflict) in the processing of information (information quality).  
 
As mentioned in chapter one, this study seeks to address two research questions: (1) 
What processes do public entity boards follow in making good quality decisions? How 
are board processes linked to board decision quality? To address the research 
questions, a mixed research approach was selected for the study. The 
phenomenological (qualitative) and positivist (quantitative) philosophical paradigms 
were adopted with the purpose of obtaining a greater understanding of board quality 
decisions in the Public Entities. 
 
This chapter is divided into seven parts. The first part looks into the design of the study. 
The second part provides the epistemological perspective of the study. The section also 
links the research questions to the study approach, thereby giving rationale for the study 
approach adopted. This is followed by a discussion on sampling issues (part three). In 
the fourth part of the chapter the qualitative and quantitative data collection instruments  
are presented. This section also includes a discussion on how issues of bias were dealt 
with. The fifth part of the chapter presents the analytical tools used to analyse both the 
qualitative and quantitative data. Validity and reliability issues are then discussed (part 
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six) followed by the final part of the chapter that looks into how ethical issues were 
handled. 
 
4.2 Assumption of the Research Paradigms 
Cresswell (2007) showed the different assumptions associated with both the positivistic 
paradigm and the phenomenological paradigm. The research design and approach 
chosen shaped the epistemological basis of the study.  This section aimed to create an 
understanding of how research methods for the study are implemented within a 
phenomenological and a positivist approach.  Yin (1994) and Denzin and Lincoln (1994: 
p.223) pointed out that the type of research questions determine the choice of research 
methodology to be employed in a study. 
 
Table 4.1 Assumptions of the research paradigm related to the current study 
Assumption  Question  Positivistic Paradigm Phenomenological 
Paradigm 
Ontological  What is the nature of reality?  Reality is objective and 
singular, apart from the 
researcher. Reality is 
determined through the 
administration of the survey 
to determine the 
relationships between board 
process variables, board 
decision quality and board 
activism  
Reality is subjective and 
multiple as seen by 
participants in a study.  In-
depth interviews are 
conducted to explore the 
phenomenon, board decision 
quality  
Epistemological  What is the relationship of 
the researcher to the 
researched? 
Researcher is independent 
from that being researched.  
Data is collected via a 
research instrument   
Researcher interacts with that 
being researched.  The 
researcher conducted 12 in-
depth interviews and two 
focus groups 
Axiological  What is the role of values? Value-free and unbiased. 
Data analysis is done with 
a software package  
Value-ladden and biased.  
The researcher interacts 
with the data and does 
thematic analysis  
Rhetorical  What is the language of the 
researcher? 
Formal.  Based on set 
definitions and use of 
Informal and evolving 
decisions. 
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accepted quantitative words. 
Existing concepts and its 
relationships are tested. 
 
Meaning of board decision 
quality is constructed. 
Methodological  What is the process of 
research? 
Highly structured  
Questionnaire with 43 
items  
In-depth investigations  
12 in-depth interviews and 
two focus group interview  
Table 4.1 Source: Assumptions of the research paradigm related to the current study 
Adapted from Creswell (1994) 
 
 
The theoretical framework presented in the preceding Chapter and the research 
questions that this study seeks to address as outlined in Table 4.2 below, suggest that 
the study is both quantitative and qualitative in nature. 
 
Table 4.2:  Research questions and research methods employed in this study 
 
 
 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
 
RESEARCH 
METHOD  
 
 
DATA 
COLLECTION 
METHOD  
 
What are the factors that affect 
board decision quality? 
 
Quantitative and 
qualitative  
Focus group interviews, 
personal interviews and 
surveys  
What is the strength and direction of 
the relationship between board 
decision? 
 
Quantitative  Survey  
Does board decision quality mediate 
the relationship between effort 
norms, functional area knowledge 
and cognitive conflict? 
 
Quantitative  Survey  
What effect does the three variables 
have an effect on board decision 
quality? 
 
Quantitative  Survey  
   
Table 4.2 Source: Research methodology developed on the basis of the research 
problem as outlined in Chapter 1 
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Table 4.2 illuminates that the nature of the research questions addressed in this study 
requires both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. A case in point is that to 
address the first research question a qualitative methodology is appropriate in that very 
little is known or researched about board decision quality, board process variables and 
board activism.  Though some of the variables that affect board decision quality are 
conceptually derived, qualitative research is required to unravel insights that might not 
have emerged from the literature review.  
 
“Why” questions are explored to obtain a better understanding of the social and cultural 
aspects which trigger different behavioural patterns in participants. The quality and 
depth of information received with qualitative research is of great significance (Maree, 
2010:51). 
 
Furthermore, based on Maree (2010) contention that qualitative methods posing “why 
questions are suitable for studying any phenomenon about which little is known.  The 
quality and depth of information derived with qualitative research is of great significance.  
It aims to describe what participants have in common as they live a phenomenon (e.g. 
board decision quality).  Through an exploratory study, Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 
(2009) propose that new insights are unravelled and a deepened understanding of the 
phenomenon board decision quality emerges.  Saunders et al propose approaches to 
gain to gain a deeper understanding of the phenomena, board decision quality, by doing 
a search of literature, interviewing of experts in corporate governance and to conduct in-
depth and focus group interviews.  
 
This study predominantly used a quantitative method of research and hence makes the 
epistemological basis of the research positivist in nature.  Both Yin (1994) and Hussey 
& Hussey (1997) expounded that the epistemological position and the research 
methodology is guided by the type of research questions to be employed in a study.  
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From Table 4.2 it can be witnessed that all three research sub-questions require survey 
evidence relating to board decision quality.  Further the positivist approach is used to 
develop the epistemological framework for conceptualising this study and the 
procedures carried out to build the board decision quality model.  The study is 
reinforced through interviews with board members of public enterprises and corporate 
governance experts that support public enterprises to add a meaningful, abundant layer 
to understanding of the dimensions of board decision quality.     
 
 
In reviewing both the qualitative and quantitative literature (Cresswell, 2003; Leedy and 
Ormord, 2005; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994), salient features of the two procedures were 
identified.  Quantitative research is associated with a survey method of collecting data. 
The prominent features of this method are the ability for generating computable data on 
large numbers of people (a sample) that is representative of a wider population in order 
to test theories or hypothesis. One of the strengths of quantitative research is that it 
facilitates an exploration of causality among related variables and thus helps in building 
models that illustrate the strength and direction of related variables (Maree, 2010; 
Cresswell and Leedy and Ormord, 2005).  
 
Cooper (2006:199) argued that quantitative research is associated with a survey 
method of collecting data in an attempt to precisely measure something.  Neumann 
(2006) defined quantitative research as logic of research based on re-organising, 
standardising, codifying research knowledge and practices into explicit rules, formal 
procedures and techniques.  Both Neumann (2006) and Denzin and Lincoln (1994) 
concur that positivist research designs requires the early identification and development 
of research questions, formulation of hypothesis, identification of sampling strategies, 
research strategies and methods of analysis.    
 
Qualitative research on the other hand is a study in a natural setting and involves a 
process of building a complex and holistic picture of the phenomenon of interest 
(Maree, 2010).  From an epistemological perspective another distinguishing factor of a 
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qualitative design is that there is sustained contact between the researcher and the 
respondents whereas this is non-existent in quantitative research (Leedy and Ormord, 
2005). “Why” questions are explored to obtain a better understanding of the social and 
cultural aspects which triggers different behavioural patterns in participants (Maree, 
2010).  The qualitative research of board decision quality is an inquiry process of 
understanding where a researcher develops a complex, holistic picture, analyses words, 
reports detailed views of informants, and conducts the study in a natural setting 
(Creswell, 2007).  Thus the linkage between theory and investigation is inductive in the 
case of qualitative research and deductive in the case of quantitative research.  
 
An important distinction between quantitative and qualitative research is ascribed to a 
technical matter whereby the choice between the two methods has to do with their 
suitability in answering particular research questions (Maree, 2010; Leedy and Ormord, 
2005, Yin 1994).  Not only does this study employ quantitative and qualitative approach 
to address the research questions, but also there is a merging of data sources. In 
reviewing Table 4.2 it can be observed that two methods of collecting qualitative data 
have been used: personal interviews and a case study method.  
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The Research Plan  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1:  Research Plan for the study  
 
4.2.1 Quantitative versus Qualitative Approaches 
The figure 4.2 and Table 4.2 also serves as summary of the foregoing paragraphs, by 
linking the research subjects, research method with research questions. As much as 
there are multiple data sources, the board decision quality survey is the empirical 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
-IDENTIFICATION OF THE 
VARIABLES 
QUALITATIVE METHOD 
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS  
QUALITATIVE METHOD 
FOCUS GROUP 
INTERVIEWS  
QUANTITATIVE METHOD 
DEVELOPMENT OF 
QUESTIONNAIRE  
DATA ANALYSIS  
RESULTS 
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backbone of this study.  In concurring with Maree (2010) a number of data sources, 
both qualitative and quantitative methods have been used to obtain crucial information 
to enrich the understanding of the phenomenon, board decision quality.  There was 
recognition that depth and scope of information could not have been available if 
personal interviews, or surveys or case study methods were used exclusively. 
Particularly in this study, the reason for employing the multiple data sources, depicted in 
figure 4.1 is to be able to provide substantive contribution to board decision quality body 
of knowledge. Essentially, the purpose of this study is to develop a model of board 
decision quality and its relationship to board process variables. In so doing a two-stage 
methodology was adopted as illustrated in figure 4.2.  
 
Combined research strategies are also referred to as mixed methods, multi-method and 
integrated method.  For this study, two research strategies have been combined in a 
single research design. The positivist research strategy which includes a survey has 
been combined with a phenomenological research strategy a case study. 
Combined research strategies build on both qualitative and quantitative methods. Text 
information is obtained through interviews and observation and numeric data is 
collected through the survey instrument. Information received from the participants or 
the findings from the study is connected at various points within the study (Maree, 
2010:264).  Maree (2010) suggested that there are three mixed methods designs of 
research, namely explanatory mixed method design, exploratory mixed method design 
and the triangulation mixed method design.  The study on board decision quality used 
an exploratory mix method design. 
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Figure 4.2 Exploratory mixed methods design 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2:  Exploratory mixed method design, source adapted from Maree (2010:  267)  
 
4.3 Research Design 
Cooper and Schindler (2008) defined research design as a blue print or a structure to 
obtain answers to research questions.  In accordance with this definition this study was 
designed to explore decision processes that are likely to yield quality decisions from the 
perspective of Public Entity boards; and to ascertain whether or not board process 
variables help to improve board decision quality and consequentially board 
performance.  
 
Data for both phases was collected from participants identified from the Public Entities 
selected for the case study. As suggested by Eseinhardt (1989), who contributed 
significantly to the body of knowledge of case study research, in selecting case studies, 
efforts should focus on theoretically useful cases.  
 
As observed in Figure 4.2, responses to phase one questions shaped the research 
agenda for the second phase of the research. The purpose of the first phase was to 
explore the factors that contribute to board decision quality. For this phase, qualitative 
data was collected from two focus groups and personal interview participants.  The 
variables identified from this phase informed the design of the survey instrument used to 
collect data in the second phase of the research process. 
Qualitative 
data      
collection and 
analysis 
(interviews 
and focus 
group) 
Quantitative 
data collection 
and analysis 
(survey on 
board decision 
quality) 
 
Qualitative → Quantitative                  
Interpret how Quantitative 
results build on the Qualitative 
Results 
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Therefore the qualitative methodology chosen for phase one was found to be 
appropriate given the nature, size and location of the investigation. Furthermore, the 
qualitative method applied supports the research philosophy that informs the 
investigation. 
 
Figure 4.3: Research Design 
 
Phase 1 (Qualitative data)     Phase 2 (Quantitative Data) 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3:  Research design for the study   
 
 Case study selection  
 
 Design a survey 
instrument to 
collect data to 
address the 
second research 
instrument 
 
 
 
Identifying focus group and 
interview participants  
 
 
Qualitative data collection from 
the focus group and personal 
interview participants. 
Qualitative data analysis 
 
Quantitative data 
collection  
 
 
 
Quantitative data 
analysis 
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The data collected in the first phase was qualitative in nature, in contrast to the phase 2 
data which is quantitative in nature. Table 4.3 below outlined the characteristics of 
qualitative research as pointed out by Ryan, Coughlan and Cronin (2007).    
 
 
Table 4.3:  Characteristics of qualitative research 
 
Qualitative research 
Truth There are multiple truths regarding board decision quality - generalization 
is not sought 
Purpose  Concerned with discovery and description of board decision quality and 
its relationship to board activism although verification is also possible 
Context There is attention to the social context (board meeting and associated 
board events) in which events occur and have meaning 
Emphasis  There is an emphasis on understanding the social world from the point of 
view of the participants in the study - an emic perspective 
Approach The approach is primarily inductive 
Relationship between 
researcher and participant 
There is integration between researcher and participant - interaction is 
valued 
Sample  Usually small (21 research respondents) in number but consists of those 
who are able and willing to describe the experience 
Data  Elicits 'soft data', i.e. words 
Data Collection  The major data collection techniques include interviewing, participant 
observation, examination of personal documents and other printed 
materials. 
Procedures and tools of data gathering are subject to on-going revision in 
the field situation. 
Analysis Analysis is presented for the most part in a narrative rather than 
numerical form, but the inclusion of some quantitative measures and 
numerical expressions. 
Rigour Credibility, transferability (fittingness), dependability, conformability. 
Goodness 
Table 4.3 Source: Ryan, Coughlan & Cronin (2007).  Step-by-step guide to critiquing 
research - Part 2: qualitative research 
 
The cases are chosen either to replicate previous cases or to extend the emergent 
theory as suggested by Eisenhardt (1989). 
 
4.4 Research Strategy  
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009) argued that the choice of strategy will be guided 
by the research questions and objectives, the extent of existing knowledge, the amount 
of time, the philosophical underpinnings and other resources that are available.  For the 
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study on board decision quality in Public Entities an embedded case study research 
strategy will be used. 
4.4.1 Case Study  
Case studies focus on one (or just a few) instances of a particular phenomenon with a 
view to providing an in-depth account of events, relationships, experiences or processes 
occurring in that particular instance (Denscombe, 2008).  In accordance with the 
definition of a case study, South African Public Entities were chosen for the study.  
Denscombe (2008) argued that using a case study relates to the scale and scope of an 
investigation, and makes allowance for the use of a variety of methods depending on 
the circumstances and the specific needs of the situation.  One of the strengths of the 
case study is that it allows the researcher to use a variety of sources, a variety of types 
of data and a variety of research methods as part of the investigation.  Document 
analysis, interviews and a survey was used to understand board process variables, 
board decision quality and board activism.   
 
a. Characteristics of a case study 
Depth of research         Rather than  Breadth of study  
The particular  Rather than  The general  
Relationships/processes Rather than  Outcomes and end-products  
Holistic view  Rather than Isolated factors  
Natural settings  Rather than  Artificial situation  
Multiple sources  Rather than  One research method  
Table 4.4 Source: The Good Research Guide for small scale social research projects 
(Denscombe, 2008)  
 
There are merits and demerits about single case study versus multiple case studies Yin 
(2009: 53). In agreement for single case study, Dyer and Wilkins (1991: 634) too 
advocated that a single case study research presents a better opportunity for the deep 
understanding of a particular social setting. Dyer and Wilkins (1991: 615) argued that, a 
multiple case study research places too much emphasis on general constructs, and 
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neglect the more tacit and less obvious aspects of the setting under investigation. They 
are more likely to provide a rather distorted picture or no picture at all, of the underlying 
dynamics of the case.  In contrast to the single case study approach advocated by Dyer 
and Wilkins (1991), Eisenhardt (1989) advocated for a multiple case study approach.  In 
accordance with the contributions of Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Eisenhardt (1989) 
cases are chosen for theoretical (theoretical sampling) and not statistical reasons. 
Pettigrew (1988) agreed that cases are chosen, to replicate previous cases or extend 
emergent theory or fill theoretical categories (polar types or extreme situations) in which 
the interest is transparently declared.  With full consideration of the arguments 
advanced by scholars Yin (2009), Dyer and Wilkins (1991), Dyer and Wilkins (1991) and 
Eisenhardt for single or multiple cases – a multiple case approach was chosen (four 
state-owned enterprises).  
 
b. Embedded-case study  
 An embedded case study methodology provides a means of integrating quantitative 
and qualitative methods into a single research study (Scholz and Tietje, 2002; Yin 
2003). However, the identification of sub-units allows for a more detailed level of inquiry. 
As pointed out by Yin (2003) the embedded case study design is an empirical form of 
inquiry appropriate for descriptive studies, where the goal is to describe the features, 
context, and process of a phenomenon. 
 
Because this study is part of a process to develop a model for board processes and 
board decision quality in Public Entities, Eseihardt’s (1989) roadmap for building 
theories from case study research was used. Eisenhardt (1989) takes a view that a 
case study is a research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics of 
specific settings by collecting qualitative and quantitative evidence using a combination 
of data collection methods such as interviews, questionnaires and observations. Below 
we provide a concise account of Eseinhardt’s framework for building theories from case 
studies. 
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Eisenhardt’s Roadmap for Building Theories from Case Study Research 
Eseinhardt contributed significantly to the body of knowledge of case study research by 
putting a framework that explains an eight-step process of theory building from case 
studies. As illustrated in Figure 3, the process starts with an initial definition of the 
research questions in order to have a well-defined focus when collecting data. 
Eisenhardt (ibid) suggests an “a priori specification of constructs to facilitate a “firmer 
empirical grounding for the emergent theory”. Early identification of research questions 
and specification of constructs and/or variables are tentative because the variables 
identified in the initial stages may not be part of the resultant theory. Focus may shift as 
new evidence emerges during the research process.  
 
Eisenhardt placed emphasis on the importance of formulating a research problem with 
corresponding research questions and specifying variables with some reference to 
existing literature. The second step involves selecting cases. The purpose of this step is 
two-fold: (1) to focus efforts on theoretically useful cases; and (2) to define the limits for 
generalising the findings so as to enhance external validity. 
 
 The cases are chosen either to replicate previous cases or to extend the emergent 
theory. The third steps involve development of research instruments and protocols for 
collecting data from multiple sources. The rationale behind this step is to have multiple 
data sets that can be viewed from different perspective to foster a synergistic view of 
evidence. In so doing, the empirical grounding of the research propositions is 
strengthened. The fourth step involves entering the field to collect data such that data 
collection and analysis overlap. Eisenhardt (ibid) suggests writing field notes as a 
means of accomplishing the overlap. She explained that the researcher is able to record 
on-going thoughts, hunches and make necessary adjustments during the data collection 
process, especially if the adjustments are likely to better ground the theory being 
developed. 
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Figure 4.4: Eisenhardt’s Framework for Building Theories from Case Study 
Research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Source: Adapted from Eisenhardt (1990). Building Theories from Case Study 
Research.  Academy of Management Review, 14 (4): 532-550. 
The fifth step involves write-ups of descriptions to help researchers cope with the 
enormous volume of case study data. At this stage researchers may integrate rich and 
narrative descriptions with extensive use of illustrations, graphs and quantitative data 
summarised in tables. It is at this stage of theory development with unique patterns of 
each case being studied start to emerge. As a result cross-case comparison becomes 
possible. 
Step 1: Start with a definition of research questions, possibly a priori constructs with reference to 
existing literature. This activity provides better grounding of construct measures. 
Step 2:  Selecting cases. This step defines the population of your study from which the research sample 
is drawn.  
Step 3:  Crafting instruments and protocols to facilitate multiple data collection methods. This step 
strengthens the grounding of theory by triangulation of evidence. 
Step 4:  Enter the field in such a manner that data collection overlaps with analysis. 
Step 5:  Analysing within case data to gain familiarity with data. Preliminary theory may be generated at 
this stage. 
Step 6:  Shaping Hypotheses. Iterative tabulation of evidence for each construct is carried out to 
sharpen construct definition, validity, and measurability. The step also involves searching for 
evidence for “why” behind relationships in order to build internal validity. 
Step 7:  Compare emerging concepts, theory or hypotheses with existing literature.  
Step 8:  Reaching Closure. This step involves  ending the research process when improvement becomes 
marginal. 
208 | P a g e  
 
Evidence, impressions, concepts and themes that emerged during within case analysis 
is compared and relationships are verified at this stage (step 6). Theory and data is 
compared and assessed for goodness-of-fit. A close fit is what is required to build sound 
theory. During this stage, definitions of variables or constructs are refined. Multiple 
sources of evidence are used to build construct measures.  
The seventh step involves a reviewing of literature which conflicts with the emergent 
theory and interrogate underlying reasons for the conflict.  A review of theory discussing 
similar findings strengthens internal and external validity of the case study findings.  The 
last step requires the researcher to make a call about when to stop the iterating 
between theory and data. The decision to stop is taken when improvement becomes 
marginally small. 
4.4.2 Sampling Issues 
 
Study population of phase 1:  qualitative study  
This research will use the purposive sampling method to identify research respondents.  
Eisenhardt (1989: 537) alternatively called this method the theoretical sampling. This is 
because the research questions seek to explore the interplay between board decision 
quality and board activism. Given this particular focus of the research the purposive 
method is directly relevant as it will assist the researcher to identify cases which will 
help in the examination of the interplay between small business enterprise growth and 
the role of the owner manager. 
 
In purposive sampling method (Neumann, 2006) observed, the researcher uses a wide 
range of methods to locate all possible cases of a highly specific and is difficult to reach 
from the population.  Soliciting information from the board members of public sector 
boards is particularly challenging.  Denzin and Lincoln (1994) elucidated that the logic 
and power behind purposeful selection of informants is that the sample should be 
information rich. 
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This study seeks to address two research questions: (1) What processes do SOE 
boards follow in making good quality decisions? How board structure is linked to board 
process? According to Yin (1984, 13), if a study “investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context”, as is the case with the current study, a case 
study is a logical methodology. Yin (1984) further explained that the form of a question 
in terms of ‘how’, ‘why’, ‘what’, ‘where’, also dictates the design of the study, and the 
case study is more appropriate when ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions are asked. In order to 
understand all the interacting factors in board process and activism it was necessary to 
conduct an embedded case study in four public entities: (1) Case Study A; (2) Case 
Study B; (3) Case Study C; and (4) Case Study D. 
 
Study population of phase 2:  Quantitative Research 
A target population refers to the entire group of individuals or objects or alternatively a 
full set of cases from which researchers are interested in generalising the conclusions 
(Organ, 2006 and Sauders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009).  In the study the target 
population is identified by the public entities that have boards of directors referred to 
Schedule 1, 2 and 3 public sector organisations.  
 
PUBLIC ENTITY  NUMBER  
Schedule 1:  Constitutional Institutions  9 
Schedule 2:  Major Institutions  21 
Schedule 3:  Part A 148 
                       Part B 29 
                       Part C 82 
Total 289 
Table 4.5:  Public Finance Management Act 1999 – A list of Public Entities –Schedule 1, 2 
&3 
 
Schedule 1, 2 and 3 Public Entities (289) in accordance with the Public Finance and 
Management Act, 1999 is defined as the total population for the study. Schedule 1 is 
defined as constitutional institutions, Schedule 2 are major public entities (known as 
210 | P a g e  
 
State-owned enterprises or government business entities) and Schedule 3, National 
Public  Entities, National Government Business Enterprises and Provincial Enterprises.   
. 
At a national level SOEs can be categorised into three broad groups: 
 Constitutional Institutions (listed in Schedule 1 of the PFMA), for example the 
Municipal Demarcation Board or the Commission for Gender Equality; 
 Public entities including Statutory Corporations (listed in Schedule 3A of the PFMA), 
which includes stewardship bodies, regulators and advisory bodies, for example, 
museums, the National Energy Regulatory and the Human Sciences Research 
Council; as well as statutory corporations such as Rand Water and the South African 
Bureau of Standards. 
 Government Business Enterprises or GBEs, which include State Owned Companies 
in which the state is the sole shareholder, for example Transnet and ESKOM; State 
Interest Companies in which the state owns a partial share, for example, Telkom; 
and the Development Finance Institutions – for example the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa or the Industrial Development Corporation. These are listed under 
Schedule 2 the PFMA.  As noted, the study focuses on all categories Schedule 1, 
Schedule 2 and Schedule entities as listed in the Public Finance Management Act 
(1999).    
 
Table 4.6:  Types of Public Entities  
 
Types of entities  Schedule 1 Schedule 2 Schedule 3 Cases 
Selected  
% 
Constitutional organisation  9   3 33% 
Major Public Entities   21  10 48% 
Part A: National Public Entities 
 
  148 32 22% 
Part B: National Government 
Business Enterprises 
 
  29 7 24% 
Part C: Provincial Public Entities 
 
  9 0 0 
Part D: Provincial Entities  (Free 
State) 
  4 0 0 
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Gauteng    8 2 25% 
Kwazulu Natal   9 0 0 
Limpopo    12 0 0 
Mpumalanga    3 0 0 
Northern Cape    2 0 0 
North West   10 0 0 
Western Cape   9 0 0 
Part D: Provincial Government 
Business Enterprises 
EASTERN CAPE 
  3 0 0 
Free State     1 0 0 
Kwazulu Natal    4 0 0 
Limpopo   2 0 0 
Mpumalanga    3   
North West   2   
Western Cape    1   
TOTAL 9 21 259   
Table 4.6 Source:  A list of Public Entities in South Africa in the PFMA (1999) 
4.5. Study Sample 
The manner in which the sample case studies were selected is explained below. 
Denscombe (2008) argued that all cases studies need to be chosen on the basis of their 
relevance to the practical problems or theoretical issues being researched. 
 
Table 4.7 Criteria for the selection of case studies  
Criteria  Explanation Application to the case study  
Typical instance  The particular case is similar  in 
crucial respects with the others 
that might have been chosen and 
the findings from the case study 
are likely to apply elsewhere 
The selection of cases from Public 
Entities are chosen because of similar 
size, budget, etc. 
Extreme Instance  The case presents something of a 
contrast to the cases chosen.  An 
organisation to be chosen can 
either be large or small.   
From the cases of Public Entities, SOEs 
are selected as they are large and make 
a significant contribution to the GDP. 
Test site for theory Case studies can used for the 
purposes of ‘theory-testing’ or 
‘theory-building’ 
Cases are not selected as a result of 
theory testing or theory building  
Least likely instance  A case might be selected to test  
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the validity of theory by seeing if it 
occurs in an instance where it 
might be least expected.  
A matter of convenience  Cases are selected as it involves 
the least amount of travel, the 
least expense and the least 
difficulty when it comes to gaining 
access  
Cases are chosen as it is easy and least 
expensive. Board members referred me 
to other members of boards.  
Intrinsically interesting  The case is likely to  reach a 
wider audience and the research 
itself is likely to be a more 
interesting experience  
 
 
Commissioned research  The researcher is left with little 
leeway or no discretion in the 
selection of the case studies. 
Not considered as a criterion for the 
selection of cases.  
Unique Opportunities  Here events could be once off 
(natural disasters) or 
unpredictable (strikes) 
Not considered as a criterion  for  the 
selection of cases  
Table 4.7 Source:  Adapted - Criteria for the selection of case studies (Denscombe, 2008) 
From the extant literature Table 4.7 demonstrates that cases are not randomly selected; 
they are selected on the basis of known attributes, criteria and features.  Similarly, some 
the criteria mentioned in Table 4.7 above will be used to select the cases for phase 1 of 
the study.   
 
This study followed the sub sector approach, which means that only enterprises in one 
sector (public sector) will be selected and analysed. This approach prevents the 
methodological challenge of distinguishing between enterprise and sectoral issues. If all 
the enterprises are in one sector the major macro-economic and business environment 
issues facing the enterprises are similar.  Conversely if the enterprises are in different 
sectors the major macro-economic and business environment issues facing the 
enterprises are different. The challenge of attribution is encountered; to establish which 
factors are internal to the enterprise and which factors are external to the Sector. By 
choosing the same sector the attribution challenge falls away as all the enterprises face 
the same challenges.  
213 | P a g e  
 
 
Having decided that this research will take the same sub sector route (the public 
sector), the question now becomes: Which sub sector to choose – will it be 
Constitutional Organisations, Major Public Entities (SOEs\GBEs), and National 
Government Business Enterprises? The procedure for selecting the industrial sub 
sector to focus on was provided through the value chain selection protocol as outlined in 
the value chain selection and upgrading best practices.  The criterion for selecting the 
sector that this research followed was, employment creating growth, the number of 
Public Entities in the Sector and government prioritisation of the sector.  Chapter 1 
provided arguments in this regard.  
 
The public entities chosen provide key infrastructural and services critical to the 
provision of economic growth and development, namely, electricity, 
telecommunications, transport, water, security and other value added services.  A report 
by BUSA (2011) illustrated that the performance of key entities providing critical 
infrastructural services provides evidence that performance with respect to prices, 
reliability and quality of infrastructure services had been weak and, worryingly and with 
some notable exceptions, is getting worse rather than improving over time.  Whether 
measured in terms of cost of service, reliability or quality of supply, South Africa’s GBEs 
(and particularly those that dominate the major infrastructure industries – i.e. electricity, 
telecommunications and transport) have not performed effectively when compared to 
global comparators or in relation to public expectations.  Improving the governance of 
these entities will contribute to improvement of the performance of these entities. 
4.6 Unit of analysis 
Neumann (2006: 58) defined a unit of analysis as the unit, case, or part of social life that 
is under consideration. Unit of analysis is critical in concept development, empirically 
measuring or observing concept, and in data analysis.  According to Cooper and 
Chandler (2008: 234) the unit of analysis described the level at which the research is 
performed and which objects are researches.  In accordance with the definitions of unit 
of analysis by Neumann (2006) and Cooper and Chandler (2008) Board members 
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(participants), organisations (State-owned enterprises), management decisions, and 
documents will be unit of analysis.  
 
As highlighted by Neumann (2006) there can be more than one unit of analysis in one 
research. In this research there will be two unit of analysis, namely the primary and 
secondary units of analysis.  In this research the primary unit of analysis is the board of 
directors of the state-owned enterprises. Board of directors is the focus of the analysis. 
The decisions they make and the actions they take will be analysed thoroughly during 
the research to determine their impact on the governance control and performance of 
the Public Entities or lack of it.  The secondary unit of analysis is the Public Enterprises 
itself. The research will analyse the performance trends of the enterprise as a result of 
the board process, quality board decision making on the performance and sustainability 
of the organisation. The analysis will seek to determine what the interplay the primary 
unit of analysis the decisions and actions of the owner manager and secondary unit of 
analysis, the enterprise and its growth. 
 
a. Entrée and establishing researcher rules 
Rubin and Rubin (1995) explained that interviewees are chosen along social and 
professional networks.  In qualitative research, the researcher is the primary data 
collection instrument (Creswell, 2003).  The researcher has to maintain objectivity and 
be self-reflective and this was done through keeping a field log for field and 
observational notes (Creswell, 2003).  This is done keeping notes on the thinking, 
feelings, experiences and perceptions throughout the research process.  Field and 
observational notes are made of the participant’s non-verbal cues, the dynamics and 
process between participants in the focus groups and in individual interviews.  
4.7 Data Collection Instruments 
This section delineates the qualitative and quantitative data collection instruments used 
for the study. 
4.7.1 Qualitative data collection instruments 
a. Case study contextual issues 
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The case study selection for the qualitative and quantitative study is outline in 4.5 above  
 
b. focus group questions 
Data was collected by means of two focus group interviews (duration of between 45 and 
90 minutes with between five and seven members), The question in this research was 
open-ended to allow the participant the opportunity to structure an answer in a number 
of dimensions (Krueger, 1994).  The key question posed to the participants was:  “What 
are the dimensions or measures of board decision quality”. 
Thereafter the researcher reviews the information generated from the interviews, and 
probes, summarises and paraphrases the main themes that emerged (Burns and 
Grove, 2005).  Data was collected from focus groups interviews until data saturation 
was attained and it was established that no new information was forthcoming and that 
the same themes were being repeated (Poggenpoel, 2000).    
 
c. Personal interview questions 
The In-depth Semi Structured Interview was the primary data collection method used in 
this thesis.  Similarly, the key question posed to the participants was:  “What are the 
dimensions or measures of board decision quality”.  Twelve in-depth individual 
interviews across the four SOEs participated in an in-depth interview.  The duration of 
interviews was between 45 and 60 minutes (De Vos, Strydom, Fouche´ and Delport, 
2005).  Data was collected until data saturation was attained; when it is established that 
no more new information is likely to emerge and that the same themes are being 
repeated (Poggenpoel, 2000).    
Using the guidance of Leedy and Ormrod (2006) and Collis and Hussey (2003) for 
interviews the researcher explored all dimensions of board decision quality.  Questions 
were posed about facts (especially biographical data), beliefs and perspectives about 
facts, feelings, motives, present and past behaviour, standards for behaviour and 
conscious reasons for actions or feelings.   A semi-structured process using a few 
central questions was used by the researcher to explore the phenomenon board 
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decision quality.  The process provided flexibility to the researcher to probe and delve 
deeper to excavate deeper meaning into the issues.  The researcher managed the 
process and designed the process to ensure that each interview covered the same core 
issues (consistency).  Open ended questions are used so that respondents can provide 
their opinions as precisely as possible.                                                                              
 
The conduct of interviews needed to follow certain parameters for it to be effective in 
gathering the required data. Leed and Ormrod (2005) synthesised the guidelines offered 
by Creswell (1998), Eisner (2002), Shank (2002) and Silverman (1993) into a composite 
guide on how to conduct interviews in a qualitative research. The format this semi 
structured interview followed the guidelines offered by Perry (2001), Leedy and Ormrod 
(2005), Nuemann (2006) and Denzin and Lincoln (1994). This research synthesised the 
guidelines which was then followed. Below are the guidelines which the researcher 
followed to conduct the interviews:  
I. Identify some questions in advance: the questions must be related to the research 
questions and the overall research problem. Limit the number of questions to 
between five and seven. The questions must encourage people to talk about the 
topic without the research suggesting the direction that the answer should take. 
II. Make sure the interviewees are representative of the population but in some cases 
‘extremists’ can be chosen and in the recording of the interviews and notes the 
extremists must be identified as such. 
III. Find a suitable location that is quiet and there will be no disturbances.  
IV. Get written permission. The nature of the study and plans for using the results 
must be explained to the research participant. The research participants must sign 
a consent form. Offer to provide a copy of the research when the research has 
been completed. 
V. Establish and maintain rapport. Begin the interview with small talk to break the ice. 
Be courteous and respectful at all times. Show genuine interest in what the person 
has to say. The interviewer must not disclose his own thoughts, beliefs and 
feelings but should use body language and neutral encouragements like “Go on” 
and “What do you mean” to maintain closeness and trust. 
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VI. Focus on the actual rather than on the abstract or hypothetical. Ask what a person 
does or would do in a specific situation. 
VII. Do not put words in the interviewee’s mouth. Let a person express their own views 
and thoughts. A good interviewer is a good listener. 
VIII. Record responses verbatim 
IX. Demonstrate any reactions to the participant’s responses.  
X. The research participant’s responses are their understanding and experience of 
the phenomenon.  
XI. Manage group dynamics when conducting focus group interviews.  Ensure that all 
contributions are made and that there is maximum participation of all research 
participants.   
 
These guidelines were followed closely in the execution of the field research. This was 
very useful and valuable advice that the research followed in pursuit of a quality 
qualitative research 
4.7.2 Quantitative Data  
 
a. Research Hypotheses 
On the basis of the variables identified in literature and on the basis of the variables and 
relationships identified from personal interviews this study frames the following 
hypotheses:  The direction of the hypothesised relationships is depicted in Figure 4.2.  
 
H01:  There is no relationship between director independence and level of effort norms 
displayed by public entity boards. 
H1:  There is a positive relationship between director independence and level of effort 
norms displayed by public entity boards. 
 
H02: There is no relationship between director independence and level of cognitive 
conflict displayed by public entity boards. 
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H2: There is a positive relationship between director independence and level of 
cognitive conflict displayed by public entity boards. 
 
H03: There is no relationship between director independence and usage of knowledge 
and skills by public entity boards. 
H3: There is a positive relationship between director independence and usage of 
knowledge and skills by public entity boards. 
 
H04: There is no relationship between director independence and quality of 
information used to make board decisions. 
H4:  There is a positive relationship between director decision and the level of 
information quality used to make board decisions. 
 
H05:  There is no relationship between independence and board quality decision 
H5:  There is a positive relationship between independence and board quality 
decision 
 
H06: There is no relationship between the process variables and the board quality 
decision 
H6: There is a relationship between board process variables and board quality 
decision 
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Figure 4.5: Model illustrating hypothesised relationships* 
 
Board demography   Board Process Variables   Board level outcome   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Model illustrating hypothesised relationships* 
 
 
b. Research Instruments  
Self-report questionnaires capturing the five variables shown in Figure 4.4 were e-
mailed to 289 public entity boards from the three categories of Public Entities.  A 
covering letter informing research participants of the general purpose of the research 
and assuring them confidentiality and anonymity was attached to the questionnaire. 
One hundred and eight (108) questionnaires were returned, resulting in 37% response 
rate. 
 
Table 4.3 below shows 40 items used to measure the five variables: (1) independence; 
(2) effort norms; (3) cognitive conflict; (4) usage of knowledge and skills; and (5) 
information quality. The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which each 
item applied to their organisation, on a five point Likert Scale of 1-5, where 1 = strongly 
disagree and 5 = strongly agree. 
 
 
 
Board 
Independence 
Effort      
Norms 
Cognitive 
Conflict 
Knowledge 
and Skills 
Information 
Quality 
 
Board Quality 
Decisions 
H1+ 
H2 + 
H3 + 
H4 + 
H5 + 
H6 + 
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Demographic items  
The first section of the questionnaire had a number of demographic items.  The  items 
are considered to have face and content validity based on their grounding in variables 
used in previous research on the determinants on board performance.  
 
The items included in the study: 
 Gender was included as it differentiates between genders and board process 
variables, but also contributes to the understanding board structural dimensions.  
 Age was included to determine the relationship between age, board process 
variables and board decision quality. Highest qualification is included to determine 
the relationship between qualification and functional area knowledge 
 Number of years in the employ was included to determine the relationship between 
number of years of service and board process variables.  
 Position on the board is included to see the relationship between position and board 
process variables.  
 Participation in sub-committees is included to determine the relationship between 
participation and board process variables.  
 Current or previous participation is included to determine the relationship between 
participation and board process variables.  
 The number of meetings per annum is included to determine the relationship 
between the number of meetings and board process variables.  
 
Table 4.8:  Variable used to measure board decision quality 
 
The measures depicted in table 4.8 below are derived from previous studies on board 
structure, board process and board quality (Zahra and Pearce, 1987; Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999; Jehn, 1995 & McNulty and Peck, 2010; Fama, 1980; Young et al., 2000 
and Thomas, Schrage, Bellin and Marcotte, 2009). 
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VARIABLES 
Board Quality is defined board activism is a measure of the scope of a board’s 
activities and the degree to which a board is involved in the affairs of the organisation 
(Zahra and Pearce, 1987).  
1. Attend board meetings  
2. Attend committee meetings  
3. Read board reports prior to meetings  
4. Advise and counsel the CEO outside of board meetings  
5. Formally evaluate the CEO’s performance on a periodic basis  
6. Discuss management succession planning  
7. Request specific information not normally included in board reports  
8. Determine or request specific agenda topics for board meetings 
9.   Ask discerning questions during board or committee meetings about 
9.1 Financial results and reasons for variances 
9.2 Operating results and reasons for variances  
9.3 Firm strategy or its business model 
9.4 Proposed mergers or acquisitions 
9.5 Internal control strengths and weaknesses  
9.6 Human capital issues  
9.7 Corporate culture and ethical conduct  
Use of skills and expertise: The use of expertise “refers to the board’s ability to tap 
the knowledge and skills available to it and then apply them to its tasks” (Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999: 495) 
1. All members of this board apply their skills and capabilities to assure the greatest 
contribution to the tasks of the board 
2. The company’s executives actively seek to involve the board members in key 
strategic processes and decisions 
3.Committee assignments are made with the intention of ensuring the best use for each 
director’s skills and capabilities 
4.During board discussions the most knowledgeable members of the board, regarding 
the subject area under discussion, generally have the most influence 
5.All board members have a good understanding of the skills and capabilities of the 
other board members  
6.The board consults outside experts as and when needed 
7. The board is confident in identifying risks 
8. The knowledge and skills of board members are updated  
Cognitive conflict:  “Disagreement about the content of the tasks being performed, 
including differences in viewpoints, ideas and opinions.” (Jehn, 1995: 258 & McNulty 
and Peck, 2010) 
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1. All board and executive team members have ample opportunity to constructively 
challenge and debate decision brought to the board 
2. The culture within the board room encourages board members to express their 
disagreements and concerns when issues are presented to the board 
3.Board member deliberations are based upon a healthy discussion of facts 
4.The board is able to reach collectively shared decisions following a full and frank 
debate 
5.All board members have ample opportunity to influence the decisions made by the 
board  
6. During board meetings, the board chair creates an environment where all board 
members are comfortable expressing their opinions without fear of retribution or 
embarrassment. 
7. Discussions are open and candid 
8. There is personality clashes among directors 
9. Relationships among members are best described as "win-lose" 
“Effort Norms are a group level construct that refers to the group’s shared beliefs 
regarding the level  of effort each individual is expected to put towards a task” (Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999: 493) 
1. Carefully scrutinise board information prior to meetings  
2. Research important issues relevant to the company  
3. Takes notes during meetings  
4. Participate actively during meetings  
5. Invest whatever time is necessary to become an informed and active board member 
6. Question management or other board members when necessary  
7. The decisions taken at the board meetings are based on research, factual 
information and much debate and discussion 
Effective decision control depends on whether directors are independent of executive 
management (Fama, 1980; Young et al., 2000) 
1. Do you believe “independent directors” of your company are truly independent from 
the CEO or controlling shareholders? 
2. What do you think about the following reasons for “independent directors’ not being 
fully independent from the CEO or the controlling owner? 
2.1 Because the CEO has effectively selected the board members 
2.2 Because of concern over personal relationships with other directors  
2.3 Because openly objecting to the management-proposed agenda is viewed as an act 
contrary to behavioural norm 
2.4 Because the CEO will decide the extension or termination of the directorship  
2.5 Because of the concern of possible responsibility/blame when their views turn out to 
be wrong in the future 
2.6 Because the CEO and management team are supposed to be better informed 
      on most issues and have better judgment 
Information quality is the board’s ability to provide meaningful oversight and useful 
advice is determined by the quality, timeliness and credibility of the information it has 
(Thomas, Schrage, Bellin and Marcotte, 2009) 
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1. Data to make decisions is available or easily and quickly retrievable (accessibility) 
2. The volume of data is appropriate, applicable and helpful for the task at hand 
(relevancy). 
3. The data is not missing and is of sufficient breadth and depth for the task at hand. 
4. The extent to which data is compactly (concisely) represented. 
5. The extent to which data is regarded as true, credible and reliable (objectivity) 
6. The extent to which information is available in time to perform the task at hand 
(timeliness). 
7. The extent to which data is easily comprehended (understandability). 
8. The extent to which data is beneficial and provides advantages from its use (value-
add) 
Table 4.8:  Source: Variable used to measure board decision quality (Scarborough, 
Haynie & Shook (2010) 
 
In this study the analysis of the degree of board decision quality is undertaken 
utilising a measuring scale adopted and borrowed from previous studies as 
illustrated in Table 4.8 above. 
4.8 Instrument Pre-test  
The research instrument was designed to capture the data as specified by the 
model. The questionnaire was piloted in two phases. The first phase assessed the 
appropriateness of the terminology used. The second phase of the pre-test was a 
construct validity test, as it established the correct operational measures for the 
variables being studied. The second phase of the pre-test was directed to the 
target respondents. The pre-test sample consisted of 20 board members. As a 
result of the pre-test, a few minor changes were made with regards to the 
language and terminology used in the questionnaire 
 
4.9 Data Analysis Process  
4.9.1 Qualitative Data Analysis 
Thereafter the researcher reviews the information given, and probes, summarises and 
paraphrases the main themes that are emerging (Burns and Grove, 2005).  The data 
from the interviews were analysed using content analysis guidelines (Terre Blanche, 
Durrheim and Painter, 2009).  The procedure used was firstly to read the full corpus of 
the narrative, and then to categorise as much as possible for the narrative according to 
the coding guide.  The coding was thus done deductively, starting with predefined 
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themes (as described in the literature review in chapter 2) and matching the collected 
data with themes (Terre Blanche, Durrheim and Painter, 2009).  Data was collected until 
data saturation was attained, established when there is no new information and themes 
are not repeated (Poggenpoel, 2000).    
Recorded in-depth interviews and focus group interviews were transcribed verbatim and 
analysed using a descriptive analysis technique,Tesch’s coding (Creswell, 2007).  The 
data analysis process described by Maritz, Poggenpoel and Myburg (2009) was used 
as .a framework for analysing the  data below.  The process used was to read through 
the transcript and identify the main topics underlying the discussion and to record these 
ideas in the margins.  After all the ideas were identified the ideas were clustered into 
topics that reflect their meaning.  The ideas were sorted into main topics, unique topics 
and unassigned topics.  Through a process of verifying the topics it was compared to 
the data and the topics were abbreviated by code and written next to the appropriate 
segments of the text.  The most descriptive wording was chosen the represents the 
cluster of topics.  The procedure was to identify overarching terms that represented the 
cluster of topics.  The topics were defined and categorised.   
To ensure validity and data integrity a set of clean data was provided to an independent 
coder who has experience in qualitative data analysis.  A consensus discussion was 
held between the researcher and the independent coder to verify and agree on the 
findings.  
Data analysis is the search for patterns in data – recurrent behaviours, objects, phases, 
or ideas. It allows the researcher to move from the description of events and social 
setting to a more general interpretation of the data (Neumann, 2005). It involves 
examining, sorting, categorising, evaluating, comparing, synthesising, and 
contemplating the coded data and reviewing the raw and recorded data. Denzin and 
Lincoln (1994) set out three steps to data analysis, namely data reduction, data display 
and conclusion drawing and verification. These three steps will be followed in the data 
analysis in this thesis. 
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In concurrence with the approach to data analysis that this thesis will follow as set out 
above, Denzin and Lincoln (1994: 216) observed that, the qualitative researcher used 
inductive analysis, which means that categories, themes, and patterns come from the 
data. The categories that emerge from field notes, documents, and interviews are not 
imposed prior to data collection. Early on the researcher will develop a system of coding 
and categorising the data. There is no one best system for analysis.  
 
In agreement with the last sentence in the above quote, Leedy and Ormrod (2005) 
stated, there is no single right way to analyse data in qualitative research. 
In fact not only is there no one right way to analyse qualitative data, the actual process 
of qualitative data analysis is not very well articulated (Collis and Hussey, 2003: 252). 
Data analysis in qualitative research has four major problems, as outlined by Collis and 
Hussey (2003: 253), namely: 
 
1. Reducing the data: Phenomenological research generates a lot of data through 
field notes, documents, and transcripts of interviews. The challenge is how to 
condense it into manageable information. One solution can be to use codes to 
summarise the data. This thesis used codes to reduce the data into manageable 
information. 
2. Structuring the data: The manner in which the data was collected was not 
suitable for analysis. To address this challenge this thesis used the theoretical 
framework developed in the literature review section, then the collected data was 
then fitted into the theoretical framework. The framework gave a structure and 
prior specification of the categories into which the data could be fitted. This 
existing structure was continually tested against the emerging trends from the 
data collection with a view to enhance and adapt it. 
 
3. Anticipatory data reduction: The researcher developed a theoretical framework 
or structure through which the some data can be ignored. However anticipatory 
data reduction was not encouraged in phenomenological research as it restricted 
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a deep understanding of the phenomenon and limited the collection of rich data. 
In this thesis anticipatory data reduction will not be used. 
 
4. Detextualising the data: Most data in phenomenological research is collected in 
the form of extended text. This makes its analysis and presentation to different 
audiences difficult. To address this challenge in this thesis, the data would be 
converted into diagrams and illustrations for analysis and presentation purposes. 
 
The data analysis for this research will take into cognisance the challenges and utilise 
the practical solutions proposed for each of them as outlined above. These solutions 
follow the recommendations provided for each of the challenges by Collis and Hussey 
(2003). 
 
Thus the data analysis for the qualitative aspects of the study followed the general 
procedures outlined by Denzin and Lincoln (1994). Emphasis in the data analysis will be 
on: creating categories, groups, clusters and themes deriving from the data and then 
identifying the patterns and relationships between them. The overall theoretical 
framework from the literature review will also assist in guiding the data analysis. 
 
4.9.2 Handling research bias  
Rubin and Rubin (1995) explained that interviewees are chosen along social and 
professional networks.  In qualitative research, the researcher is the primary data 
collection instrument (Creswell, 2003).  The researcher maintained objectivity and was 
self-reflective and this was done through keeping a field log for field and observational 
notes (Creswell, 2003).  This is achieved by keeping notes on the thinking, feelings, 
experiences and perceptions throughout the research process.  Field and observational 
notes were made of the participant’s non-verbal cues, dynamics and the process that 
unfolded between participants in the focus groups and in individual interviews.  
Being conscious of how the values influence and become the lense through which the 
research is conducted and interpreted.    Hamill and Sinclair (2010) proposed that 
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bracketing should be considered throughout the entire research process, not just at the 
data collection and analysis phases. Earlier understandings of bracketing by Crotty 
(1996) and Polit and Beck (2008) related to the researcher’s preconceptions are held in 
abeyance to ensure researchers do not allow their assumptions to shape the data 
collection or impose their understanding and construction on the data. Hamill and 
Sinclair propose list of what should be bracketed.  
 
Table 4.9 Bracketing  
What should be bracketed? 
Assumptions (Crotty 1996, LeVasseur 2003) 
Assumptions and judgements (Paley 1997) 
 
Biases and beliefs (Dowling 2004) 
 
Beliefs or presuppositions (Draucker 1999) 
 
Experiences and issues (Wall et al 2005). 
 
Experiences and knowledge (Beech 1999) 
 
Judgement (Moran 2005) 
 
Perceptions (Rose et al 1995) 
 
Preconceptions, biases and judgements (Beech 1999) 
 
Presuppositions (Beech 1999) 
 
Presuppositions or pre-understandings (Koch 1999) 
 
Table 4.9:  Bracketing - Adapted from Hamill & Sinclair (2010) 
 
4.10 Ethical considerations  
To ensure credibility.as pointed out by Ryan, Coughlan and Cronin (2007) the most 
common criteria used to evaluate qualitative research studies are credibility, 
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dependability, transferability and confirmability.  Other terms such as goodness and 
fruitfulness may also be used (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).  
• Credibility refers to the consistency between the participants' views and the 
researcher's representation of them. Koch (2006) asserted that credibility may be 
enhanced by the researcher describing and interpreting his/her experiences as 
researcher.  To adhere to the principle of credibility the researcher kept a learning 
journal or field notes as a record of reflection and learning.  Another strategy is to 
consult with participants and allow them to read and provide feedback on the findings.  
Further credibility is also demonstrated by prolonged engagement, observation and 
audit trials.    
• Dependability (auditability) is achieved through the researcher giving the reader 
sufficient information regarding the research process and steps so that if another 
researcher undertakes the research will arrive at the same or comparable conclusions.  
The research is dependable and auditable.  
• Transferability (fittingness) refers to whether or not findings can be applied outside the 
context of the study situation.  Transferability is applicable when the findings can 'fit' into 
other contexts and readers can apply the findings to their own experiences.  
• Confirmability requires the researcher to demonstrate how conclusions and 
interpretations have been reached.  
• Goodness is another criterion against which the trustworthiness and authenticity of 
qualitative research can be measured.  
 
In relation to rigour and the adherence to the principles of credibility, dependability, 
transferability, confirmability and goodness the researcher provided a rich description of 
the research process and steps. 
 
Objectivity 
This implied the use of bracketing (Hamill and Sinclair, 2010) by placing knowledge 
and preconceived ideas about the experience between brackets, and instead focused 
awareness and energy on the experience of participants and the research process 
(intuiting). 
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Bracketing implies that the researcher willingly lay aside what is known about the 
experience that is studied to achieve an open context and to facilitate “seeing” all the 
facets of the phenomenon and the formation of new construct.  Intuiting (Burns and 
Grove, 1987:80) is the process of actually “looking at” the phenomenon and developing 
insight into the phenomenon. It requires concentration and complete absorption of the 
experience that is studied (de Vos, 1998:337). In order to achieve meaningful 
bracketing and intuiting, continual self-evaluation is a prerequisite for the qualitative 
researcher that is involved in the research process in an attempt to “be unbiased by 
preconceived notions” (Yin, 1994:56). Creswell (1994:147) stated that qualitative 
research is interpretative in nature and therefore the assumptions, values and 
judgments of the researcher are stated explicitly as part of conceptualisation in order to 
facilitate the conduction of valid, reliable research. 
 
The way in which participants view the researcher is of cardinal importance. Where the 
researcher is seen as a stranger or intruder, the outcome of the study may be affected. 
For this reason prolonged engagement enhanced the trustworthiness of qualitative 
research.  This researcher strived for objectivity in the research. The researcher 
endeavoured not to be influenced by perceptions, impressions, and biases. 
Nonetheless, qualitative research is often seen as tainted researcher subjectivity and 
measurement bias by the quantitative researchers (Hirschman, 1986: 239). Most 
qualitative researchers believe that there is not necessarily a single, ultimate truth to be 
discovered. Instead there are multiple perspectives held by different individuals each 
with equal validity to the truth. The goal of qualitative research was therefore to discover 
these multiple perspectives (Hirschman, 1986).  
 
4.11 Quantitative data analysis 
 
A.  Multiple Regression  
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The multiple regression analytical tool was used to investigate whether there was a 
statistical relationship between board process variables (effort norms, cognitive conflict, 
usage of knowledge and skills and information quality) and board decision quality. The 
relative contribution of process variables will be analysed with the aim of identifying a 
variable that has the highest predictive power on board decision quality. 
 
The equations and the corresponding hypotheses that this study tested using the 
multiple regression analytical tools are listed below: 
 
H1: Effort Norms = b1 Independence + E1                                Equation (1) 
H2: Cognitive Conflict = b2  Independence + E2                          Equation (2) 
H3: Knowledge and Skills = b3 Independence + E3                   Equation (3) 
H4: Information Quality = b4  Independence + E4                                   Equation (4) 
H5: Board Quality Decison = b5 Independence + E5                 Equation (5) 
H6: Board Quality Decision = b6 effort norms + b7 cognitive conflict + b8 use of 
knowledge and skills +b9  quality of information + E6    Equation 6 
 
4.12 Validity and Reliability Issues 
In qualitative research this refers to truthfulness. It refers to how well an idea fits with 
actual reality. Qualitative researchers pursue authenticity rather than an absolute truth. 
Nuemann (2006: 196) defines authenticity as giving a fair, honest, and balanced 
account of social life from the viewpoint of someone who lives it. 
 
Internal validity refers to the absence of the errors in the design of the research. While it 
is a concept from quantitative research it still has relevance in qualitative research, 
which is why guidelines, procedures and protocols have been developed to assist in the 
execution of qualitative research. 
 
External validity refers to the ability to generalise the findings from a small group to a 
range of people (Perry, 2001). This measure is generally seen as are more relevant to 
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quantitative than to qualitative research. In support of this, Denzin and Lincoln (1994: 
217) asserted that, the traditional view of generalisability limits the ability of the 
researcher to reconceptualise the role of social science in education and social science. 
 
In qualitative research, two of the major tools to ensure validity are the use of member 
checks and audit trails (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994).  Member check is when the 
researcher has an outsider, albeit with experience in qualitative research and 
knowledge of the subject matter, to read the field notes and interview scripts and then 
the data analysis and findings. This enabled the outsider to check if the explanation fits 
the description and if the explanation is credible (Hirschman, 1986: 246). 
 
This thesis will use the member check method. It has obtained the acceptance of an 
experienced scholar in the field of corporate governance to review the final thesis to 
check that the explanation fits the description. 
 
The audit trail is when there is careful documentation of the conceptual development of 
the study which leaves an adequate amount of evidence which interested parties can 
reconstruct the process with to reach the research’s conclusion (Hirschman, 1986). The 
audit trail has six types of documentation: raw data, data reduction, and analysis 
products, data reconstruction and synthesis products, process notes, materials relating 
to intentions and dispositions, and instrument development information (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1994: 230). 
 
This thesis will ensure that there is a careful documentation of all the steps in the 
development of this thesis which can allow for a reconstruction. An adequate amount of 
evidence will be provided for all the steps. This will be an audit trail that can be used by 
interested parties. 
 
The use of the member check and the audit trail will enhance the validity of this thesis. 
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Reliability 
Reliability refers to dependability and consistency. This means that the same studies 
procedures on a particular phenomenon can be repeated in the same conditions and 
produce the same results (Neumann, 2006: 188) 
 
Qualitative researchers want to be consistent in how phenomena are observed over 
time. The challenge is that the phenomenon that is observed is not stable over time. 
Researchers emphasise the changing nature of the relationship between the researcher 
and the phenomena being studied. Because of this importance of the nature and role of 
change in the qualitative approach, qualitative researchers reject the concept of 
replicability as it is used in the quantitative approach. Proponents of the qualitative 
research approach accept that the use of different methods to analyse the same 
phenomena lead to different results. Moreover, the diversity of perspective gives a 
richer view of what is regarded as complex reality in the social world. In support of this, 
Denzin and Lincoln (1994: 217) asserted that, the value of case study is its uniqueness; 
consequences, and reliability in the traditional sense of replicability. 
 
The validity and reliability issues as discussed above were succinctly summarised by 
Yin (2009: 41). 
 
Table 4.10 Validity and Reliability 
TESTS Case Study Tactic Phase of research in which 
tactic occurs 
Construct Validity Use multiple sources of evidence 
Establish chain of evidence 
Have key informants review draft 
case study report 
Data collection 
 
Data collection 
Composition 
Internal Validity Do pattern matching  Data analysis 
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Do explanation building 
Address rival explanations 
Use logic models 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 
Data analysis 
External validity Use theory in single case studies 
Use replication in multiple case 
studies 
Research design 
 
Research design 
Reliability Use case study protocol 
Develop case study 
Data collection 
Data collection 
Table 4.10:  Source: Validity and reliability Yin (2009:41) 
 
This thesis will utilise the case study tactics as outlined in column two of Table 4.10 
above to enhance the validity and reliability of the thesis. 
 
4.13. Ethical issues in the study 
Neumann (2006: 129) defined ethical issues as, concerns, dilemmas and conflicts that 
arise over the proper way to conduct research. Ethics defined what is legitimate and 
what is not legitimate to do, or what ‘moral’ research procedure involved. Although there 
are few fixed rule nevertheless that are agreed principles. 
 
The dilemmas of ethics in research involve the endeavour to strike a balance between 
the pursuit of scientific knowledge and the rights of those being studied or of others in 
society (Cooper and Chandler, 1998). The potential costs of research are loss of dignity, 
self esteem, privacy, or democratic freedoms by the research participants (Cooper and 
Chindler, 1998). The benefits of this research have to be balanced against the potential 
costs suffered by the research participants.  
 
The ethical considerations in research are carried by this individual researcher. He has 
to guard against unethical behaviour based on his ethical integrity as a person. Before, 
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during and after the research the researcher will reflect on the research process and 
actions using his conscience.  
 
Nuemann (2006:130) observed that, ethical research takes longer to complete, costs 
more money, and is more complicated.  
 
The major types of unethical behaviour are scientific misconduct, research fraud 
and plagiarism. (Neumann 2006, 130)   Scientific misconduct is when a researcher 
falsifies or distorts the data or the methods of data collection or plagiarizes the work of 
others (Neumann, 2006: 130). Like most universities UNISA SBL also has policies and 
procedures to detect misconduct, report it and penalize research who engage in 
misconduct. The guidelines for ethical conduct are contained in Doctor of Business 
Leadership Degree Rules and Procedures, the Masters and Doctor degree general 
information and the Master’s dissertation and Doctoral Thesis:  A Guide to Research 
and the Organisation of Material.    
 
This research will meet all of the standards for ethical conduct as laid out in the UNISA 
SBL guidelines. 
 
Research fraud is when a researcher fakes or invents data that was not really 
collected, or falsely reports how the research was conducted (Neumann, 2006: 130). 
This researcher will not undertake in research fraud. 
 
Plagiarism is when a researcher steals the ideas or writings of another or uses them 
without citing the source. This researcher will not engage in plagiarism. 
The researcher will follow the prescripts of doing ethical research in the guidelines 
provided by Denzin and Lincoln (1994) and Neumann (2006).  The professional codes 
of ethics were beneficial to structure in and consider all ethical considerations 
throughout the research process.  Furthermore Neumann (2006: 131- 136) provides 
‘minimal standards’, ‘rules’ or code of ethics for conducting research by not causing 
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unnecessary stress or irreversible harm to research respondents, obtain informed prior 
from prior participants prior to induction and never humiliate, degrade or release harmful 
information about the research participants.   
 
Informed Consent 
To comply with the principle of informed consent the research participants were 
informed of the nature of the research, and had to provide explicit consent for 
participating in the research study (Collis & Hussey, 2003).   The guidelines provided by 
Neumann (2006) were followed to draft a letter of informed consent.  The letter of 
informed consent (Annexure C) outlined the research, the duration, the procedure for 
the research, the risks of participating in the study, a guarantee of anonymity, 
researcher’s details, voluntary participation, benefits or rewards of the study and 
feedback of the results. 
 
Privacy  
However Neumann (2006: 139) observed, the ethical researcher violates privacy only to 
the minimum degree necessary and only for legitimate research purposes. In addition, 
he or she protects the information on research participants from public disclosure. 
 
The conditions for confidentiality and anonymity were adhered to in the research 
process.  Cooper and Schindler (1998) argued that the confidentiality pledge ensures 
that most research respondent’s answer the research questions honestly.  . Further the 
respondents had to be convinced that the guarantee of confidentiality will be given and 
respected. In addition, the information attained through the research from the 
respondents will only be used for the research and not for any other purposes. The 
researcher should use codes to protect the identity of the respondents (Cooper and 
Chindler, 1998).  
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The respondent may refuse to participate in the research or can decide to withdraw 
from the study at any point.  .  This thesis will respect the privacy of all the respondents 
as laid out in The Privacy, Anonymity and Confidentiality Pledge, Annexure B 
 
Anonymity and confidentiality 
The names of the participating board members will remain nameless or anonymous 
(Neumann, 2006) Even as the details of the case are given, the board directors is 
protected and the identity of the individuals is protected and the individual remains 
unknown to the readers.    
This thesis will maintain the anonymity of all the respondents as laid out in The Privacy, 
Anonymity and Confidentiality Pledge, Annexure B 
 
4.14 Chapter summary 
This research will attempt to follow the directives of “good research”. This research will 
follow the sectoral approach and have chosen to focus on the board decision quality in 
Public Entities.   It will follow the inductive research path where the theory will be driven 
by the data. The first phase used the phenomenological approach where the 
phenomena will be studied in the context, the board members.  The case study method 
was used to understand the board process and board decision quality of four SOES in 
relation to board decision quality and board activism. The research used the 
triangulation method, observers, and data source to enhance validity, objectivity and 
credibility.  For the second phase a survey will be administered to board members.  
 
The data gathering was undertaken through: in-depth semi - structured interviews, 
observation, focus group and document review. Guidelines, protocols and procedures 
laid out by various scholars will be followed to overcome perceived weaknesses of the 
phenomenological approach as a research paradigm. For the qualitative approach to 
analyse the data, thematic analysis was used to code and cluster emerging themes.  
For data analysis thematic analysis was used to code and cluster emerging themes.   
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Finally research was rigorous and adhered to a strong ethical foundation. To this end 
the research participants signed an informed consent and also a privacy, anonymity and 
confidentiality pledge that was respected through all stages of the research. 
 
CHAPTER 5 
Drivers of Board Decision Quality:  
Presentation of Empirical Findings 
 
5.1Introduction  
The first chapter provided a rationale for study through the crafting of a cogent problem 
statement.  Chapter two examined the evolution, history, theory and practice of 
corporate governance. Chapter three provided an overview on corporate governance 
practices in South Africa.  Chapter four indicated the research methodology adopted for 
phase one and chapter 4 outlines the research methodology followed for phase two of 
the study. This chapter summarises the research findings and provides a basis for the 
analysis of the data in interpreting derived from the questionnaires and interviews that 
administered and conducted respectively. A structured result analysis was conducted by 
following a systemic plan of action.  This chapter presents and analyses the results of 
the findings with respect to the board decision quality concept as applicable to State-
owned enterprise and the effect thereof on the entity’s performance and sustainable 
growth. The chapter presented all the findings in accordance with the propositions 
linked to the research questions.   
 
The aim of this study was to develop a model for board decision quality that identified 
variables that influence board decision quality in Public Entities in South Africa.   
Developing such a model was seen as an initiative with potential to develop a better 
understanding of other determinants of improving board performance and 
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consequentially improved corporate governance practice.  This chapter covered the 
sequence of the development of the model on board decision quality.  
 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first presented results of qualitative 
interviews with board of directors and the second discussed results obtained through 
quantitative study. 
5.2 Qualitative research:  results, discussion and interpretation of findings 
The findings for the qualitative side will be discussed below.    A number of propositions 
were constructed that are aligned to the research questions.  The main research 
question is: 
“How and why should SOEs achieve board decision quality to optimise performance 
and become sustainable?” 
The sub research questions and a priori constructs  
a. What board process in SOEs influences board decision quality?  
b. What is the relationship between board process and board activism?  
Proposition 1: A higher proportion of outside directors lead to higher level of effort 
norms, higher level of cognitive conflicts, higher level of affective conflict, higher level of 
process conflicts and higher presence/usage of knowledge/skills. 
Proposition 2: A higher proportion of outside directors lead to lower level of 
cohesiveness. 
Proposition 3: A higher presence/usage of knowledge/skills leads to higher level of 
effort  
Proposition 4: A higher level of effort norms leads to higher level of board activism  
Proposition 5:  A Higher levels of information quality leads to better effort norms and 
consequentially board activism 
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Proposition 6:  Higher levels of cognitive conflict leads to better effort norms and 
consequentially board activism  
Proposition 1: A higher proportion of outside directors lead to higher level of effort 
norms, higher level of cognitive conflicts, higher level of affective conflict, higher level of 
process conflicts and higher presence/usage of knowledge/skills. 
Table 5.1 provided the findings of the variable, independence across the four cases.  
Overall, there was agreement that outside directors introduce more objectivity and 
knowledge about external dynamics.  Participants were concerned about the directors 
being truly independent.  A further observation was that director interlock could 
compromise the quality of decision making.  
Most participants agreed that a larger proportion of outside directors bring objectivity, 
better knowledge, an understanding of industry norms and best practise.  A respondent 
commented that “the presence of outsiders directors is more conducive to debate and 
discussion of a firm's mission, goals, and appropriate strategy”.  
The proportion of outside directors must not only be analysed from the perspective of 
the number of directors but also from the level of independence. A few respondents 
were concerned that the independence of directors are not assessed.  There is an 
inherent assumption that outside directors are “independent”, hence independence was 
not verified and this remained the status quo over the tenure on the board.  If 
independence of the board is not maintained, effort norms and board activism will be 
negatively affected.    
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Table 5.1: Findings from interviews on independence across public entities A, B, 
C & D 
Construct Case A Case B Case C Case D 
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
 
 The presence 
of a majority of 
outsiders is 
thus presumed 
to be more 
conducive to 
debate and 
discussion of a 
firm's mission, 
goals, and 
appropriate 
strategy. 
 
Independence 
results in 
Director 
interlock and 
group think.  
 
Independence 
is not verified 
and this 
remains the 
status quo over 
the tenure on 
the board 
Some board 
members were 
concerned 
about director 
interlock, a 
network of 
directors with 
common 
thinking on the 
same boards. 
There is an 
inherent 
assumption that 
outside directors 
are “independent” 
The quality of the 
decisions is 
compromised 
because of lack of 
robust engagement 
and rigorous 
scrutiny is not 
applied to the 
board issues. 
 
Outside directors 
bring objectivity, 
better knowledge, an 
understanding of 
industry norms and 
best practise. 
The quality of the 
decisions is 
compromised 
because of lack of 
robust engagement 
and rigorous scrutiny 
is not applied to the 
board issues. 
 
Table 5.1:  Findings from interviews on independence across public entities  
Some board members were concerned about director interlock, a network of directors 
with common thinking on the same boards.  The implications are that directors may not 
have sufficient time to attend to board activities across the different boards.  A further 
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implication is that little or no effort is exerted on board activities for the different boards.  
With little or no preparation board members are not confident to contribute to 
discussions and decisions made on particular board agenda items despite having the 
skills and expertise (functional area knowledge).  The quality of the decisions is 
compromised because of lack of robust engagement and rigorous scrutiny is not applied 
to the board issues.  A lack of commitment, engagement and non-accountability 
becomes the norm and influences the board culture.  Consequentially, effort norms and 
board activism is reduced.  
Majority of the participants stated that dissent must be encouraged in that the board 
must have robust and intelligent discussion to arrive at the right decision.  Participants 
felt that there is enough policies and procedures – checklist, annual board agendas, 
board charters and protocols so there is knowledge of what should be done.  The 
attention should be moved to why boards make bad decisions.  Participants quoted two 
particular examples of poor decisions made by the SOEs are SAA irregularly awarding 
sponsorships and bonuses and the short supply of electricity by Eskom resulting in 
massive rolling blackout affecting economic development and productivity in South 
Africa.  
 
Proposition 2:  A higher proportion of outside directors leads to lower level 
cohesiveness. 
 
Overall the results in table 5.2 show that cohesiveness is affected by board structure 
(outsider directors).  Cohesion is developed through creating an inclusive and robust 
discussion space at board meetings.  Cohesion must be maintained but not to a point of 
paralysis (group think). 
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Table 5.2:  Findings from interviews on cohesiveness across public entities  
Construct Case A Case B Case C Case D 
C
o
h
e
s
iv
e
n
e
s
s
 
 Cohesiveness is 
affected by the 
number of outside 
directors  
The chairperson must 
encourage 
engagement and an 
inclusive environment  
All board members 
must have an equal 
opportunity to 
contribute to the 
decision making 
process 
Cohesiveness is 
cultivated through 
board interaction 
and the 
involvement in 
board activities. 
Cohesiveness is 
developed 
through other 
board activities – 
strategic 
planning, 
company events, 
launches, etc.   
 
What level of board 
involvement (effort 
norms) is required to 
sustain group 
cohesion but not 
compromise 
independence. 
Board size affects the 
level of cohesiveness  
 
Must have 
cohesiveness but not 
group think 
 
Outside directors 
are something 
treated as 
outsiders. 
 
Outsider and 
insider mentality 
 
Cohesiveness 
encourages the 
principle of 
sameness – 
agreeableness  
 
Table 5.2:  Findings from interviews on cohesiveness across public entities  
A respondent stated that having more outsider directors on the board affects cohesion.  
The members primarily interact at board meetings for limited time so there is limited 
opportunity to build a team.  Outside directors lack knowledge of the organisation’s 
policies, procedures and systems and their contributions can seem aloof.  “There is an 
assumption that all contributions made by executive directors are biased, is not 
benchmarked and not best practice” Whereas the contributions made by outside 
directors need no validation and is accepted unchallenged.  This then snowballs into 
Board dynamics that the outside perspective is what is right and affects participation, 
engagement and cohesiveness of the team.  There was general agreement that board 
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dynamics must be managed by the chairperson in being inclusive, encouraging 
participation and exploring all options are considered. 
Another interesting perspective emerged on preserving the independence of board 
members.  In this regard some interesting insights were shared by participants.  
Cohesiveness is cultivated through board interaction and the involvement in board 
activities.  Involvement in other board activities like social events can impair 
independence.  However, this must be safe guarded through the extent of involvement 
in the board activities so that it does not impair independence.  So the question is how 
to preserve board independence.  What are the measures of independence?  So what 
is the fine line?  What level of board involvement (effort norms) is required to sustain 
group cohesion but not compromise independence. 
Across the four SOEs, participating in the study, the total number of board members in 
each SOE ranges between 14-17 members per organisation.  A board of this size 
generates a diversity of views and options.  In addition, there is less opportunity to 
intensely explore and deepen the analysis of options put forth. Cohesion is affected by 
the range and diversity in thinking.  Building consensus creates cohesion amongst 
members of the board.   
 
Proposition 3: A higher presence/usage of knowledge/skills leads to higher level of 
effort  
Generally there is agreement that the presence of the knowledge and expertise at the 
board level brings many advantages to the organisation.  In particular, the organisation 
is able to strategically position and remain competitive and sustainable.  Based on the 
volatility and intensity of change the organisation is able to respond and reduce the risks 
that are posed.  
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Table 5.3:  Findings from interviews on functional area knowledge in Cases A, B, 
C & D  
Construct Case A Case B Case C Case D 
F
u
n
c
ti
o
n
a
l 
a
re
a
 k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 
Based on their 
knowledge 
Directors are 
able to develop 
strategic 
options that 
reduce risks.  
  
Direct 
relationship 
between  effort 
norms, board 
performance 
and company 
performance  
This tacit 
knowledge will 
assist the 
board to 
strategically 
position the 
organisation.   
Outside 
directors are 
also familiar 
with a range of 
functional 
knowledge) 
expertise within 
particular 
industries  
 Outside 
directors are 
familiar with 
benchmarks, 
industry norms 
and 
benchmarks 
within particular 
industries and 
this could be 
invaluable to 
the organisation 
for competitive 
positioning. 
From a strategic 
perspective, to 
cope with 
complexity, 
uncertainty and 
volatility of the 
external 
environment, 
directors are able 
to develop 
strategic options 
that reduce risks.  
Superior 
knowledge and 
expertise can lead 
to an 
organisation’s 
sustainable 
competitive 
advantage. 
 
Outside directors bring 
resources to the firm, 
such as information, 
skills, access to key 
constituents such as 
suppliers, buyers, public 
policy makers, social 
groups, networks and 
resources needed 
Superior knowledge is 
key to good decision 
making. 
 
Strategic and 
entrepreneurial skills  
 
Table 5.3:  Findings from interviews on functional area knowledge of Cases A, B, C & D 
Outside directors bring resources to the firm, such as information, skills, access to key 
constituents such as suppliers, buyers, public policy makers, social groups, networks 
and resources needed.  From a strategic perspective, to cope with complexity, 
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uncertainty and volatility of the external environment, directors are able to develop 
strategic options that reduce risks.  
Outside directors are also familiar with a range of functional knowledge (expertise) 
within particular industries and this tacit knowledge will assist the board to strategically 
position the organisation.   
Some participants agreed that outside directors have firsthand knowledge of 
benchmarks, industry norms and benchmarks within particular industries and this could 
be invaluable to the organisation for competitive positioning. 
Some of the participants claimed that outside directors may be connected through 
board memberships on other boards.  The board member status as independent 
directors becomes compromised or less objective.  Group think and familiarity amongst 
board members can affect decision quality.  
 
Proposition 4:  A high level of effort leads to a higher level of board activism  
Generally, there is agreement that the full execution of the roles and responsibilities of 
the board in time and effort.  The impact of effort can positively influence the quality of 
the decision.  Conversely, a lack of effort breeds a culture of non-performance.   
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Table 5.4:  Findings from interviews on effort norms in Cases A, B, C & D 
Construct Case A Case B Case C Case D 
E
ff
o
rt
s
 N
o
rm
s
 
Board members do 
the necessary 
amount of research 
to make more 
informed decisions  
  
Board members 
have too many 
board positions 
and cannot 
dedicate 
effort\time. 
  
It is like having a 
generic job 
description without 
having the scope 
and depth of the 
work defined.  
Adequate 
preparation for 
board meetings is 
essential.  
  
Information is given 
on the role and 
responsibilities of 
board members, 
the expectations 
and standards of 
performance is not 
discussed fully  
 
Poor preparation = 
poor participation 
and the result is 
poor quality 
decisions  
Board members 
must commit to the 
requisite time to fulfil 
board 
responsibilities. 
The operating 
culture of the board 
also influences the 
level of engagement 
and participation of 
the board.  
 The symptoms we 
see is, uneven 
participation as a 
result of a lack of 
preparation, unable 
to fully assess the 
risk, etc. 
 
As a result of the 
lack of preparation 
participation at 
board meetings will 
not be optimal.   
 
Poor preparation 
and participation 
leads to deferments, 
delayed 
responsiveness and 
missed 
opportunities.  
 
A culture of non-
performance 
developed and 
reduces the level of  
participation  
Table 5.4:  Findings from interviews on effort norms in Cases A, B, C & D 
Generally, it was agreed that Board members do not put in the requisite time to fulfil 
board responsibilities in preparing thoroughly for board meetings and doing additional 
research.  This attributed to having many other responsibilities to other board roles or 
not receiving the board pack timeously.  As a result of the lack of preparation and 
participation at board meetings performance will not be optimal.   
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Another, stream of thinking is that although information is given on the role and 
responsibilities of board members, the expectations and standards of performance is 
not discussed fully.  It is like having a generic job description with knowing the scope 
and depth of the work defined.   
The operating culture of the board also influences the level of engagement and 
participation of the board.  The tracking of board performance and board effectiveness 
is essential. What is acceptable behaviour at board meetings is not defined? Particular 
norms develop and this translated into board culture defining how things are done at the 
board level.  Some of these behaviours are deferring decisions as a result of being 
unable to reach a decision, the number of times a decision is deferred, uneven 
participation as a result of a lack of preparation, unable to fully assess the risk, etc. 
 
Proposition 5:  Higher levels of information quality leads to better effort norms and 
consequentially board activism  
 
Holistically information quality in the form of the relevance, accuracy, reliability, 
completeness, conciseness, sufficiency (scope and depth) and timeliness are critical to 
decision making.  Decision quality is dependent on good quality decisions  
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Table 5.5:  Findings from interviews on information quality in Cases A, B, C & D 
Construct Case A Case B Case C Case D 
In
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 
There is little or 
no focus on 
information 
quality. 
  
Incomplete or 
insufficient 
information 
could lead to the 
postponement 
of decisions 
  
No evidence of 
any internal 
information 
quality link to 
board decision 
quality  
 
Sometimes too 
much information 
can lead to 
information overload  
  
Less is more  
The accuracy and 
reliability of the 
information is critical 
decision making  
Round robin 
practises could 
results in lower 
quality 
Board proposals 
should be developed 
and presented to the 
board  
 
The board packs may 
be received late and 
this affects preparation 
for board meeting  
 
Information asymmetry 
between executive and 
non-executive directors  
 
What types of 
information is needed 
and in what level of 
depth and volumes. 
  
No direct evidence of 
information quality link 
to board performance , 
but potential for further 
research  
No discussion on 
what is expected or 
what standards to 
observe.  
  
The board should 
become 
operational in its 
focus  
  
The relevancy and 
currency of the 
information affects 
decision  quality  
 
Table 5.5:  Findings from interviews on information quality in Cases A, B, C & D 
The participants claimed that in terms of information quality the basics must be 
considered – receiving the board pack timeously, accurate, relevant, accessibility, and 
completeness of information and represented and synthesised for the level of 
discussion.  Participants claimed that having the quality information is the first step in 
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decision making and this information has to be fully interpreted and explored to reach a 
quality decision.  
Further, board members must cultivate the skills to access additional information (expert 
opinions) and evaluate the information provided by management.  The board should be 
directed by management to think in a particular way.  There was a view put forward that 
although the board are experts in certain functional areas and collectively has a wealth 
of knowledge there should be no misconception that the board is expected to know 
everything.  There must be an opportunity to consult and seek expert advice if in doubt.  
 
Proposition 6:  Higher levels of cognitive conflict leads to better effort norms and 
consequentially board activism  
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Table 5.6: Findings from interviews on cognitive conflict in Cases A, B, C & D 
Construct Case A Case B Case C Case D 
C
o
g
n
it
iv
e
 C
o
n
fl
ic
t 
 P
ro
c
e
s
s
 C
o
n
fl
ic
t 
A
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
 C
o
n
fl
ic
t 
 Dissenting views 
result in better 
informed products 
and services  
There is difference in 
opinion on how the 
work is allocated and 
what resources are 
allocated 
 
Similar to devil’s 
advocate  
There is 
cooperation and 
collaboration 
between board 
members  
Boards must 
embrace change. 
There are no 
personality clashes 
amongst the 
directors 
Diversity in thinking 
leads to a reflective 
exploration of all the 
possible 
alternatives. 
Boards are not a 
homogenous group 
of individuals. 
Conflict is evident – 
the allocation of 
scarce resources 
 
Table 5.6: Findings from interviews on information quality in Cases A, B, C & D 
5.2.1 Discussion of findings for all propositions 
 
Proposition 1: A higher proportion of outside directors lead to higher level of effort 
norms, higher level of cognitive conflicts, higher level of affective conflict, higher level of 
process conflicts and higher presence/usage of knowledge/skills. 
The findings indicate that outside directors brings diverse exposure of industry best 
practise, technical expertise and expertise on board functionality.  Independent 
director’s diverse experience challenges the status quo of the board inculcating better 
decision process to improve the quality of the decisions taken.  The finding of this study 
is similar to the findings in the extant literature of previous studies. 
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Wan and Ong (2001) argued that from an agency perspective that outsider directors are 
more likely to be objective in discussions and deliberations and consider the needs 
diverse groups in the decision process.  A further contribution by Ong et al. (2001) is 
that diversity at the board level could cause higher levels of affective conflict and lower 
level of cohesiveness. Moreover, outside directors are less familiar with the 
organisational policies, processes and procedures and the consequence could be 
higher levels of process conflicts   
Alternatively, with outsiders on the board, task performance issues become more urgent 
and hence result in higher level of cognitive conflict.  In the same manner, a higher level 
of effort norms will be exerted by members to do a better job with the presence of 
diverse personality and backgrounds of different members. 
McIntyre, Murphy and Mitchell (2007) advanced the idea that the board is responsible 
for decision control and the board as a team of individuals that play a role in developing 
and selecting creative ideas for the advancement of the firm.  The presence of a 
majority of outsiders is thus presumed to be more conducive to debate and discussion 
of a firm's mission, goals, and appropriate strategy (Ong and Wan, 2001). Further, such 
debates enlarge the basis of expertise, force management to consider a wider range of 
options and clarify constraints within each strategy implementation.  As argued by 
Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold (2000), outside directors bring with them a different set 
of skills and knowledge to the firm. With a higher proportion of outside directors, there 
would accordingly exists a larger percentage of business experts (e.g. directors of other 
firms), support specialists (e.g. lawyers and bankers) and community influential (e.g. 
political leaders and university professors) in the firm. In other words, a larger proportion 
of outsiders in a company is likely to imply higher presence/usage of knowledge/skills. 
Similarly, Lawler, Finegold, Benson and Conger, (2002) argued a shift in focus to a shift 
more than shareholder value towards a stakeholder approach.  The movement away 
from ‘‘old boys’ clubs’’ to responsive stakeholder Boards with an increase focus on 
ethical behaviour.  
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Proposition 2: A higher proportion of outside directors leads to lower level of 
cohesiveness. 
 
The findings indicate that cohesion is slightly “impaired” with more outside directors.  If 
directors are not familiar with each other then cohesiveness will develop over time.  The 
board decision quality will improve as a result of diverse perspectives.  Diverse thinking 
can negatively affect decisions in terms of the time it takes to make a decision.  The 
right amount of cohesiveness is needed to be effective.                   
 
In the extant literature studies on cohesiveness are from a number of perspectives, 
namely the complexity of the tasks and decisions, the size of the board, consensus, 
cognitive conflict and board culture.  
Choi, Park and Yoo (2007) agreed that the effectiveness of the Board will depend in 
part on how well the Board functions as a group (or as a team) to handle the complex 
tasks it faces.  Similar studies done by Weick (1979) by the nature of being outside 
director, having part-time status; met only periodically, the relationship among directors 
is one of partial inclusion. Furthermore, Park (1995) argued the part-time involvement of 
directors is a cause for ineffective board performance.  
O'Reilly, Caldwell and Barnett (1989) argued that the impact of cohesiveness on 
strategic decisions from the perspective of generation and implementation. Generation 
of diverse thinking is negatively associated with social integration and consensus in 
groups. Groups such as boards value cooperation, are more cohesive and more 
motivated to maintain cordial relations. Consequently, this leads to higher pressure for 
conformity (group think), limiting the quality of both alternative generation (thinking) and 
evaluation of decisions. They put forth the notion that the effectiveness of strategic 
decision roles is positively related to social integration and consensus. Within such 
groups, there exists high level of cooperation, frequent communication and group 
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identification, all of which will enhance the implementation of decisions (Guth and  
MacMillan, 1986). Furthermore, consensus can create more feelings of satisfaction with 
the decision-making process, giving rise to greater decision acceptance and 
commitment (Isbella and Waddock, 1994). 
Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker (1994) argued that increased size can significantly 
reduce cohesiveness among board members. Large boards may encounter more 
hindrances for a consensus on decisions as a result of the diversity in views and 
thinking. Shaw (1981) for example reasoned that directors might experience lower 
levels of motivation and satisfaction with the lack of participation characterizing large 
work-groups. Gladstein (1984) added that larger teams may be more difficult to 
coordinate due to the large number of potential interactions among members. 
Scarborough, Haynie and Shook (2010) argued that the relationships between board 
culture, directors’ cohesion, and cognitive conflict should also be explored. Further they 
argue that much of the normative literature points to the importance of board activities 
that build group cohesion as being vitally important to healthy board relationships. The 
partial inclusion status of outside directors referred to by Weick (1995) can be 
transformed by involvement in board activities.  Board trips to visit plant sites and board 
dinners prior to meetings are seen by directors as building group cohesion, which in 
turn, sustains cognitive conflict and positively influences decision quality. Scarborough, 
Haynie and Shook (2010) argued that does involvement in board activities besides 
board meetings impair independence? Without group cohesion, cognitive conflict can 
slip into the realm of affective conflict with all its dysfunctional consequences. 
Further McDonnell & Moynihan (2011) argued that boards should be aware of factors 
that limit effective board decision quality, such as limited information, dominant 
personalities or agenda restrictions.  They also proposed that factors which may distort 
judgement in the decision-making process such as conflicts of interest, emotional 
reliance or inappropriate reliance on previous experience.   
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Proposition 3: A higher presence/usage of knowledge/skills leads to higher level of 
effort 
 
The findings indicate that level and types of functional area knowledge will positively 
impact the organisation.  Director’s rich knowledge about industry, best practice and 
experience becomes the organisation’s strength and competitive advantage.  These 
findings correlate with extant literature in this regard.  
For boards to perform effectively, Ancona and Caldwell (1988) argued that directors 
must possess functional knowledge and skills with external networks for information 
gathering and problem solving. Nonaka (1994) added that it is also necessary for 
directors to have firm-specific knowledge and skills so as to make informed decisions. 
Carlson (1998) added that directors could benefit from each other's knowledge and 
experience. It aided in reducing mistrust that might initially exist when individuals do not 
know each other well or have not worked together. 
Besides the factor of independence outside directors bring resources to the firm, such 
as information, skills, access to key constituents such as suppliers, buyers, public policy 
makers, social groups as well as legitimacy (Hillman, Canella and Paetzold, 2000). 
Scarborough, Haynie and Shook (2010) found empirical support for the positive 
relationship between functional area knowledge and board activism which is consistent 
with current strong boards are well-balanced boards in terms of varied backgrounds, 
experiences, and perspectives of directors (Blair, 1950; Copeland and Towl, 1947; 
Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Koontz, 1967; Norburn, 1986; Salmon, 1993). More recently, 
Rindova (1999) suggested that boards of directors should be viewed as intellectual 
assets of a corporation. Boards of directors are potentially valuable assets because 
both outside and inside directors bring a variety of experiences, judgments, and 
functional area knowledge that are potentially applicable to the cognitive needs of the 
corporation.  
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To cope with complexity, uncertainty and volatility, directors develop perceptual filters 
and dominant logics (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) that correspond to their experiences as 
leaders of their own organizations and as directors of other organizations. Ong and Wan 
(2001) further argued that following the thinking by Prahalad et al. (1986) board of 
directors, are comprised of directors who bring multiple perceptual filters and dominant 
logics to the governance of a corporation. It is the diversity of these perspectives and 
the degree to which they match the cognitive demands of a particular corporation that 
increase board activism.   
Directors’ varied knowledge domains thereby reduced the risk of competitive blind spots 
(Zajac and Bazerman, 1991). Directors categorised information they receive and create 
links to pre-existing knowledge areas and beliefs, and use these links to conceive 
actions and consequences. Scarborough et al. (2010) agreed that directors with diverse 
functional area knowledge increase the overall cognitive capacity of a board. Thus, 
functional area knowledge is critical to both the scope and the ultimate quality of 
directors’ decision-making. When cognitive capacity matches the cognitive demands of 
a corporation’s business environment, board activism increases. In other words, as 
cognitive diversity is applied to the cognitive needs of a corporation’s competitive 
environment, a board’s involvement in the affairs of a corporation increases. 
Maharaj (2008) if board members are not knowledgeable about finances, industry or 
environmental issues that are affecting the corporation then they will not be fully 
engaged in discussion and dialogue during board meetings.  Additionally, board 
members must be able to develop problem-solving skills (capacity to create new 
knowledge) to render benefits to the corporation. 
Effective corporate governance depends largely on the perceived value of the 
knowledge base, knowledge flow, and the motivation to receive and share knowledge 
among board members and between board members and management. 
Proposition 4: A higher level of cohesiveness leads to effort  
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Summers, Coffelt and Horton (1988) defined cohesiveness as the extent to which 
directors are attracted to each other and motivated to stay with the board. Below 
cohesiveness is argued from the perspective of the part-time nature of the outside 
director, the nature of the interaction of board members and the size of the board. 
Weick (1979) noted that as boards met only periodically due to the part-time status, the 
relationship among directors is one of partial inclusion. Furthermore, Park (1995) 
extended the argument, that the part-time involvement of directors is a cause for 
ineffective board performance. Cohesiveness thus encompasses the affective 
relationship of directors and represents their ability to stay and work together. 
O'Reilly, Caldwell and Barnett (1989) argued that the impact of cohesiveness on 
strategic decisions. They argued that the robust generation of ideas is negatively 
associated with social integration and consensus in groups. Further boards value 
cooperation, are more cohesive and more motivated to maintain cordial relations. 
Consequently, this leads to higher pressure for conformity, limiting the quality of both 
alternative generation and evaluation of decisions. Within such groups, there exists high 
level of cooperation, frequent communication and group identification, all of which will 
enhance the implementation of decisions (Guth and MacMillan, 1986). Furthermore, 
consensus can create more feelings of satisfaction with the decision-making process, 
giving rise to greater decision acceptance and commitment (Isbella and Waddock, 
1994). 
Atkinson and Atkinson (2010) propose that there must be active promotion of the 
expression of diverse opinions. They further argue that there is social pressure to 
conform to group norms and provide examples below in this regard.  Common inhibitors 
to the expression of diverse opinions are statements like: “I am sure we are all on the 
same page,” “We all need to be onside on this issue,” or “Any thinking person will agree 
with this point of view.”  
Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker (1994) argued that increased size can significantly 
reduce cohesiveness among board members. Large boards may encounter more 
hindrances for a consensus on decisions. Shaw (1981) for example reasoned that 
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directors might experience lower levels of motivation and satisfaction with the lack of 
participation characterizing large work-groups. Gladstein (1984) added that larger teams 
may be more difficult to coordinate due to the large number of potential interactions 
among members. 
Board dynamics and board culture has major influence on board decision quality.  
 
Proposition 5: A higher level of effort norms leads to higher level of board activism  
The findings indicate that the level of effort individually and collectively results in 
improved decisions.  It will become board culture to exert maximum effort in executing 
board responsibilities individually and collectively.  The outcome of consistent effort will 
result in board activism.  The extant literature below provides a similar analysis. 
Scarborough, Haynie and Shook (2010) agree with Sonnenfeld (2002) that truly high-
performing boards of directors are ones that act as robust, effective social systems. In 
fact, he argues some of the most effective boards of directors do not follow all structural 
rules-of-thumb. Instead, truly high-performing boards of directors are ones that act as 
robust, effective social systems. Effort norms are a fundamental element of a board’s 
social system – they are shared beliefs about the level of effort directors should expend 
on board work. A key element in creating an effective board of directors is the devotion 
of sufficient time, effort, and resources to the corporation (Pound, 1995). Strong effort 
norms directly and indirectly communicate to all directors what they are expected to 
invest personally to become informed and active board members. 
 
Proposition 5:  A high level of information quality leads higher level of effort 
Thomas, Schrage, Bellin and Marcotte (2009) recognizes that management at all times 
knows more about the business than the company’s shareholders (and directors) do, 
and that this information asymmetry. They propose directors need to overcome this 
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information asymmetry so that they will have a firm grasp of the business and the risks it 
faces. 
They proposed that the nature and quality of interactions between company’s 
management and board and four types of interactions were identified, namely:  (1) 
Open discussion or review is possible when each side reveals what it knows to the 
other; (2) the board fulfills its role as adviser when members share insights and 
experiences with management; (3) disputes are possible between management and the 
board when the line between management’s knowledge (of operations, for example) 
and that of the board is challenged by the board’s quest for further discussion or review; 
(4) The danger zone is the space where neither management nor the board has 
knowledge about a situation (for example, competitor behaviour or legal/ethical terrain). 
5.2.2 Structure of the model emerging from the qualitative study 
Board process is hypothesized as an intervening variable between structure, CEO-
chairman duality and (2) insider/outside directors (most studied board structure 
variables) and performance, following the arguments by Ong  Wan (2011), Johnson, 
Daily and Ellstrand (1996) and Buchanan, and Huczynski (1997).  
The conceptual model for the study of the inter-relationship among board structure, 
board processes influencing increased board decision quality, positively impacting 
board activism, and consequentially performance. 
In this section, the structure of the integrative model will be explained. Next, the 
variables will be defined, operationalized and propositions will be formulated.  Briefly, 
the conceptual model suggests a direct relationship between (1) board structure and 
board processes and (2) leading to board decision quality, increased board activism and 
positive board performance. With following the arguments by Wan & Ong (2001), 
Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) and Buchanan, and Huczynski (1997), board 
process is hypothesized as an intervening variable between structure and performance.  
The distinctive characteristics of the model are as follows: 
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 Firstly, the findings in the extant literature between board structure and firm 
performance are conflicting and inconclusive. Research done by Berg & Smith, 
1978; Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Daily & Dalton, 1994; found that independent CEO-
chairman was positively related with financial performance, while research done by 
Chaganti, Mahajan & Sharma, 1985; Daily & Dalton, 1992; Daily & Dalton, 1993; 
Ong, 1999 found no relationship between CEO-duality and firm performance and 
whereas research done by Boyd, 1995 and Daily and Dalton, 1994; Donaldson & 
Davis, 1991 and Kiel and Nicholson, 2003 found dual CEO-chairman was positively 
related with financial performance in high complexity environments.  A few studies 
identified a positive relationship between the percentage of outside directors and 
firm performance ( Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Daily and Dalton, 1993), while other 
studies found no significant relationship between board composition and company 
performance (Daily and Johnson, 1997; Bhagat and Black, 1999; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991; Klein, 1998; Dulewicz and Herbert (2004).  Hence, board structure 
still remains an important variable to study in any serious board research. 
 Research done by Scarborough, Haynie and Shook (2010) elucidated that having an 
independent board would alleviate these conflicts of interests and promote board 
activism.  Further they argued that effective decision control is dependent on the 
independence of the board of directors.  In addition, the independence of the board 
would allow organizations greater access to information and other critical resources, 
which promote the activism of the board.  Scarborough et al 2010) proposed that 
board activism increases as the proportion of outside board members increases, 
which is the premise behind board independence. 
 Secondly, instead of studying all aspects of board structure, and in accordance with 
the guideline of King III, one area which have been extensively examined: (1) the 
proportion of insider/outsider directors (see Dalton & Daily 1999; Davis, Schoorman 
& Donaldson, 1997; Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
 Thirdly, in a study done by (Cartwright, 1980) cohesiveness has also been proposed 
as a criterion of performance instead of process.  For this study, cohesiveness is 
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part of board processes, similar to arguments put forth by Guth and MacMillan, 
(1986), Isbella & Waddock (1994) and Ong and Wan (2001).   
 Fourthly, if board process variables are considered, a conducive set of group norms 
emerge and a high performance culture emerges leading to board decision quality.  
Atkinson & Atkinson (2010) argue that studies of groups have observed that 
members undergo a process of socialization by which they learn group norms and 
expected behaviours communicated by board chairpersons. 
 Fifthly, board process variables, namely, skills and knowledge of board members, 
effort norms, information quality and cognitive conflict are reviewed. Scarborough, 
Haynie and Shook (2010) found empirical support for the positive relationship 
between functional area knowledge and board activism.  This findings is 
consistent with previous research that shows that board members with varied 
backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives of directors (Blair, 1950; Copeland and 
Towl, 1947; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Koontz, 1967; Norburn, 1986; Salmon, 1993) 
positively impacts board performance. Choi, Park & Yoo (2007), in terms of 
cohesiveness, agree that the effectiveness of the Board will depend in part on how 
well the Board functions as a group (or as a team) to handle the complex tasks it 
faces.  Effort norms are shared beliefs about the level of effort directors should 
expend on board work. A key element in creating an effective board of directors is 
the devotion of sufficient time, effort, and resources to the corporation (Pound, 
1995). Strong effort norms directly and indirectly communicate to all directors what 
they are expected to invest personally to become informed and active board 
members.   
 Finally, for board performance, we concentrate on three main roles of directors: 
monitoring, service and strategy (Ong & Lee, 2000). 
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Table 5.7:  An integrative model of governance – structure, process and outcome  
SYSTEM ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
DETAIL OF ANLAYSIS (CODE OF FAMILIES) 
B
O
A
R
D
 
S
T
R
U
C
T
U
R
E
 
Board 
Independence  
The number of non-executive or outside directors on boards 
and level of independence that it introduces to the decision-
making. 
B
O
A
R
D
 P
R
O
C
C
E
S
S
  
Cognitive 
Conflict 
Cognitive conflict: In cognitive conflict, open debate of 
different views in groups could lead to faster completion of 
tasks and more effective use of resources (Schwenk and 
Valacich, 1994; Tjosvold et al., 1992). Cognitive conflict 
within groups also encourages people to develop new ideas 
and approaches, hence enhancing group learning and 
assessment of situations (Jehn and Mannix, 2001). 
Effort Norms  
An examination  and analysis of effort norms as a group 
level construct that refers to the group’s shared belief 
regarding the level of effort each individual is expected to 
put towards a task (Forbes and Milliken, 1999: 493) 
Boards undertake their duties with widely varying degrees of 
attentiveness, analysis, and participation.  
 
Skills and 
knowledge  
Functional skills pertain to the domains of businesses, 
including strategic thinking, analytical thinking and result-
oriented outlook (Dulewicz et al., 1995). Directors’ varied 
knowledge domains thereby reduce the risk of competitive 
blind spots (Zajac and Bazerman, 1991). 
Information 
Quality  
Some researchers argue that outsiders are likely to show 
more objectivity in their deliberations and are willing to 
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consider diverse groups in making their decisions (Jones & 
Goldberg, 1982; Spencer, 1983) 
Cohesiveness  
Cohesiveness in the extant literature is studies from a 
number of perspectives, namely the complexity of the tasks 
and decisions, the size of the board, consensus, cognitive 
conflict and board culture 
B
O
A
R
D
 
P
E
R
F
O
R
M
A
N
C
E
 
 
Strategy, service and monitoring  
Table 5.7:  An integrative model of governance – structure, process and outcome  
5.3 Results, discussion and interpretation of quantitative findings 
 
This chapter focused on reporting the results that were obtained from the data collected 
through the research process. It presents and analyses the results of the findings with 
respect to the board decision quality concept as applicable to Public Entities in South 
Africa. The chapter presents all the findings in tables and graphic form according to 
each test item on the questionnaire followed by explanations of the graphical 
presentations. The forward method of regression was used to determine the relationship 
between independence, the independent variable and the dependent variables (efforts 
norms, cognitive conflict, knowledge and skills, information quality and board decision 
quality). Both descriptive and inferential statistics analysis was used to interpret the 
findings as well as to infer the data statistically. 
 
5.3.1 Hypothesis of the study  
 
Table 5.8 provides a summary of the study hypotheses on board decision quality  
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Table 5.8: Summary of the Hypotheses tested 
 Hypotheses 
H1 
 
There is a positive relationship between director independence and 
level of effort norms displayed by public entity boards. 
H2 There is a positive relationship between director independence and 
level of cognitive conflict displayed by public entity boards. 
H3 There is a positive relationship between director independence and 
usage of knowledge and skills by public entity boards. 
H4 There is a positive relationship between director independence and 
the level of information quality used to make board decisions. 
H5 There is a positive relationship between independence and board 
quality decision 
H6 There is a relationship between board process variables and board 
quality decision 
Table 5.8: Summary of the Hypotheses tested 
5.3.2 Analysis of the demographic factors  
 
The rationale for this information was to assess if demographic factors would lead and 
or have any impact on staff turnover in the dispatching section. The responses from the 
closed ended questions are discussed hereafter 
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a. Gender  
Gender 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Male 68 65.4 65.4 65.4 
Female 36 34.6 34.6 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Table 5.9 Gender Dimensions  
 
There is a disproportionate number of females that participated in the study.   
b. Age  
Age 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
21-30 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 
31-40 34 32.7 32.7 34.6 
41-50 33 31.7 31.7 66.3 
51-60 31 29.8 29.8 96.2 
60-65 2 1.9 1.9 98.1 
65 and above 2 1.9 1.9 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Table 5.10 Age dimension  
 
There is an almost equal distribution of board members in the different age categories 
namely, 31-40 (34), 41-50 (33) and 51-60 (31).  Age relates to the issue of experience 
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and know-how.  Arguably, directors of the age category 31-40 have less experience and 
expertise.   
c. Qualification  
Qualification 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Nil 3 2.9 2.9 2.9 
Diploma 3 2.9 2.9 5.8 
Bachelor Degree 64 61.5 61.5 67.3 
Master Degree 30 28.8 28.8 96.2 
Doctoral Degree 4 3.8 3.8 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Table 5.11 Levels of qualification  
Majority of the board members have a Bachelor Degree (34) and about a third (30) has 
a Masters Degree.  This demonstrates that the board members have the some requisite 
knowledge to perform their fiduciary responsibility.  
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d. Board Committees 
Board Committees 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Remunerations Committee 27 26.0 26.0 26.0 
Audit Committee 11 10.6 10.6 36.5 
Risk Committee 1 1.0 1.0 37.5 
Ethics Committee 1 1.0 1.0 38.5 
Investment and Treasury 2 1.9 1.9 40.4 
SHEQ Technical 62 59.6 59.6 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Table 5.12 Types of board committees  
 
Board activity is also executed through the various board activities.  These board 
committees could be developing proposals, fully exploring and investigating an issue 
and making firm recommendations to the board or even taking a decision for a board 
item that has been delegated to the committee.  From the study is a phenomenal focus 
on Safety, Health, and Environmental and Quality issues.   
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e. Number of meetings 
Number of meetings 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
1-5 times per annum 80 76.9 76.9 76.9 
5-10 times per annum 14 13.5 13.5 90.4 
10-15 times per annum 7 6.7 6.7 97.1 
15-20 times per annum 3 2.9 2.9 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Table 5.13:  Number of meetings  
The board members that participated in the study meet on average five times a year.   
f. Board Structure  
The study shows that the majority of the board members attend meetings between 1-5 
times per annum.  Attendance at board meetings is at last four times per annum, once 
every quarter and in addition an extraordinary meeting.  
Board Structure  
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Executive Director 27 26.0 26.0 26.0 
Non-executive director 66 63.5 63.5 89.4 
Independent chairperson 2 1.9 1.9 91.3 
Company Secretary 2 1.9 1.9 93.3 
Governance Executive 7 6.7 6.7 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
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Table 5.14: Board Structure  
5.3.2 The Cronbach’s Coefficient Alpha 
The Cronbach’s alpha is a statistical test used to determine the internal consistency and 
reliability of the questionnaire. According to Saunders (2003) alpha values greater than 
0.7 are an indication of acceptable internal reliability. 
 
Table 5.15 Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.796 43 
 
Table 5.15 reliability statistics 
 
Prior to testing the hypotheses, data was tested for internal consistency reliability. Table 
5.15 shows the means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations of the study 
variables. The values of the Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients for the instruments 
are all within the 0.7 benchmark. These results establish a good justification for using 
these instruments for collecting the data for the study. 
 
The standard deviation is low indicating that variability around the mean is low.   
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Table 5.16:  Descriptive statistics, reliabilities and inter correlations of study 
variables 
Table 5.16:  Descriptive statistics, reliabilities and inter correlations of study variables 
 
5.4 Results of Regression Analyses and Tests 
 
Data was coded, cleaned and loaded into the Statistical Package for Social Science 
(SPSS). As pointed out in Chapter 4, six hypothesis were tested:  
 
 
H1: Effort Norms = b1 Independence + E1     Equation (1) 
H2: Cognitive Conflict = b2 Independence + E2    Equation (2) 
H3: Knowledge and Skills = b3 Independence + E3   Equation (3) 
H4: Information Quality = b4 Independence + E4   Equation (4) 
H5: Board Quality Decision = b5Independence + E5   Equation (5) 
H6: Board Quality Decision = b6effort norms + b7cognitive conflict + b8use of knowledge 
and skills +b9 quality of information + E6     Equation 6 
    
 Mean Std 
Deviation 
C. Alpha 
α 
1 2  3 4 5 6 
1. Board Independence 2.32 .68 .76 1.000      
2. Effort Norms  3.75 .56 .85 -.163 1.000     
3. Cognitive Conflict 3.80 .63 .85 -.242 .666 1.000    
4. Knowledge &Skills 3.95 .66 .91 -.252 .503 .724 1.000   
5. Information Quality 3.69 .81 .94 .018 .419 .491 .614 1.000  
6. Board Decision Quality 4.06 .63 .85 -.207 .454 .536 .600 .564 1.000 
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We tested our hypotheses using a multiple regression model. The regression analyses 
results are presented in Table 5.16.   The Table shows the dependent and independent 
variables for each hypothesis, the values of the regression coefficients (standardised), 
the calculated F- and t-values, and the p-values for the test of significance of regression 
coefficients.  
 
 
Table 5:17 Tests of significance for the coefficients in the regression equation 
 
Equation 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent 
variable 
Beta 
Coefficient 
F-
calculated 
p-
value 
t-
calculat 
p-value 
1 Effort Norms Independence b1 = - 0.16 2.80 0.09 -2.39 .09 
2 Cognitive 
Conflict 
Independence b2 = - 0.24 6.36 0.00 -2.52 .10 
3 Knowledge & 
Skills 
Independence b3 = - 0.25 6.93 0.01 -2.63 .10 
4 Information 
Quality 
Independence b4 = 0.02 .03 .86 .18 .86 
5 Board Quality 
Decision 
Independence b5= -0.20 4.13 .04 -2.03 .04 
6 Board Quality 
Decision 
Knowledge & 
Skill 
b8= 0.33  
26.17 
0.000 3.31 .001 
Information 
Quality 
b9 = 0.28 0.000 2.93 .004 
Effort Norms b6 = 0.79 0.000 2.03 0.05 
Table 5:17 Tests of significance for the coefficients in the regression equation 
 
 
The F test aims to test the “global significance” of the model.  All the F scores for effort 
norms, cognitive conflict, functional area knowledge, information quality and board 
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decision quality are moderate to high.  The model is significant as it has high f values 
and low corresponding p values.  
 
As the results in the table 5.17 show the coefficient of cognitive conflict and 
independence is -0.24. The F-test shows that there is a significant and negative 
relationship (F = 6.36, 01.p ) between the dependent variable (Cognitive Conflict) and 
the independent variable, thus supporting the hypothesis.  
 
Table 5.17 shows that the coefficient of knowledge and skills and independence is -
0.25. The F-test shows that there is a significant and negative relationship (F = 6,93; 
01.p ) between the dependent variable (Knowledge and Skills) and the independent 
variable independence, thus supporting the hypothesis. 
 
For information quality and independence table 5.17 show that the coefficient is 0.01.  
The F-test shows that there is a significant and negative relationship (F = 0.03; p < .86) 
between the dependent variable (Information Quality) and the independent variable 
independence, thus supporting the hypothesis  
 
Also in relation to board decision quality and independence table 2 shows that the 
coefficient is -0.20.  Similarly the F-test shows that there is a significant and negative 
relationship (F = 4.13; p < .4) between the dependent variable (Board Decision Quality) 
and the independent variable independence, thus supporting the hypothesis. 
 
All the p values are low as demonstrated in table 5.17 above which suggests that lower 
p values indicating confidence that the relationship is not happening by chance.  
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5.5 Interpretation of the findings 
 From the analysis, besides cognitive conflict, efforts norms, knowledge and skills 
and information quality has the highest beta coefficients, -0.16, -0.25 and 0.01 
indicating a strong relationship to independence and board decision quality. 
 From table 5.16 above it appears that the direction of the relationship of the 
variables, effort norms, skills and knowledge, information quality and cognitive 
conflict when put together is even stronger.  Further we can deduce that board 
decision quality improves the beta coefficients for effort norms increases from -0.16 
to 0.79, whereas knowledge and skills increases from -0.25 to 0.33 and information 
quality increases from 0.01 to 0.28.    We further can deduce that effort norm is the 
highest predictor of board decision quality.  
 To determine if the sample that was chosen is likely to represent the population from 
which was chosen or whether it is likely that the population as a whole has similar 
characteristics to the sample (a similar coefficient) or whether the coefficient would 
be zero for the whole population.  The t test therefore tests whether the population 
coefficient is likely to be different from zero.  The probability of this is indicated by 
the p-value.   
 
The results of the F test of overall model fit indicate the model is significant. The results 
of the t-tests for each partial regression coefficients indicate that there are two 
significant independent variables, functional area knowledge and effort norms. 
Independence and duality were not statistically significant, and none of the control 
variables were statistically significant. The signs of the partial regression coefficients 
were positive for both significant variables. Refer to Table 5.17 for the Regression 
analysis. Thus, the regression showed support for both H1 and H4 but not for H2 and 
H3. While functional area knowledge and effort norms were both positively related to 
board activism, no relationship was found between independence and board activism or 
duality and board activism. 
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The research contributes to the management literature in several ways. Firstly, previous 
empirical research studies failed to find a consistent and practically significant 
relationship between board structure and firm performance (Ong and Wan, 2001; 
Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Kesner, 1987).  Still other empirical research focused 
primarily on the effect of directors’ independence and duality on firm performance 
(Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  The findings for this research was also inconclusive 
extracting the lesson that further research would continue to yield the same misguided 
results.  The study lifts the “veil” between board structure and firm performance and 
empirically tests the antecedents of board decision quality, an intermediate link to 
effective board governance and firm performance.  The research establishes that board 
structure is not the only variable that influences board performance, there are 
intervening factors, like board process variables that improves board activism 
(Scarborough, Haynie & Shook, 2010), improve board decisions and consequentially 
improves firm performance.  The domino effect of a number of board variables that 
cause a chain reaction that influence board decision quality.  This study produces 
similar results and agrees with previous scholars that future research must delve into 
dimensions of board process variables (Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Scarborough, Haynie & 
Shook, 2010) and its relationship to board performance.  They urged future researchers 
to study the intermediate links between board attributes and firm performance (the 
antecedents of board activism and board decision quality). This study tested an 
intermediate link and the results were a meaningful addition to the literature.  Second, 
we found empirical support for the positive relationship between functional area 
knowledge and board activism which is consistent with current knowledge base.   
 
5.6.1 The association between independence and effort norms of directors 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between director independence and level 
of effort norms displayed by public entity boards. 
As can be seen in the table, the value of the coefficient of effort norms, where the 
independent variable is independence, is -0.16. Both the F-test and t-test show that this 
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coefficient value is significant (F = 2.80, p = 0.09), indicating that independence is 
negatively or inversely related to effort norms. This establishes the truth of Hypothesis 
1.   
This study hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between director 
independence and level of effort norms displayed by public entity boards.    Indeed, the 
findings supported this hypothesis. It was found that there is a strong positive 
correlation between independence of board members and the level of effort norms of 
the board.  Accordingly by implication governance practitioners and scholars may 
consider to more accurately and realistically stipulate what the expected degree of effort 
that is required from both insider and outsider directors. 
Research by Sonnenfeld (2002) argued that truly high-performing boards of directors 
are ones that act as robust, effective social systems and have shared beliefs about the 
level of effort directors should expend on board work.  Norms have been shown to exert 
a strong influence on group behaviour (Feldman, 1984; Latane et al.1979; Steiner, 
1972; Weldon and Gargano, 1985). A key element in creating an effective board of 
directors is the devotion of sufficient time, effort, and resources to the corporation 
(Pound, 1995). According to Pound (1995) strong effort norms directly and indirectly 
communicate to all directors what they are expected to invest personally to become 
informed and active board members perform better.  Other studies by Lorsch and 
MacIver (1989) noted that directors that commit to preparation and do the necessary 
research to obtain information required.   
 
5.6.2 The association between director independence and the level of cognitive 
conflict  
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between director independence and level 
of cognitive conflict displayed by public entity boards. 
Hypothesis 2 postulated a statistically significant relationship between director 
independence and the level of cognitive conflict of the board.  As the results in the table 
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5.16 show the coefficient of cognitive conflict and independence is -0.24. The F-test 
shows that there is a significant and negative relationship (F = 6.36, 01.p ) between the 
dependent variable (Cognitive Conflict) and the independent variable, thus supporting 
the hypothesis.  
The P value is used to assess if there exists a statistically significant relationship 
between variables, director independence and cognitive conflict.  Furthermore, a P 
value that is equal to 10 indicates that there is a relationship between the two variables.  
However, equation 2 has a p value of .10 (p x 100) is less than 90 indicating that the 
variability is higher.  The p value is equal to 10 and it can be deduced that there is a 
bigger chance that the relationship is not happening by chance; hence there is a 
relationship between the variables.   
Studies by Jehn (1995) considered cognitive conflict as disagreements about the 
content concerning the tasks being performed. Amason (1996) proposed that It involves 
the use of processes involving critical and investigative interaction. Critical investigation 
has the potential of discovering flawed assumptions in management’s plans. Generally, 
cognitive conflict has been found to increase the number of alternative and creative 
solutions considered by small groups (Eisenhardt et al., 1997; Jackson, 1992; Milliken 
and Vollrath, 1991). A Board culture that promotes cognitive conflict has the potential to 
influence decision quality in the boardroom.  The above scholars advocated the 
advancement of a more sophisticated view of factors that impact a board’s decision 
scope and quality, such as board culture and cognitive conflict.  (Schweiger and 
Sandberg, 1989; Schwenk, 1990) agree that cognitive conflict improves decision quality 
because the synthesis that emerges from the conflict is generally superior to the 
individual perspectives themselves.   
Jehn, Northcraft and Neale (1999) defined process conflict as the awareness of 
controversies about aspects of how task accomplishment will proceed, such as who 
should do what and how much responsibility different people should get. For instance, 
when group members disagree about whose responsibility it is to complete a specific 
duty, they are experiencing process conflict.   
276 | P a g e  
 
O'Reilly, Caldwell and Barnett (1989), Guth and MacMillan (1986) and (Isbella and 
Waddock, 1994) stated that the generation of ideas is negatively associated with social 
integration and consensus in groups. The principle of cohesion and cooperation 
consequently, leads to higher pressure for conformity, limiting the quality of both 
alternative generation and evaluation of decisions. These scholars argued that the 
effectiveness of strategic decision roles is positively related to social integration and 
consensus. These scholars recognise the dichotomy of cohesiveness (cooperation and 
identify) and cognitive conflict to enhance decision making.  Isbella and Waddock 
(1994) claimed that consensus can create more feelings of satisfaction with the 
decision-making process, giving rise to greater decision acceptance and commitment.  
Scarborough, Haynie and Shook (2010) promoted research into board culture that is 
conducive to free and vibrant discussions, encouraging cognitive conflict of the issues 
pertinent to the long-term success of a corporation and improved decision quality.  
 
5.6.3 The association between director independence and the usage of 
knowledge and skills  
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between director independence and 
usage of knowledge and skills by public entity boards. 
Hypothesis 3 postulated a statistically significant relationship between director 
independence and the use of knowledge and skills.  Table 5.16 shows that the 
coefficient of knowledge and skills and independence is -0.25. The F-test shows that 
there is a significant and negative relationship (F = 6,93; 01.p ) between the 
dependent variable (Knowledge and Skills) and the independent variable independence, 
thus supporting the hypothesis. 
 
The P value is used to see if there is a relationship between variables (director 
independence and knowledge\skills).  Furthermore, a P value that equals to or greater 
than10 indicates that there is a relationship between the two variables.  Equation 4 has 
a p value of .10 (p x 100) is less than 90 indicating that the variability is higher.  The p 
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value is 10 and we can deduce that there is a bigger chance that the relationship is not 
happening by chance; hence there is a relationship between the variables.   
Studies by Zajac and Bazerman (1991) argued that director’s varied knowledge 
domains thereby reduce the risk of competitive blind spots.  Further directors with 
diverse functional area knowledge increase the overall cognitive capacity of the board 
and decision quality.  Directors’ varied knowledge domains thereby reduced the risk of 
competitive blind spots (Zajac and Bazerman, 1991). Directors categorize information 
they receive and create links to pre-existing knowledge areas and beliefs, and use 
these links to conceive actions and consequences. Directors with diverse functional 
area knowledge increase the overall cognitive capacity of a board. Thus, functional area 
knowledge is critical to both the scope and the ultimate quality of directors’ decision-
making.  
5.6.4 The association between director decision and information quality  
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between director decision and the level of 
information quality used to make board decisions. 
For information quality and independence table 5.16 show that the coefficient is 0.01.  
The F-test shows that there is a significant and negative relationship (F = 0.03; p < .86) 
between the dependent variable (Information Quality) and the independent variable 
independence, thus supporting the hypothesis. 
 
The P value is used to see if there is a relationship between variables (director 
independence) and information quality.  Furthermore, a P value greater than 10 
indicates that there is a relationship between the two variables.  However, equation 4 
has a p value of .86 (p x 100) is less than 90 indicating that the variability is higher.  The 
p value is less than 10 and we can deduce that there is a bigger chance that the 
relationship is happening by chance; hence there may be no relationship between the 
variables.  Ideally, it has to be at a 95% level.  
5.6.5 The association between the director independence and board decision 
quality  
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Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between independence and board quality 
decision 
 
Despite several decades of research designed to link the relationship between board 
structure and company performance.  The results of these studies are inconclusive and 
contradictory (Daily and Dalton, 1999).  Scholars like Heracleous (2001; Johnson, Daily 
and Ellstrand, (1996) and Zahra and Pearce (1989) agreed that there is a mixed 
relationship between board structure and board performance (for review, see).   Further 
Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) argued the same that the relationship between 
board structure and financial performance might not exist at all. Or, if there is a 
relationship, their magnitude may not be of practical significance. Kesner and Johnson 
(1990) suggest that, the board is probably not an important, direct determinant of firm 
performance. The reason is that boards are not involved in daily decision-making.  Phan 
(1998) and Buchanan and Huczynski (1997) claimed that board structure is as 
important as board process.  
The reason for the lack of direct relationship between board structure and firm 
performance is attributable to the intervening board process. Finkelstein and Hambrick 
(1996) and Heracleous (1999, 2001) noted that a reason why board structure is unlikely 
to have universal impact on firm performance is that there are too many intervening 
processes to expect a strong direct association. The mixed results could be due to both 
methodological and conceptual issues, such as lack of attention to group dynamics, 
high complexity of processes, variations in measurements of board attributes and 
performance. Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) concluded that since there is little 
consistency between board structure and firm performance, researchers should inspect 
the process by which boards may affect company results instead. 
5.6.6 The association between board process variables and board decision 
quality   
Hypothesis 6: There is a relationship between board process variables and board 
quality decision 
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Hypothesis 6 postulated a statistically significant relationship between board decision 
quality and board process variables (knowledge & skills, information quality and effort 
norms)  As the results in the table 5.16 show the coefficient of board decision quality 
and board process variables is 0.33 (knowledge and skills), 0.28 (information quality) 
and 1.79 (effort norms).  It appears that the direction of the relationship changes when 
the variables are put together and they improve board decision quality.  The F-test 
shows that there is a significant and negative relationship (F = 26.17, 01.p ) between 
the dependent variable (board decision quality) and the independent variable (board 
process variables), thus supporting the hypothesis.  
The P value is used to see if there is a relationship between variables (board process 
variables and board decision quality).  Furthermore, a P value greater than or equal 
to10 indicates that there is a relationship between the two variables.  However, equation 
6 has a p value of .10 (p x 100) is less than 90 indicating that the variability is higher.  
The p value is less than 10 and we can deduce that there is a bigger chance that the 
relationship is happening by chance; hence there may be no relationship between the 
variables.   
 
5.7 Revised model of board decision quality  
The regression method used the forward method in that all variables were included in 
the analysis.   
5.8 Parsimonious Fit measures 
(a) Parsimonious goodness-of-fit index (PGFI) 
This is also a non-statistical measure and ranges in value from 0 (poor fit) to 1.0 (perfect 
fit). The desired threshold for this measure is .90 (Arbuckle 1997; Hair 1998). The 
hypothesised model had a GFI of .700, which greatly improved to .90 for the revised 
model. This indicates that the model provides a plausible representation of data. 
Similar to the above mentioned goodness-of-fit indices, PGFI is an adjusted GFI, based 
on the parsimony of the estimated model. Parsimony as Hair et al (1998) define it as 
“the degree to which a model achieves goodness-of-fit for each estimated coefficient. 
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The objective is to maximise the number of variables without overfitting the model.  
There was a better model fit with the variables knowledge\skills, information quality and 
effort norms.  
Figure 5.1:  A conceptual model for board decision quality 
Board demography   Board Process Variables   Board level outcome   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1:  A conceptual model for board decision quality 
A conceptual model for the study is proposed of the inter-relationship among board 
structure, board processes and performance.  Below the integrated model will be 
explained and the variables will be fully discussed. 
Structure of Model 
In alignment with the conceptual model of Wan and Ong (2001) this study too proposed 
a direct relationship between (1) board structure and board processes and (2) board 
processes and board decision quality (board performance).  Studies by Wan & Ong 
(2001), Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) and Buchanan, and Huczynski (1997) 
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board process is hypothesized as an intervening variable between structure and 
performance. Distinctive features of our model are as follows: 
 Firstly, despite the unequivocal findings between board structure and firm 
performance, board structure remains an important variable to study in any serious 
board research. 
 
 Secondly, for board structure, insider/outsider directors are used as a measure (see 
Dalton & Daily 1999; Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997; Johnson, Daily & 
Ellstrand, 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
 
Finally, for board performance, we concentrate on three main roles of directors: 
monitoring, service and strategy (Ong and Lee, 2000).  In alignment with scholars (Wan 
& Ong, 2001; Capon, Farley and Hoenig, 1990) the firm performance is deliberately left 
out in the model.  Firm performance is dependent on many variables. Simultaneously, 
while it is possible to equate board performance with firm performance, this approach is 
not taken for the study. As emphasised by Frankforter, Berman and Jones (2000) and 
Kosnik (1987) the financial performance of a firm is affected by a multitude of 
endogenous and exogenous factors.   Further, as Mace (1986), and Lorsch and 
MacIver (1989) make clear, boards are not well positioned to oversee the day-to-day 
financial affairs of the firm. 
Definition and Research Measurements for Board Decision Quality  
Board structure. As noted above, we propose to study one item of board structure. 
Insider\outsider duality is coded as a dichotomous variable.  The measure of the 
proportion of outside directors, the figure is the divisor of the number of outside directors 
and the total number of directors for each company. The theoretical range for this 
variable is 0-1. The variables are obtained from the annual report of each listed 
company. 
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Board processes. In general, according to Zahra & Pearce (1989) board process 
refers mainly to the decision-making activities of the board.  In addition, Anderson and 
Anthony (1988) noted that board process pertains to the healthy and sometimes 
rigorous discussion on corporate issues and problems so that decisions can be reached 
and supported.  Further board process is the functioning of the board, planning and 
organising to achieve board objectives (Dulewicz, MacMillan and Herbert, 1995).   
Four process variables were identified based on studies by (Scarborough, Haynie and 
Shook, 2010; Wan and Ong, 2001; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Amason and Sapienza, 
1997and Jehn and  Mannix, 2001). They are effort norms, cognitive conflict, 
presence/use of knowledge/skills and information quality. 
Board processes which have been identified as affecting board performance include (1) 
effort norms; (2) conflict; (3) presence/use of knowledge and skills and (4) cohesiveness 
(Amason and Sapienza, 1997: Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Jehn and Mannix, 2001). 
Shaw and Power (1998) argued that for a group to perform successfully, the team must 
be a cohesive unit with the necessary knowledge and skills to manage conflict that 
happens so as to establish acceptable norms for problem-solving and decision-making. 
5.7 Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis was conducted on the correlation matrix to identify factors that could 
potentially impact on board process and board decision quality and also to reduce the 
number of individual variables under each factor to a much smaller set of variables that 
underlie board decision quality.   
Table 5.18 KMO and Bartlett’s Tests  
Construct  Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin 
Approx Chi-
Square 
Df Sig.  
Board Independence  0.855 390.830 21 0.000  
Board Activism  0.873 1082.510 105 0.000  
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Functional area 
knowledge  
0.901 526.602 28 0.000  
Effort Norms  0.814 305.798 21 0.000  
Cognitive Conflict  0.874 684.821 36 0.000  
Information Quality  0.905 757.401 28 0.000  
Table 5.18 KMO and Bartlett’s Tests 
5.7.1 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
KMO was used to measure sampling adequacy to compare the magnitudes of the 
observed correlations coefficients in relation to the magnitudes of the partial correlation 
coefficients.  KMO values higher than 0.8 is excellent because correlations between 
pairs of variables (i.e potential factors) can be explained by other variables.  Table 5.18 
shows that board independence has a score of 0.855, skills\knowledge (0.901), effort 
norms (0.814), cognitive conflict (0.874) and information quality (0.905).  
5.7.2 Bartlett’s test of sphericity  
The Bartlett’s test of sphericity is used to test the hypothesis that the correlation matric 
is an identity matrix.  The objective is to assess for significance (score of less than 0.05) 
would show that the variables are correlated.  For example a correlation matrix; all items 
are perfectly correlated with themselves and have some correlation with the other items.  
Table 5.18 shows that board independence has a score of (0.000), skills\knowledge 
(0.000), effort norms (0.000), cognitive conflict (0.000) and information quality (0.000).  
The score for all the factors are less than 0.05 which shows that they are correlated with 
other items.  
5.7.3 Communality  
Communality is the proportion of variance accounted for by the common factors or 
communality) of a variable.  Communalities range from 0 to 1.  Zero means that the 
common factors do not explain any variance; one means that the common factors 
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explain all the variances.  All the above mentioned constructs have a score of 1 that 
show that common factors explain all the variances.  
5.7.4 The eigenvalues 
The eigenvalues is the total variance explained by each factor.  Any ‘factor’ that has an 
Eigenvalue of less than one does not have enough total variance explained to represent 
a unique factor, and therefore has to be disregarded.   
 The eigenvalues for board independence, components 2 through 7 are 
eliminated from the analysis for having eigenvalues less than1.0.  This is 
because not all of the variance is explained when only some of the factors are 
retained in the final analysis. 
 The eigenvalues for use of knowledge\skills, components 2 through 8 are 
eliminated from the analysis for having eigenvalues less than 1.0 
 The eigenvalues for effort norms, components 2 through 7 are eliminated from 
the analysis for having eigenvalues less than 1.0  
 The eigenvalues for cognitive conflict, components from 3 through to 9 are 
eliminated from the analysis for having eigenvalues less than 1.0.  
 The eigenvalues for information quality, components from 2 through to 8 are 
eliminated from the analysis for having eigenvalues less than 1.0. 
 
5.8 Reliability  
Table 5.19 presents reliability statistic of all the variables for this study. The Cronbach’s 
alpha is 0.764 for board independence, 0.908 for knowledge\skills, 0.850 for effort 
norms, 0.854 for cognitive conflict and 0.944 for information quality.   These scores 
mean that the questionnaire had an acceptable degree of reliability and an acceptable 
level of inter-item consistency. 
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Table 5.19 Reliability scores for board decision constructs 
Reliability of board decision quality constructs  Chronbach Alpha  
Board Independence (BODIN)   0.764 
Board Activism (BODACT) 0.845 
Functional Area Knowledge (FnKnow) 0.908 
Effort Norms (EN) 0.850 
Cognitive Conflict (CogC) 0.854 
Information Quality (INFOQ) 0.944 
  
Table 5.19 Reliability scores for board decision constructs 
5.9 CONCLUDING SUMMARY 
This Chapter explored how the different board process dimensions interrelate to a board 
decision quality. Out of the six linear regression equations, for estimating the regression 
weights for the hypothesised relationships, it was found that all were statistically 
significant: (1) The relationship between director independence and effort norms; (2) 
The relationship between director independence and cognitive conflict (3) the 
relationship between director independence and level of information quality,  (4) the 
relationship between independence and board decision quality and finally (5) 
relationship between board process variables and board decision quality (see above).  
With the exception of equation (4) there is no relationship between director 
independence and information quality.  
It was found to be somewhat surprising to have an insignificant relationship between 
director independence and level of information quality, as this is in conflict with cited 
information quality literature (see Chapter 2). A practical implication of this finding is that 
director independence does not have a direct relationship with information quality. 
Rather the relationship is mediated through the total quality management culture. It is 
variables such as skills\knowledge, and effort norms that have a direct impact on the 
board decision quality. However, when the model is put together and information 
quality, knowledge\skills and efforts norms are included there is significance for the 
model.  Hypothesis 6 postulated a statistically significant relationship between board 
decision quality and board process variables (knowledge & skills, information quality 
286 | P a g e  
 
and effort norms)  As the results in the table 5.16 show the coefficient of board decision 
quality and board process variables is 0.33 (knowledge and skills), 0.28 (information 
quality) and 1.79 (effort norms).  It appears that the direction of the relationship changes 
when the variables are put together and they improve board decision quality.  The F-test 
shows that there is a significant and negative relationship (F = 26.17, 01.p ) between 
the dependent variable (board decision quality) and the independent variable (board 
process variables), thus supporting the hypothesis.  
The highlight of this Chapter is in the regression weights that were estimated. These 
regression weights are illustrated in Figure 5.17 provide insight as to which variables 
have the most predictive power of board decision quality. In the order of the highest 
predictive power as depicted by the regression weights, the impact of director 
independence to knowledge\skills is rated the highest (0.25). This is followed by the 
impact of director independence to cognitive conflict (0.24).  
A number of statistics from the factor analysis show that the constructs (effort norms, 
knowledge\skills and information) are good measures or predictors of board decision 
quality.  From the factor analysis the conbrach alpha for all variables has an acceptable 
degree of reliability and an acceptable level of inter-item consistency.  The Cronbach’s 
alpha is 0.764 for board independence, 0.908 for knowledge\skills, 0.850 for effort 
norms, 0.854 for cognitive conflict and 0.944 for information quality.   The KMO values 
higher than 0.8 is excellent because correlations between pairs of variables (i.e 
potential factors) can be explained by other variables.  Table 5.18 shows that board 
independence has a score of 0.855, skills\knowledge (0.901), effort norms (0.814), 
cognitive conflict (0.874) and information quality (0.905).  
 
The objective of Bartlett Sphericity is to assess for significance (score of less than 0.05) 
would show that the variables are correlated.  Board independence has a score of 
(0.000), skills\knowledge (0.000), effort norms (0.000), cognitive conflict (0.000) and 
information quality (0.000). 
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Communalities range from 0 to 1.  Zero means that the common factors do not explain 
any variance; one means that the common factors explain all the variances.  All the 
above mentioned constructs have a score of 1 that show that common factors explain 
all the variances.  
Furthermore, the board process variables are considered moderating or intervening 
variables.  The model theorises that board decision quality is a function of board 
structure plus board process variables.  For instance this finding confirms the 
hypothesis that effort norms, information quality and knowledge\skills improve board 
decision quality.  The implication of this finding is that governance can be improved by 
ensuring that directors are independent, board process variables are considered and 
result in board decision quality.    
 
Overall, the findings indicate that, the higher board decision quality will cause improved 
governance and board performance and consequentially result in improved 
organisational performance. High board decision quality will then result in high board 
activism and with increased commitment to board activity.   
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 CHAPTER SIX 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, the results of the study will be discussed, and conclusions will be drawn.  
This will be achieved by firstly focusing on what was found in the literature, and then the 
empirical results will be discussed. This will be followed with a discussion on the extent 
to which the research goal was achieved. As stated in Chapter 1, the specific goal was 
to adapt and evaluate a measure of board decision quality for use in the public sector, in 
Southern Africa. Recommendations will be made regarding the use of the measure and 
the chapter and the study will be ended off with a discussion of the limitations of the 
study and recommendations for future research. 
To develop a model of significance some essential issues had to be addressed. Among 
several questions to be addressed is that regarding the notion: board decision quality.  It 
became abundantly apparent however, that for a clear understanding of this concept 
background information around corporate governance thinking was critical.  The global 
overview corporate governance thinking was thus provided in Chapter 1 with specific 
reference to South Africa where this study was conducted. Furthermore, the historical 
background of corporate governance theory and practice was covered.  Figures 2.1 in 
Chapter 2 helped put into perspective the characteristics and elements of the board 
decision quality model 
The aim of this study has been to develop a model of board decision quality that would 
first explain and secondly positively influence board performance in the public sector.  
Developing such a model was seen as an initiative with potential to develop Theory of 
Corporate Governance in the Public Sector. Every chapter of the dissertation is a 
sequence towards the development of a board decision quality model.  
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Chapter 1 laid the foundation for the thesis not only by presenting definitions, tracing the 
origins of corporate governance and the evolution of thinking.  The context and 
background provided a good foundation to introduce the research problem, the research 
questions and the hypotheses.  A justification for the research is provided, the 
methodology is briefly discussed and the rationale for the thesis was presented. 
 
Chapter 1 provided the background of governance theory while Chapter 2 crafted a 
theoretical foundation for model on governance.  This conceptual framework guided the 
empirical research process.   The elements of the conceptual framework were distilled 
from four sources: (1) board members of Public Entities, (2) governance literature, (3) 
governance empirical studies, (4) board decision process literature, and (5) board 
decision quality literature. The literature on board decision quality was reviewed 
subsequent to the initial exploratory survey. The findings of the initial exploratory survey 
required the adjustment of the framework and the inclusion of the board decision quality 
construct.  
 
Having provided background information for the study in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 
concerned itself with building the theoretical basis for the model. This required a 
conceptual framework that was to guide the empirical research process. The elements 
of the framework were drawn from four sources: (1) corporate governance literature, (2) 
Board structure empirical studies, (3) board process literature and (4) board decision 
quality literature. The findings of the initial exploratory survey required the adjustment of 
the framework and refinement of the variables that influence board decision quality.  
Five variables that were identified that influence board decision quality in public sector 
entities. These include five variables including use of skills and knowledge, cognitive 
conflict, effort norms, board independence and information quality dimensions. All the 
six variables and their meaning which were defined in the context of this study were 
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provided. The variables were specified into causal connections to form the hypothesised 
relationships.  
Chapter 2 covers all the hypothesised relationships which were conceptually derived, 
the first requirement for model development. At the close of Chapter 2 a model of the 
hypothesised relationships were integrated to explain board decision quality. 
The ensuing sections of the thesis concerned the operationalisation of the variables 
through theories.  The nature of the study promoted the selection and a discussion of 
the methodologies that were adopted to conduct the study. The research design and 
sampling plan was influenced by the research questions in Chapter 1 and the 
conceptual framework in chapter 2.   Chapter 3 demonstrates this.  
Different data sources were used to build the model, and Figure 4.2 gave a synopsis of 
the different data sources and the methodologies used to acquire the data. As has 
already been mentioned, the research was carried out in two stages. First, the research 
involved an initial exploratory survey carried out to identify the factors of board decision 
quality in Public Entities in South Africa. This was supplemented by interviews with the 
industry consultants in order to gain insight and identify variables that were industry 
specific and not covered in the literature. The interviews with board directors were 
structured and organised to yield data concerning factors of decision quality. 
 
The first stage of the research was also concerned with case study selection. Additional 
information about case study organisations was gathered and used to determine how 
different case organisations vary from one another. In the second stage of the research, 
a survey was used to gather data from 104 distributors in 3 case study organisations so 
that the model proposed in Chapter 2 could be tested.  
Chapter 3 dealt with the operational definition of variables and constructs of proposed 
relationships in the model. The nature and the direction of the hypothesised 
relationships is as illustrated in figure 4.4. The reliability of the constructs was 
examined. 
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The nature of the research questions presented in Chapter 1 and 3 and the 
methodological procedures used for collecting data (qualitative and quantitative) are 
evidence that this study, in its attempt to develop theory, has not narrowed its view to 
one particular philosophical paradigm. Instead, the study has adopted both the 
phenomenological and positivist approaches in order to offset the limitations of any one 
approach. The presentation of results in different research phases demonstrates this. 
 
The results of the second stage of the research were presented in Chapters 5. In this 
Chapter the hypothesised relationships in the proposed model were tested. This 
allowed a comparison between theory and the corporate governance practices. The 
study provides an opportunity to determine whether the data corresponds to the real life 
situation.   
 
In the preceding paragraphs, the link between the Chapters has been maintained. The 
rest of this Chapter is concerned with the discussion relating to conclusions about the 
hypotheses and the research questions. This Chapter also seeks to relate the theory 
with findings reported in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Section 6.2 presents the conclusion for 
each hypothesis. The conclusions about the research questions are presented in 
section 6.2  
 
The utility of research goes beyond the research approach and methods hence the 
implications of this study are provided for practitioners together with a list of 
recommendations for improving board decision quality in section 6.4. Finally, sections 
6.5 and 6.6 deal with the limitations of the study and future areas of research 
respectively. 
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With the methodological issues dealt with, Chapter 4 presented the results of both the 
first phase of the research. At the end of Chapter 4 a cross-case analysis was 
presented that examined how the four case study organisations varied in terms of 
skills\knowledge, effort norms, cognitive conflict, information quality, and director 
independence. 
This chapter presents the recommendations, the implications for future research and 
the conclusions.  The chapter emerges and evolves from the findings in Chapter Five, 
the analysis of the findings and contributions to knowledge   . It highlights the main 
lessons learnt from this research. It also highlights areas requiring further research. 
Discussion of results pertaining to the literature review 
From Chapter 2, an eight step process is used to structure the literature review as 
outlined in section 2.1.  The outcome of the literature review is discussed below for each 
step.    
Step 1 entailed the definition of governance from several perspectives to define the 
concept from several perspectives. It can be read in Chapter 2, entailed under section 
2.2 that several definitions were found in the literature. The goal in this part of the 
research was to come to a thorough understanding of what is meant when the word 
governance is used. The operational definition adopted after reviewing all the definitions 
was Solomon and Solomon (2004) description that governance as the internal and 
external system of checks and balances , which ensures that companies discharge their 
accountability in a socially responsible way in business activity.  Naidoo (2009) provided 
another definition of corporate governance as essentially the effective leadership that is 
characterized by ethical values of responsibility, accountability, fairness and 
transparency that regulates the exercise of power in the achievement of organisational 
objectives.    
2. To describe how the concept relates to other variables. It can be read in Chapter 2.2 
that several theories or models exist around governance. The theories include the 
classical theories which include Agency Theory, Berle & Means (1932), Policy Model 
Theory, Carver & Carver’s(1996), Stewardship Theory, Donaldson (1990) & Barney 
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(1990); Stakeholder Theory which include Abdullah and Valentine (2009),  Resource 
Dependency Theory, Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996); Resource-based View 
Theory (RBV), Barney (1991), Board Process Variables, Korac-Kakabadse, Kakabadse, 
and Kouzmin (2001) The theory found most suitable for this research was the 
Integrative Model Theory by (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson, 1998; Shook and 
Haynie, 2010; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Wan and Ong, 2005).  
 
3. To compile several lists of the elements, if any, of which the concept comprises. 
Here, the objective was to identify the building block of the concept (board structure, 
board process variables and board decision quality). The goal was to find the elements 
that needed to be included in the measure. It was found that board process variables 
and board structure could be broken down into elements. These are: 
§ Structural elements – which include the notion of independence (the number of 
independent directors) 
§ Board process elements – This refers to effort norms, knowledge\skills, cognitive 
conflict and information quality. 
4. To write notes on the validity and reliability of a psychometric measure, and the 
characteristics of a good measure and its items. This was achieved, and notes were 
written about test-retest reliability, alternative forms reliability, split sample reliability, 
internal consistency reliability, scorer reliability, as well as interrater reliability. 
5. To list measures and describe the measures of board process. Several measures 
namely knowledge and skills (23 item measure) by Forbes & Milliken (1999); 
independence measured as the number of independent directors SEC Guidelines); 
effort norms (6 item measure) by Forbes and Milliken (1999); cognitive conflict (6 item 
measure) by Smith, Smith, Olian, Sims, Bannon, & Scully (1994) and information quality 
(8 item measure).  These results can be read in Chapter 2.6. 
294 | P a g e  
 
7. To describe how measured concept relates to other variables. It can be read in 
Chapter 2, under the heading “decision process, decision criteria and decision outcome”  
8. To suggest the selected measure or pool of items to be considered as a measure of 
the concept. A pool of nineteen (55) items was selected. These items were the items 
included in the measure and were the items used in the empirical study. 
From the aforementioned, it is clear that literature-related goals of the study were 
largely achieved. The exception was goal 2 (two) on how the concept relates to other 
variables.   
 
Discussion of results pertaining to empirical findings 
It can be read from Chapter 1 that there were several goals set for the empirical study.  
These were described under section 1.4 & 1.5. The results pertaining to these goals will 
be discussed one by one. 
1. To compile a list of items to be tried out in the empirical investigation. This was 
achieved taking into consideration the reviewed literature and after consultation with 
fellow students and the study leader. The questionnaire, as it was used, is an 
attachment to this document. 
2. A battery of 43 items was compiled of these concepts and combined that with other 
questionnaires. This was done, by using the instruments that were developed by Forbes 
& Milliken, 1999) and Smith, Smith, Olian, Sims, Bannon, & Scully (1994)  
3. The battery was send to a language editor and requested feedback on with specific 
comments on face validity. The feedback given by the language editor resulted in minor 
modifications of the questionnaire. The results of the verification process were an easy-
to-read questionnaire with some face validity. 
4. The population was selected for the battery to be administered to determine ist 
psychometric characteristics.  The population consisted 215 board directors of Public 
Sector Entities (Schedule1, 2 & 3)  
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5. Consent from the participants was obtained and the questionnaire was administered.  
The participants were informed about the purpose of the study and about their rights.  . 
Consent forms were completed and signed by the participants handed to each 
participant can be seen in Annexure A. 
6. To capture the data on SPSS. This was done in groups of two students in order to 
eliminate punching errors. 
7. To eliminate items based on their low correlation with construct (correlation matrix), 
and high levels of gender and race bias. It can be read from Table 4.2 that one item had 
a relatively low correlation with the total score. 
From Table 4.3, it can be read that five items showed gender bias, and from Table 4.4, 
it can be read that three items showed race bias.  In the summative table, Table 4.5, it 
can be seen that one (1) item had “defaulted” or showed less disable psychometric 
characteristics in more than one area. As this number was too small, it was decided to 
stick to the suggested measure as proposed originally. 
8.To determine the reliability of the shortened questionnaire. This was done for the full 
measure as the proposed measure was not adapted. The reliability of the questionnaire 
was Cronbach alpha = 0.796. This coefficient is acceptable and it gives an indication of 
consistency of the participants’ responses on the administration of the questionnaire, 
and this gives a satisfactory reliability (Hair et al., 2006). 
9. To determine the correlation between measured concept and other concepts 
measured and identified in the literature review. The correlation between the measured 
construct, and knowledge\skills was .53 (p<.001) and effort norms 1.23 (p<.001),.  From 
the literature, the following relationships were expected: 
 There is a positive relationship between director independence and level of effort 
norms  
 There is a positive relationship between director independence and level of 
cognitive conflict  
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 There is a positive relationship between director independence and usage of 
knowledge and skills  
10. To discuss the utility of the questionnaire for future use. Given the reliability of the 
questionnaire being .796 indicating its acceptability to be used as a measure of board 
decision quality. 
Conclusions 
All the goals of this study, as set out in Chapter 1 were achieved. The resulting measure 
of board decision quality is now available for use in the public sector. More knowledge 
reliability of the measure and the validity thereof is now available.  
This will allow for more confident use of the measure relatively low correlation with the 
total score. From Table 4.3, it can be read that five items showed gender bias, and from 
Table 4.4, it can be read that three items showed race bias. 
 
6.2 CONCLUSIONS ABOUT HYPOTHESES 
To test whether a relationship exists between two variables, and to determine whether 
the differences between two variables are statistically significant.  Depending on the 
nature of the variables two statistical tests were conducted in Chapter 4. These tests 
include regression analysis and factor analysis. The results of these hypotheses tests 
are examined and their implications are discussed. The discussion will also look at the 
simultaneous effect of all the variables in the model, in connection with how they 
interrelate and their impact on board decision quality.  
 
It should be noted that the data used to test hypothesis (H1 – H6) was based on the 
survey questions.  A sample used to test the hypothesis is board directors of Public 
Sector Entities.   
There is a positive relationship between director independence and level of 
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effort norms displayed by public entity boards. 
There is a positive relationship between director independence and level of 
cognitive conflict displayed by public entity boards. 
There is a positive relationship between director independence and usage of 
knowledge and skills by public entity boards. 
There is a positive relationship between director decision and the level of 
information quality used to make board decisions. 
There is a positive relationship between independence and board quality 
decision 
There is a relationship between board process variables and board quality 
decision 
 
6.2.1 The association between director independence and the level of effort 
norms of public entity boards.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The degree to which director independence has an effect on the level of 
effort norms by public entity boards. 
 
This study hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between director 
independence and level of effort norms displayed by public entity boards.    Indeed, the 
findings supported this hypothesis. It was found that there is a strong positive 
correlation between independence of board members and the level of effort norms of 
the board.  Accordingly by implication governance practitioners and scholars may 
consider to more accurately and realistically stipulate what the expected degree of effort 
that is required from both insider and outsider directors. 
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King III advocates for more independent directors to occupy director positons and 
having a proportion of outside members on the board helps to alleviate the extent to 
which there are conflicts of interests (Fama, 1980; Young, Stedham & Beekun, 2000).  
Secondly, from a resource dependency perspective theorists view boards of directors 
as means to gain some level of control over critical resources in their external 
environment (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Boeker and Goodstein, 1991; Pfeffer, 
1972).  With no conflict of interest and the ability to attract critical resources needed by 
the firm there will be increased involvement in the activities (board activism) of the firm 
and greater levels of effort will be given by board directors.  
The results indicate that the higher the level of independence,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
the higher the level of effort of board directors. Accordingly, Public Entities may consider 
improving the levels of independence and number of independent directors in order to 
improve the level effort norms of board directors.  
 
6.2.2 The association between director independence and the level of cognitive 
conflict  
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between director independence and level 
of cognitive conflict displayed by public entity boards. 
 
Hypothesis 2 postulated a statistically significant relationship between director 
independence and the level of cognitive conflict of the board.    
Studies by Jehn (1995) considered cognitive conflict as disagreements about the 
content concerning the tasks being performed. Amason (1996) proposed that it involves 
the use of processes involving critical and investigative interaction. Critical investigation 
has the potential of discovering flawed assumptions in management’s plans. Generally, 
cognitive conflict has been found to increase the number of alternative and creative 
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solutions considered by small groups (Eisenhardt et al., 1997; Jackson, 1992; Milliken 
and Vollrath, 1991). A Board culture that promotes cognitive conflict has the potential to 
influence decision quality in the boardroom.  The above scholars advocate to advance a 
more sophisticated view of factors that impact a board’s decision scope and quality, 
such as board culture and cognitive conflict.  (Schweiger & Sandberg, 1989; Schwenk, 
1990) agreed that cognitive conflict improves decision quality because the synthesis 
that emerges from the conflict is generally superior to the individual perspectives 
themselves.   
Jehn, Northcraft and Neale (1999) defined process conflict as the awareness of 
controversies about aspects of how task accomplishment will proceed, such as who 
should do what and how much responsibility different people should get. For instance, 
when group members disagree about whose responsibility it is to complete a specific 
duty, they are experiencing process conflict.   
O'Reilly, Caldwell and Barnett (1989), Guth and MacMillan (1986) and (Isbella and  
Waddock, 1994) state that the generation of ideas is negatively associated with social 
integration and consensus in groups. The principle of cohesion and cooperation 
consequently, leads to higher pressure for conformity, limiting the quality of both 
alternative generation and evaluation of decisions. These scholars argue that the 
effectiveness of strategic decision roles is positively related to social integration and 
consensus. These scholars recognise the dichotomy of cohesiveness (cooperation and 
identify) and cognitive conflict to enhance decision making.  Isbella and Waddock 
(1994) claim that consensus can create more feelings of satisfaction with the decision-
making process, giving rise to greater decision acceptance and commitment.   
The results indicate that the higher the level of independence,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
the higher the level of cognitive conflict of board directors. By implication the 
independent directors are free from conflict of interest and are receptive to exploring 
diverse options and alternatives.  Accordingly, Public Entities may consider improving 
the levels of independence and number of independent directors in order to improve the 
level of cognitive conflict at board level.  With a board culture that encourages diverse 
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thinking (cognitive conflict) the best alternatives and options are explored which will 
consequentially improve board decision quality.  
6.2.3 The association between director independence and the usage of 
knowledge and skills  
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between director independence and 
usage of knowledge and skills by public entity boards. 
Hypothesis 3 postulated a statistically significant relationship between director 
independence and the use of knowledge and skills.   
Studies by Zajac and Bazerman (1991) argued that director’s varied knowledge 
domains thereby reduce the risk of competitive blind spots.  Further directors with 
diverse functional area knowledge increase the overall cognitive capacity of the board 
and decision quality.  Directors’ varied knowledge domains thereby reduce the risk of 
competitive blind spots (Zajac and Bazerman, 1991). Directors categorize information 
they receive and create links to pre-existing knowledge areas and beliefs, and use 
these links to conceive actions and consequences. Directors with diverse functional 
area knowledge increase the overall cognitive capacity of a board. Thus, functional area 
knowledge is critical to both the scope and the ultimate quality of directors’ decision-
making.  
 
The results indicate that the higher the level of independence,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
the higher the level of cognitive capacity of board directors. By implication the 
independent directors are free from conflict of interest and are receptive to exploring 
diverse options and alternatives.  Scholars advocate that Well-balanced boards in terms 
of varied backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives of directors (Blair, 1950; 
Copeland and Towl, 1947; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Koontz, 1967; Norburn, 1986; 
Salmon, 1993) improve company performance.  This finding also suggests boards of 
directors should be viewed as intellectual assets of a corporation.  To cope with 
complexity and uncertainty, directors develop perceptual filters and dominant logics 
(Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) that correspond to their experiences as leaders of their own 
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organizations and as directors of other organizations. Together, directors scan larger 
volumes of environmental and organisational data and view the data through multiple 
perspectives and logic. Directors’ varied knowledge domains thereby reduce the risk of 
competitive blind spots (Zajac and Bazerman, 1991). 
Accordingly, Public Entities may consider improving the levels of independence and 
number of independent directors in order to improve the level of cognitive capacity at 
board level.  Directors’ varied knowledge domains thereby reduce the risk of competitive 
blind spots (Zajac and Bazerman, 1991). 
 
6.2.4 The association between director independence and information quality  
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between director independence and the 
level of information quality used to make board decisions. 
Information quality is one construct that has received surprisingly little attention in the 
literature on boards of directors. As directors spend both limited and intermittent time 
preparing for board meetings, the quality of information provided to board members 
should have a significant impact on decision quality. What are the attributes of quality 
information provided to board members? Are there individual differences that affect 
information quality and decision outcomes? What types of information are most 
important in a board’s decision making process? Does it matter whether board 
information is externally or internally focused, operational, or financial in nature, risk-
based, or market-based, forward or backward looking, textual or visual, etc? How timely 
is timely as it relates to making board decisions? How much information is too much?   
The results indicate that the higher the level of independence,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
the higher the level of information quality of board directors. By implication the 
independent directors have less information about company related information and are 
therefore very reliant on receiving quality information on particular issues for 
assessment and to reach a quality decision. If independent directors do not have quality 
information (accessibility, adequacy, sufficiency, relevancy, .timely, reliable and 
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objective) they are unable to apply their cognitive capacity to evaluate the information 
and reach a decision.  If the information is deficient it compromises board decision 
quality.    Accordingly, Public Entities may consider improving the levels of information 
quality to independent directors because they have limited exposure to the organisation 
issues and would need high quality information.   
6.2.5 The association between the director independence and board decision 
quality  
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between independence and board 
decision quality 
 
Despite several decades of research designed to link the relationship between board 
structure and company performance.  The results of these studies are inconclusive and 
contradictory (Daily and Dalton, 1999).  Scholars like Heracleous (2001; Johnson, Daily 
& Ellstrand, (1996) and Zahra and Pearce (1989) agreed that there is a mixed 
relationship between board structure and board performance (for review, see).   Further 
Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) argued the same that the relationship between 
board structure and financial performance might not exist at all. Or, if there is a 
relationship, their magnitude may not be of practical significance. Kesner and Johnson 
(1990) suggested that, the board is probably not an important, direct determinant of firm 
performance. The reason is that boards are not involved in daily decision-making.  Phan 
(1998) and Buchanan and Huczynski (1997) claimed that board structure is as 
important as board process.  
The reason for the lack of direct relationship between board structure and firm 
performance is attributable to the intervening board process. Finkelstein and Hambrick 
(1996) and Heracleous (1999, 2001) noted that a reason why board structure is unlikely 
to have universal impact on firm performance is that there are too many intervening 
processes to expect a strong direct association. The mixed results could be due to both 
methodological and conceptual issues, such as lack of attention to group dynamics, 
high complexity of processes, variations in measurements of board attributes and 
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performance. Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) concluded that since there is little 
consistency between board structure and firm performance, researchers should inspect 
the process by which boards may affect company results instead. 
The results indicate that the higher the level of independence,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
the higher the level higher the level of board decision quality.  Independent directors are 
free from conflict of interest and are more likely to act in the interest of the organisation 
and all its stakeholders.  By implication the independent directors are more willing to 
explore diverse options and alternatives.  Accordingly, Public Entities may consider 
improving the levels of independence and number of independent directors in order to 
improve the level board decision quality.   
6.2.6 The association between board process variables and board decision 
quality   
Hypothesis 6: There is a relationship between board process variables and board 
quality decision 
Hypothesis 6 postulated a statistically significant relationship between board decision 
quality and board process variables (knowledge & skills, information quality and effort 
norms)  As the results in the table 5.16 show the coefficient of board decision quality 
and board process variables is 0.33 (knowledge and skills), 0.28 (information quality) 
and 1.79 (effort norms).  It appears that the direction of the relationship changes when 
the variables are put together they improve board decision quality.  The F-test shows 
that there is a significant and negative relationship (F = 26.17, 01.p ) between the 
dependent variable (board decision quality) and the independent variable (board 
process variables), thus supporting the hypothesis.  
6.3 CONCLUSION ABOUT THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As was indicated in Chapters 1 and 3, this thesis sought to address one main research 
questions and four sub-questions 
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How and why should public entities achieve board decision quality to optimise 
performance and become sustainable? 
Sub-questions  
 What are the factors that affect board decision quality? 
 What is the strength and direction of the relationship between board decision 
quality and board activism? 
 Does board decision quality mediate the relationship between effort norms, 
functional area knowledge and cognitive conflict and board activism? 
 What effect does the three variables have an effect on board activism? 
 
6.3.1 Addressing Research Question 1 
Review of board structure and board process literature discloses a variety of 
hypothesised relationships of the variables, functional area knowledge, effort norms, 
board independence, board activism, cognitive conflict and cohesiveness. For example, 
Scarborough, Haynie, Shook (2010) found empirical support for the positive relationship 
between functional area knowledge and board activism; a strong link between effort 
norms and board activism and failed to find a consistent and practically significant 
relationship between board attributes and firm performance.  This finding of this study 
steered the researcher to explore the antecedents of board decision quality; further to 
explore the relationship between director independence and level of effort norms 
(hypothesis 1); relationship between director independence and level of cognitive 
conflict (hypothesis 2); director independence and usage of knowledge and skills 
(hypothesis 3); director decision and the level of information quality (hypothesis 4); 
independence and board quality decision (hypothesis 5) and board process variables 
and board quality decision (hypothesis 6).   
While there were studies that linked board process variables directly to board decision 
quality (Scarborouugh, Haynie and Shook, 2010; Wan and Ong, 2001) this research 
predicted that process variables impact board decision quality, they would tend to 
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exhibit increased commitment to their organisations (Hypothesis 6). The hypothesis was 
derived from work done by Scarborough, Haynie and Shook (2010). As discussed 
earlier hypothesis 6 was confirmed.  The performance of the individual variables 
improve when lumped together to test the model with higher scoring.    
Literature revealed that effort norms, cognitive  conflict, knowledge\skills, information 
quality and director independence have a positive association with board performance 
and board activism (Scarborough, Haynie  Shook, 2010; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; 
Sonnenfeld , 2002; Wan and Ong, 2001; Forbes and Milliken 1999) as predicted in 
Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. These hypotheses were confirmed as discussed earlier.  
Personal interviews were conducted as another measure to identify additional variables 
that were thought to have an impact on board decision quality. The analysis of the 
interviews resulted in the incorporation of two variables in the board decision quality 
model: information quality, and cognitive conflict. The variables were predicted to affect 
board decision quality indirectly via director independence variable (see Hypotheses 2, 
and 4).  
6.3.2 Addressing Research Question 2 
The variables defining board process, knowledge\skills, effort norms, and information 
quality interrelate to provide explanation of board decision quality as illustrated in figure 
5.1. The model in figure 5.1 illustrates that board process variables has a direct impact 
on board decision quality, in which, effort norms has the strongest relationship in the 
model. The board process variables (effort norms, knowledge\skills, and information 
quality) have a direct impact on board decision quality. 
The model also shows that the board process variables are intervening variables 
between board structure and board decision quality.  Effort norms, information quality, 
director independence and functional knowledge are antecedents of board decision 
quality.    The variable, cognitive conflict is not included in the model as an antecedent 
of board decision quality.  Although the information quality relationship was statistically 
insignificant it was included in the model again to improve model parsimony.  Tenure 
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was also found to have an indirect link to intention to quit, via the organisational 
commitment variable. 
6.3.3 Addressing Research Question 3  
The model (figure 5.1) illustrates that be sides effort norms, director independence has 
the most predictive power across all process variables and board decision quality (beta 
coefficient ranging between -.016 and 0.33) compared to other variables that are 
directly linked to board decision quality. The results also show that variables in the 
model, are strong predictors of board decision quality.  Effort norms are the strongest 
predictor of board decision quality (beta coefficient = 1.79), followed by knowledge\skills 
(beta coefficient = -.33) and information quality (beta coefficient = .28). The process 
variables, effort norms, knowledge\skills and information quality indirectly influence 
board decision quality  
 
6.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE - RECOMMENDATIONS 
Poor board decision quality results in poor performance of the board and 
consequentially poor company performance.  The intervening variables, board process 
variables impact decision quality.  Without measuring, developing tools, techniques and 
paying attention to process variables can result in low decision quality.  An inability to 
respond timeously to the external environment as a result of insufficiency of 
knowledge\skills, low effort and low information quality result in poor performance and a 
loss of market share. 
The Auditor General Report (2013) found that of the 2011-12 audit results of the 
national and provincial government of 536 entities, only 22%, or 117, received clean 
audit opinions.  The report identified stagnation, regression in audit opinions and a lack 
of leadership to address findings from previous years.  The qualified audits was largely 
attributed to poor governance practices in the areas of supply-chain management, 
human resources, information technology systems and accuracy of reporting. 
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6.4.1 Black listing irresponsible directors 
With the deterioration of governance practices over the past five years there is a need 
to take drastic action or punitive measures against directors that neglect or do not 
executive their fiduciary responsibilities.  Negative sanctions for board directors may 
deter some of the poor governance practices that continue to evade the public sector.  
The corruption perception index for 2013/4 (69 out of 176 countries) and the 
competitiveness rating for 2013/4 (53rd of 176 countries) require improvement in 
governance practices.  The findings reinforce a need to implement a black listing 
register for directors for deliberate poor governance practices.  Especially as it relates to 
conflict of interest, practices of fraud and gross negligence and dereliction of duty.   
 
6.4.2 Development of Board Decision Quality Strategy 
Solutions to improve decision making require an emphasis on continuous improvement, 
total quality management and creating a learning board culture. This would also require 
board directors to be held accountable for executing fiduciary responsibilities diligently. 
Given the impact poor decision quality has on an organisation’s bottom line, it is 
advisable to establish a “monitoring process of the ROI of decisions” within public sector 
entities. The focus of this process would be to continually evaluate the responsiveness 
of the board to emergent issues and the consequences taken to remedy and restore 
alignment between the organisation and the strategic issues the organisation is 
influenced by.  The board decision quality strategy is attained through a focus on 
continuous improvement, reflective practice, TQM and creation of learning board 
culture.   
6.4.3 Continuous improvement, reflection practice, and creation of a learning 
board culture    
 Continuous improvement processes  
 
Board of the twenty-first century should strongly emphasise quality and productivity 
in their decision processes and in the product and services offerings. The message 
for organisations is clear: change or face elimination. Creating tools and techniques 
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to monitor decisions and return on investment.  For example, analysis of the types of 
decisions that are taken, sufficiency, adequacy and reliability of information and the 
decision process culminates in improvement in board practices.   In addition, for 
agenda items that require further investigation and research should be delegated to 
a sub-committee of the board for developed a full proposal for consideration by the 
board.    Generally information quality must be monitored to assess if information 
provided to the board is timely, sufficient, reliable, valid, adequate, concise, 
objective, accessible, relevant, understandable and valuable.  The presentation, 
format and style of the information can be modified to determine the best format for 
the purpose.   
The practice of round robin discussion and decision practice must be reviewed to 
assess its success.   
 Total  quality management  
TQM is the management of activities that involve improving the quality of the 
organisation’s process, product or service. It is an organisational strategy that is 
committed to improving customer satisfaction by developing techniques to carefully 
manage output quality. The board must review process and ensure that all aspect of 
board functioning and behaviour is aligned to quality practices.  
A TQM philosophy requires top management support, TM practices by leadership, 
partnership with customers and suppliers and developing a distinctive quality 
competence and capability.   
 The board as a High performance system  
In accordance with the high performance system boards must avoid external control 
and produces its own standards.  The board decision process must provide 
exemplary governance practise to all stakeholders of the organisation.  The board 
must be open to new methods, inventions and developments in the external 
environment.  Cognitive conflict should be encouraged to cultivate diverse thinking 
and the best possible alternatives.   
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 A learning board culture  
The characteristics of a learning organisation relates to constant readiness to 
respond to external factors and competitor forces; continuous planning, improvised 
planning, flexible systems and action learning.  This thinking can be expended to the 
functioning and processes of the board.  The board must develop a continuing 
capacity to adapt and change.  Board directors must be conscious of how they think 
and interact, and begin developing capacities to think and interact differently.  
6.4.4 Director orientation, evaluation and effort norms  
A comprehensive orientation and induction policy for directors must be implemented. 
New director orientation provides another opportunity to reinforce or enhance existing 
effort norms. The objective was to provide a written role of the roles and responsibilities 
of board members.  The traditional role and responsibilities document is extended to 
cover definitions of conflict of interest, the manner in which potential conflicts are 
disclosed and ethical dilemmas are identified.  Further, reviewing the standard board 
book and highlighting key operational and financial drivers are important topics at new 
director orientation sessions.  The expected effort is given both quantitatively and 
qualitatively, in terms of key performance areas and key performance indicators.   
A comprehensive evaluation procedure and process is necessary to manage 
performance.  An active and effective board member evaluation process can also serve 
to reinforce or strengthen effort norms. Increased effort norms result in increased 
attention to board process and improved decision quality.   An evaluation system 
provides constructive feedback about whether a director’s level of effort and contribution 
to board governance is acceptable, or it can serve as the basis for a decision not to re 
elect a director. In short, there are several ways boards can establish or enhance effort 
norms, and this study finds that strengthening effort norms increases board activism. 
6.4.5 Effort norms and motivation  
In accordance with agency theory directors are given remunerative benefits to align the 
director’s behaviour to the strategic objectives of the organisation. Little is known about 
director’s motivation.  Likewise, there is a need to understand what the antecedents of 
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directors’ motivation.  A determination of whether higher director compensation and 
share options lead to more effort exerted on board activity.  A number of questions 
remain unanswered in terms of are retired executives more motivated than current 
executives and what are the antecedents to strong board effort norms? 
Director motivation could relate to self-actualisation, create a legacy of success, and 
contribute to the success and development of the organisation, and the prestige or 
access to particular business and social networks.   
6.4.6 Knowledge/skills and expert counsel 
The literature makes a distinction of use of knowledge\skills, management cognitions, 
expertise, firm specific knowledge and functional area knowledge.  Based on these 
distinctions firms must adapt and refine the recruitment and selection tools and criteria 
in the selection of board of directors to assess level of functional knowledge, 
skills\knowledge, expertise and management cognitions.  In this regard Dulewicz, 
MacMillan and Herbert (1995) identified 37 skills required of directors and subsequently 
researchers further divided the required competencies into 6 groups. 
Entities have to formulate and choose strategies that will enable the organisation to 
effectively align its capabilities and resources with the organisation's long-term 
objectives, and reconcile them with existing as well as potential opportunities and 
threats in the dynamic external business environment.  The cognitive capacity of the 
board is increased by the diverse functional area. Further there it is recognition that both 
the scope and the ultimate quality of directors’ knowledge and skills result in boar 
decision quality.  Director knowledge/skills is a resource strength, distinctive capability 
and competence is something the company is exceptional at doing, or some attribute 
that enhances its competitiveness in the industry/market. These resource strengths are 
often critically important assets and determinants of the company’s competitiveness and 
ability to succeed in the marketplace. 
Directors’ varied knowledge domains thereby reduce the risk of competitive blind spots 
(Zajac and Bazerman, 1991). Directors categorize information they receive and create 
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links to pre-existing knowledge areas and beliefs, and use these links to conceive 
actions and consequences 
A board of directors, however, is comprised of directors who bring multiple perceptual 
filters and dominant logics to the governance of a corporation. It is the diversity of these 
perspectives and the degree to which they match the cognitive demands of a particular 
corporation that increase board activism.  However, the board cognitive ability is not 
static and will vary based on changes in the external environment or changes the board 
structure.   If the is a gap in knowledge or skills or even is more objective views or 
opinions are needed the board should rely on the experts to provide support to the 
board.    An assessment of the changes to cognitive ability of the board should be done 
to ensure that the cognitive capacity matches the cognitive demands of a corporation’s 
business environment.   
6.4.7 Board independence  
The level of independence of the directors must be assessed to ensure that they are 
truly independent.  Independent directors could still be familiar with the other directors 
or the organisation through social networks.  The antecedents of independence must be 
determined.   
6.4.8 Board process and board decision quality:  interplay between at sub-
committee and board 
 
A number of studies examine the effectiveness of the work performed by committees 
within the board. This research stream led to results that are similar to those obtained 
by studies which concentrate on the general board, maintaining that independence, 
diligence and expertise are also important at the subgroup (committee) level. While 
there is vast research that examines the work of the board as a whole as well as the 
work of each committee in isolation, little is known about the interplay between different 
committees. 
312 | P a g e  
 
6.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
5.5 Limitations and recommendations for future studies 
The limitations and recommendations for future studies are presented under two 
separate sub-headings. 
6.5.1 Limitations 
The primary limitation of the study was the sample. In this research, data was collected 
from a purposive sample of Schedule 1, 2 and 3 public entities, 104 board members. It 
is, therefore, difficult to generalise within the public sector, and it would be irresponsible 
to generalise outside the sector. 
A second limitation is with regards to the measuring instrument itself. Although the 
measure has high validity and reliability, it can be observed that questionnaire was used 
primarily in the study of profit making entities. This may suggest that applying the 
measure to the public sector may not adequately recognise the peculiarities of the 
public sector entities.  Caution is thus advised. 
6.5.2 Recommendations for future studies 
 
 As this research was conducted from 104 board directors in the public sector, it is 
suggested that including more board directors in future researches will be beneficial. 
This approach will result in wider generalisability within the industry. 
 A second recommendation would be to investigate and fully exhaust all the variables 
that influence board decision quality.  Future board researchers should focus on 
directors’ functional area knowledge and deeply explore the variable managerial 
cognitions.   Another angle is that insider director is privy to more information and 
knowledge of the issue than outsiders.  This discrepancy of uneven knowledge by 
insider\outsider directors affects decision quality  
 Board researchers should fully explore the antecedents of board decision quality 
amongst the variables identified by the study, functional area knowledge, effort 
norms and information quality.  Other dimensions that could be explored further is 
board culture that could emanate from the board process variables (cognitive 
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conflict, functional area knowledge, cognitive conflict, information quality, cohesion 
and board independence).   
 Cohesiveness and cognitive conflict are essential to improve decision quality.  Much 
of the normative literature points to the importance of board activities that build 
group cohesion as being vitally important to healthy board relationships. Board 
events like board dinners, team building and board trips to visit plant sites aim to 
build group cohesion, sustain cognitive conflict and positively influence decision 
quality.  It will also be important to explore the impact of cohesiveness and cognitive 
conflict to board culture.   
 In the extant literature of board of director information quality receives surprisingly 
little attention. The nature of board preparation is limited and at least intermittent, the 
quality of information impact on the adequacy of preparation.  The sufficiency, 
adequacy, currency, completeness and timeliness of information impact on decision 
quality.  Board decision may either be delayed or deferred to a later date as a result 
of a lack of information quality.  Very little is known about information quality to 
boards and a range of questions need to be answered.  What are the antecedents of 
quality information provided to board members? Are there individual differences that 
affect information quality and decision outcomes? What types of information are 
most important in a board’s decision making process? Does it matter whether board 
information is externally or internally focused, operational, or financial in nature, risk-
based, or market-based, forward or backward looking, textual or visual, etc? How 
timely is timely as it relates to making board decisions? How much information is too 
much?  These research questions are rich opportunities for future board research.   
 Likewise, future board researchers should build on this study’s findings regarding 
directors’ effort norms and explore the salient antecedents of directors’ motivation.  
Additional information is required to understand what motivates directors to exert 
more effort and activate board activism and improve decision quality.  It is necessary 
to plunge deeper into fully understanding the construct motivation and to understand 
individual and collective motivation.  Does higher board compensation attract and 
retain more highly motivated board members? Do director stock options motivate 
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board members to dedicate more time to board service? Are retired executives more 
motivated than current executives?  What are the antecedents to strong board effort 
norms? 
 Future board researchers should plunge into investigating firstly the measures for 
independence.   Research into the measures of independence because it is 
assumed that independence related to individuals that do not own shares or the 
individual is not employed with the organisation.  Are there other criteria that require 
application to assess the level of independence?  Especially, in the Public Sector are 
appointed primarily on political affiliation and particular mandates.    
 Board research could also focus on look at independence from the perspective 
cognitive conflict, and cohesiveness.       
 Boardroom behaviour is also very important. Future researchers can observe and 
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 Eradicating some limitations mentioned in the previous section above would be the 
first and most appropriate place to begin future research.  
  
6.5.3 Practical significance  
 
 For example, further research is required to develop an impact assessment review 
of key decisions over a period of six months to a year.  An assessment rubric to 
guide the review of key decisions is developed.  Some of the criteria to be used in 
the assessment is the type of decision, decision impact, effects and lessons drawn.  
The tested instrument can be used practically by boards in the reflective process to 
improve board decision quality and consequentially result in board development. 
 Different companies can have different board compositions that are appropriate. 
Further studies can be taken up to see which board composition is suitable for 
different companies which are in different stages of the life cycle (starters, fast 
growth, mature, etc). Besides composition, other factors like number of meetings, 
the time for which they last, the attendance records of independent directors, the 
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number of agenda items in the board meeting, etc., are also important and can be 
included in the future studies.   
 Strong substitution effects are present amongst the various aspects of governance 
conduct. Substitution between monitoring by the outside directors and the large 
shareholders, as well as monitoring by the inside directors in determining the 
performance can be studied. 
 
A second limitation of this study is findings are generalizable only to publicly sector 
entities that have boards (Schedule 1, 2 & 3). This may imply results are generalizable 
only to South African public sector entities with more sophisticated commitments to 
board governance, as evidenced by their commitment to membership in an organization 
dedicated to improving board governance. 
A final limitation is common source bias. The use of board directors and company 
secretaries as the only source of data may have inflated the results found here. Future 
research should attempt to overcome this limitation and the others discussed here by 
implementing this study in a new sample. 
 
6.6 Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter, the results were discussed, and conclusions were drawn. Some 
recommendations were also presented. From this, it was evident that the measure may 
be valuable for use in the financial industry. As all the research goals were achieved, 
this concludes the study. In the following pages, the references are presented as well as 
the annexures. 
From the literature review eight variables that were thought to influence board activism 
and board decision quality in Public Entities were identified. These variables include, 
namely, board structure variables, board independence, five board process related 
variables including, effort norms, functional area knowledge, cognitive conflict, 
cohesiveness, information quality, and two board outcomes variables, namely, board 
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activism and board decision quality.  Studies covering all the eight variables, meanings, 
definitions, linkages and associations were identified.  The variables were specified into 
causal connections to form the hypothesised relationships.  
The orientation of chapter 2 was to demonstrate that all the hypothesised relationships 
were conceptually derived the first requirement for model development. At the end of 
Chapter 2 a model was provided that illustrated how the hypothesised relationships 
were integrated to explain board decision quality was proposed. 
The operationalisation of variables was covered in chapter 1, the development of a 
conceptual framework in chapter 2 that influenced the research design and sampling 
plan in chapter 3.   Operationalisation of the variables is achieved through the research 
problem, significance of the study, research questions, and problem statement. 
 
Different data sources were used to build the model.  Figure 4.2 gave a synopsis of the 
different data sources and the methodologies used to acquire the data. As has already 
been mentioned, the research was carried out in two stages. First, the research 
involved an exploratory study to determine the factors that influence board decision 
quality in Public Entities in South Africa.  This process involved in-depth interviews and 
focus group interviews in order to gain insight and identify variables that were public 
sector specific and not covered in the literature. The data from the interviews with board 
members were structured and organised thematically to yield information with regards 
to the factors that influence board decision quality.  
 
The first stage of the research was also concerned with case study selection. Additional 
information about case study organisations, Public Entities was gathered and used to 
determine defining characteristics of the cases. In the second stage of the research, an 
electronic survey was used to gather data from 289 Public Entities (Schedule 1, 2 and 
3) in 4 case study organisations so that the model proposed in Chapter 2 could be 
tested.  
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Chapter 3 dealt with the operational definition of variables and constructs of proposed 
relationships in the model. The nature and the direction of the hypothesised 
relationships as illustrated in figure 3.4. The reliability of the constructs was examined. 
The nature of the research questions presented in Chapter 1 and 3 and the 
methodological procedures used for collecting data (qualitative and quantitative) are 
evidence that this study, in its attempt to develop theory, spans the two philosophical 
paradigm. Expanding this thinking, the study has adopted both the phenomenological 
and positivist approaches in order to offset the limitations of any one approach. The 
presentation of results in different research phases demonstrates this. 
With the methodological issues dealt with, Chapter 5 presented the results of both the 
first phase of the research.  At the end of Chapter 4 a cross-case analysis was 
presented that examined how the four case study organisations varied in terms of board 
process variables, board activism and board decision quality.  
The results of the second stage of the research were presented in Chapters 5.  In this 
Chapter the hypothesised relationships in the proposed model were tested. This 
allowed a comparison between theory and the real world to occur. Because of this, it 
was easy to determine whether the data corresponded to the real life situation. 
In the foregoing paragraphs, the link between the Chapters has been provided. The rest 
of this Chapter is concerned with the discussion relating to conclusions about the 
hypotheses and the research questions. This Chapter also seeks to relate the theory 
with findings reported in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Section 6.2 presents the conclusion for 
each hypothesis. The conclusions about the research questions are presented in 
section 6.3.  
In agreement with this thinking the implications of this study for practitioners together 
with a list of recommendations for refining and improving board decision quality practice 
are provided in section 6.4. Finally, sections 6.5 and 6.6 deal with the limitations of the 
study and future areas of research respectively. 
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APPENDIX A: PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
INFORMED CONSENT 
 
I hereby agree to participate in the research on the role of internal branding in creating 
sustainable competitive advantage, from the employee’s perspective. I understand that 
my participation is voluntary. I also understand that I can stop participating at any 
point should I not want to continue and that this decision will not in any way affect me 
and the organization negatively. 
 
I understand that this is a research project whose purpose is not necessarily to benefit 
me personally in the immediate or short term. 
 
I understand that my participation will remain confidential. 
 
 
……………………………..     …………………………….. 
Signature of participant     Date 
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ANNEXURE B 
The Privacy, Anonymity and Confidentiality Pledge 
 
Every person has the right to privacy. This research will violate privacy only to the minimum 
degree necessary and only for legitimate research purposes.  
I, the researcher will protect all the information from you the research participants from public 
disclosure. 
The information from the respondents will only be used for the research and not for any other 
purposes.  
 
I, the researcher, will use codes to protect the identity of all the respondents and the business. 
You can at any stage in this research refuse to be interviewed or to answer any question. 
 
You, as the respondent, will remain anonymous and nameless in all the documentation of this 
research.  
I, the researcher, will hold the information about you the respondent in confidence and keep it 
away from the public 
 
Even as the details of the case are given, you the respondent’s identity and the business’s 
identity is protected and remains unknown to the readers of the case. 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
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Shamila Singh  
Researcher 
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ANNEXURE C:  BOARD DECISION QUALITY SURVEY 
 
05 November 2012 
 
Dear Research Participant, 
 
I am conducting research on the process of board decision quality and its relationship to 
effort norms and board activism.  
 
Kindly assist in the research by filling in the attached questionnaire.  All responses will 
be strictly confidential and data will be presented only in an aggregate and responses 
will not be attributed to a particular respondent.     
 
 
Completed questionnaires should be kindly returned by the end of the workshop.  For 
any enquiries relating to the questionnaire, please contact the researcher, Shamila 
Singh on +27823791908 or at shamila.singh1@gmail.com. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Shamila Singh 
Doctoral Student  
School of Business Leadership, UNISA 
South Africa 
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To the respondents 
Thank you very much for your willingness to join this survey. This survey is being conducted for 
research purposes of a doctoral degree on board decision quality with a view to understanding 
corporate governance practices across State-owned enterprises in South Africa.  The survey is 
asking questions on the practices in your firm, regardless of the laws and regulations. Your 
accurate and frank response is key.  The results will be used only for research purposes and be 
presented only in aggregate without being revealed by individual entity 
 
To be answered by the company secretary or any officer in charge of governance matters 
(shareholder relations, public disclosure, assisting outside directors, etc.) 
 
Please check () the appropriate parentheses or express the extent to which you agree or 
disagree on the given statement by choosing (circling) one of the following: 
5 = strongly agree 
4 = agree 
3 = Not sure 
2 = disagree 
1 strongly disagree 
 
 
Research Questionnaire 
 
Please tick the appropriate box: 
Gender 
 
Age 
 
Male Female 
21 - 30 31 - 40 41 - 50 51 - 60 60 - 65 65 and above 
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Highest Qualification 
 
 
Number of years with your Institution  
 
 
Your employer 
 
V 
 
Indicate by ticking which types of board sub-committees exist in your organisation  
 
 Remunerations Committee  
 Audit Committee 
 Risk Committee 
 Ethics Committee 
 IT  Governance Committee  
 
Other (please indicate) ____________________________________ 
Nature of board member:       current participation previous participation 
On average how many times does the board meet per annum:  ________________? 
Your position in the company_____________________________ 
Bachelors Degree Masters Degree 
Less than 1 year 1-2 years 3-5 years 6-10 years 11 years and above 
Doctoral Degree 
Business Owner  Non-government  Private Company Public Entity Government 
Diploma Nil 
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Executive   Non-executive  
INSTRUCTIONS 
Kindly follow the below mentioned instructions to complete the mini-survey below. 
 
*Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements by ticking the 
appropriate box: 
*Kindly indicate the extent to which this is important to the decision making process  
Corporate Governance Questionnaire 
Board Activism is defined as a measure of the scope of a board’s activities and the degree to which a 
board is involved in the affairs of the organisation (Zahra and Pearce, 1987).   
Please rate the extent to which board members as a group perform each of the board activities 
listed below:  
1. Attend board meetings  1 2 3 4 5 
2. Attend committee meetings  1 2 3 4 5 
3. Read board reports prior to meetings  1 2 3 4 5 
4. Advise and counsel the CEO outside of board meetings  1 2 3 4 5 
5. Formally evaluate the CEO’s performance on a periodic basis  1 2 3 4 5 
6. Discuss management succession planning  1 2 3 4 5 
7. Request specific information not normally included in board 
reports  
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Determine or request specific agenda topics for board meetings 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Ask discerning questions during board or committee meetings 
about 
 
 
    
9.1 Financial results and reasons for variances 1 2 3 4 5 
9.2 Operating results and reasons for variances  1 2 3 4 5 
9.3 Firm strategy or its business model 1 2 3 4 5 
9.4 Proposed mergers or acquisitions 1 2 3 4 5 
9.5 Internal control strengths and weaknesses  1 2 3 4 5 
9.6 Human capital issues  1 2 3 4 5 
9.7 Corporate culture and ethical conduct       
      
 
  
 
Use of skills and expertise: The use of expertise “refers to the board’s ability to tap the knowledge and 
skills available to it and then apply them to its tasks” (Forbes and Milliken, 1999: 495) 
10. All members of this board apply their skills and capabilities to assure the 1 2 4 4 5 
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greatest contribution to the tasks of the board 
11. The company’s executives actively seek to involve the board members in key 
strategic processes and decisions 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Committee assignments are made with the intention of ensuring the best use for 
each director’s skills and capabilities 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. During board discussions the most knowledgeable members of the board, 
regarding the subject area under discussion, generally have the most influence 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. All board members have a good understanding of the skills and capabilities of 
the other board members  
1 2 3 4 5 
15. The board consults outside experts as and when needed 1 2 3 4 5 
16. The board is confident in identifying risks 1 2 3 4 5 
17. The knowledge and skills of board members are updated  1 2 3 4 5 
 
Cognitive conflict:  “Disagreement about the content of the tasks being performed, including differences 
in viewpoints, ideas and opinions.” (Jehn, 1995: 258 & McNulty and Peck, 2010) 
18. All board and executive team members have ample opportunity to constructively 
challenge and debate decision brought to the board 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. The culture within the board room encourages board members to express their 
disagreements and concerns when issues are presented to the board 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. Board member deliberations are based upon a healthy discussion of facts 1 2 3 4 5 
21. The board is able to reach collectively shared decisions following a full and frank 
debate 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. All board members have ample opportunity to influence the decisions made by 
the board  
1 2 3 4 5 
23. During board meetings, the board chair creates an environment where all board 
members are comfortable expressing their opinions without fear of retribution or 
embarrassment. 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. Discussions are open and candid 1 2 3 4 5 
25. There is personality clashes among directors 1 2 3 4 5 
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26. Relationships among members are best described as "win-lose" 1 2 3 4 5 
 
“Effort Norms are a group level construct that refers to the group’s shared beliefs regarding the level  of 
effort each individual is expected to put towards a task” (Forbes and Milliken, 1999: 493) 
To what extent does the board clearly communicate to its members that all directors are 
expected to do the following: 
27. Carefully scrutinise board information prior to meetings  1 2 3 4 5 
28. Research important issues relevant to the company  1 2 3 4 5 
29. Takes notes during meetings  1 2 3 4 5 
30. Participate actively during meetings  1 2 3 4 5 
31. Invest whatever time is necessary to become an informed and active board 
member 
1 2 3 4 5 
32.Question management or other board members when necessary  1 2 3 4 5 
33. The decisions taken at the board meetings are based on research, factual 
information and much debate and discussion 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
Effective decision control depends on whether directors are independent of executive management 
(Fama, 1980; Young et al., 2000) 
Board Independence 
34. Do you believe “independent directors” of your company are truly independent 
from the CEO or controlling shareholders? 
1 2 3 4 5 
35. What do you think about the following reasons for “independent directors’ not 
being fully independent from the CEO or the controlling owner? 
1 2 3 4 5 
35.1. Because the CEO has effectively selected the board members 1 2 3 4 5 
35.2 Because of concern over personal relationships with other directors  1 2 3 4 5 
35.3 Because openly objecting to the management-proposed agenda is viewed as an 
act contrary to behavioural norm 
1 2 3 4 5 
35.4 Because the CEO will decide the extension or termination of the directorship 1 2 3 4 5 
35.5 Because of the concern of possible responsibility/blame when their views turn 
out to be wrong in the future 
1 2 3 4 5 
35.6 Because the CEO and management team are supposed to be better informed 1 2 3 4 5 
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on most issues and have better judgment 
 
Information quality is the board’s ability to provide meaningful oversight and useful advice is determined 
by the quality, timeliness and credibility of the information it has (Thomas, Schrage, Bellin and Marcotte, 
2009) 
36. Data to make decisions is available or easily and quickly retrievable 
(accessibility) 
1 2 3 4 5 
37. The volume of data is appropriate, applicable and helpful for the task at hand 
(relevancy). 
1 2 3 4 5 
38. The data is not missing and is of sufficient breadth and depth for the task at 
hand. 
1 2 3 4 5 
39. The extent to which data is compactly (concisely) represented. 1 2 3 4 5 
40. The extent to which data is regarded as true, credible and reliable (objectivity) 1 2 3 4 5 
41. The extent to which information is available in time to perform the task at hand 
(timeliness). 
1 2 3 4 5 
42. The extent to which data is easily comprehended (understandability). 1 2 3 4 5 
43.The extent to which data is beneficial and provides advantages from its use 
(value-add) 
1 2 3 4 5 
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